Spring 1-1-2011

Environmental Saviors? The Effectiveness of Nonprofit Organizations in Greater Yellowstone

David Neil Cherney
University of Colorado at Boulder, david.cherney@colorado.edu

ENVIRONMENTAL SAVIORS?
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN GREATER YELLOWSTONE

by

David Neil Cherney

B.A., Claremont McKenna College, 2002

M.E.M., Yale University, 2005

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Environmental Studies Program
2011

This thesis entitled:
Environmental Saviors?
The Effectiveness of Nonprofit Organizations in Greater Yellowstone
written by David N. Cherney
has been approved for the Department of Environmental Studies

_____
Roger A. Pielke Jr.

_____
Sam Fitch

Date _____

The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.

IRB protocol # 10-0187

Cherney, David Neil (Ph.D., Environmental Studies Program)

Environmental Saviors?
The Effectiveness of Nonprofit Organizations in Greater Yellowstone.

Thesis directed by Professor Roger A. Pielke Jr.

ABSTRACT

Over the last ten years, environmentalists have levied serious critiques of environmental nonprofits—specifically that environmental groups are struggling to make an impact. Critiques include accusations of dubious behavior on the part of environmental groups in developing countries, charges that the environmental elite are more interested in maintaining an affluent lifestyle than achieving organizational goals, and allegations that environmental nonprofits lack the strategies necessary to meet their purposes. This dissertation looks at the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem as a case study to answer the question: *How can environmental nonprofits do better?*

The Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community consists of 183 conservation nonprofits that command a combined annual budget of $150 million, have 500 employees, and are overseen by 700 board members. Despite these tremendous resources, the status quo performance of Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits falls short in many ways. These organizations have the potential to drastically improve the realization of conservation outcomes. To understand why performance is lacking, this analysis first looks to experienced conservation practitioners. The resulting four explanatory factors are called 'the holy trinity (plus one) of environmental nonprofit failure.' While useful in explaining some failures to achieve conservation goals, conventional wisdom is insufficient to leverage greater performance alone. Six alternative explanations are presented by analyzing the role of nonprofits

in bison, elk, grizzly bear, pronghorn migration, snowmobile, and wolf management. The central finding is that environmental nonprofits artificially and unnecessarily restrict the scope of choices available to them. By doing so, these nonprofits miss important opportunities and are less likely to achieve their current and future goals.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

> I come before you tonight both as a lover and a critic of the conservation movement, as one who is at once proud of our past accomplishments and disappointed by them, troubled about the future of the movement and hopeful for it. I stand here….with great pride, and yet my pride is tempered by my concern for the future of this fine movement. I catch myself wondering if future historians will say that our time was the beginning or the beginning of the end of the environmental cause.
>
> Morris K. Udall, 1974

> America has run a 40-year experiment on whether…mainstream environmentalism can succeed, and the results are now in.
>
> James Gustav Speth, 2008

This dissertation is motivated by a simple question. *How can environmental nonprofits do better?*

Over the last ten years, I worked for and with a diverse group of nonprofits. These organizations varied in strategy (e.g. advocacy, litigation, research, education, direct services) and in topical expertise (e.g. health care, homeless, disabled citizens, environmental conservation). The sundry of organizations I worked with share more than the legal designation of nonprofit within the United States. Each organization represents a coalition of individual citizens—no different than you and me—voluntarily banding together towards a common cause.

A central challenge for nonprofits and their funders is the attribution of nonprofit success. How do we know these organizations are effectively pursuing outcomes they purport to care about? Often simple quantitative metrics cannot measure the outcomes these organizations claim to seek. Yet, this challenge is more important today than ever. Over 1.4 million nonprofits currently register with the United States Internal Revenue Service declaring combined annual revenue of $1.4 trillion. These organizations permeate virtually every aspect of our lives:

education, healthcare, religious, and more. We need to learn how these organizations can do better.

One of my earliest professional experiences in the environmental movement was as an intern for the Santa Monica Baykeeper, an enforcement and research based environmental nonprofit in southern California. One of the projects I worked on entailed creating proposals for new marine protected areas through California's Marine Life Protection Act. As part of our strategic process, we held closed door meetings with six other environmental nonprofits to discuss our collective strategy in advancing our coalition's agenda. I remember being incredibly excited for my first meeting. I was a recent college graduate, finally part of the professional environmental club. The actual meeting shocked me. In fact, I was sickened. I left with a visceral distaste for the reality of my new found profession.

The coalition's meeting focused on one thing: how to destroy the recreational fishermen's agenda. Some of my colleagues spent hours discussing—with great distain—about the vile nature of people who viewed fishing as a legitimate pursuit, let alone a sport. The policy objectives of the recreational fishing industry were never discussed in that meeting. However, one thing was clear. We must not let them win.

I sat in that first meeting conflicted. I was an environmentalist. I still am. I was also a recreational fisherman. I still am. I saw no conflict between the two identities. For many of my colleagues, the division could not be more distinct. In that meeting, I nervously (and perhaps foolishly) asked why we had not tried working with the recreational fishing industry to advance our collective agendas. After all, recreational fishermen were not completely opposed to new marine protected areas. Our respective coalitions differed in the proposed locations of new

protected areas. Perhaps a compromise would make our public positions stronger? I was laughed out of the room.

In 2004, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger's essay "The Death of Environmentalism" sent a ripple through the environmental movement. Nordhaus and Shellenberger and argued that "today environmentalism is just another special interest." They contend that environmentalists have arbitrarily determined what issues should be legitimate 'environmental' topics, and in the process ignored pertinent issues that could help secure lasting environmental outcomes. Lasting outcomes need broad, long-term public support. The failure for natural allies to work together, such as environmental marine nonprofits and recreational fishermen in southern California, is problematic for long term conservation success. The frequent divisive interactions between mainstream environmental nonprofits and the hook-and-bullet clubs is just one example of lost opportunity for improved environmental outcomes.

When I tell most people that my dissertation focuses on nonprofit effectiveness, the first question most people ask is, "Well…what organizations are effective?" Of course, this is a reasonable question. As I push these individuals in conversation to why they want to know the answer, the most frequent response is these individuals want to know where their limited resources (personal donations) will do the most good. Again, this is a rational response. Individuals looking for a scorecard of which organizations are "effective" or "ineffective" will be disappointed by this dissertation. This dissertation demands more of the reader than simply dispensing information.

In 1971, Harold D. Lasswell declared that the purpose of scientific inquiry is "freedom through insight." Rather than using science to restrict the scope of choices we have in decision making, scientific thought should be used to expand the available choices to us. In the spirit of

Lasswell, the central purpose of this dissertation is to expand the range of choices nonprofits have in realizing their goals. This dissertation is intended to help nonprofit organizations, particularly environmental nonprofits, better understand the challenges and choice they face.

I owe a large intellectual debt to a number of individuals. First, I must thank my committee chair Roger A. Pielke Jr. who sharpened my critical thinking skills beyond what I thought possible. His invaluable guidance helped me streamline and clarify my arguments for application to the widest possible audience. Committee member Susan G. Clark introduced me to the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, and has served as a professor, mentor and good friend for the past eight years. My other committee members deserve special thanks for the time and effort they generously contributed to my graduate development: Sam Fitch, Krister Andersson, and Bill Travis. I would be remiss if I failed to thank Bill Ascher for introducing me to the policy sciences. Ron Brunner and Garry Brewer provided valuable insight from the inception of this project. I am also indebted to colleges who helped shape my understanding of conservation in Greater Yellowstone, including Jason Wilmot, Dave Mattson, Murray Rutherford, Rich Wallace, Doug Clark, Michael DelloBuono, Justin Westrum, Lydia Dixon, Jonathan Schechter, and Christina Cromley Bruner. Jason Vogel and Shali Mohleji also graciously served as a sounding board for many of the ideas in this manuscript.

I would also like to recognize the generous support of a number of organizations. The Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative (NRCC) served as a regional host for my research. NRCC's ability to convene and facilitate high level discussions on conservation topics is unlike any other organization I have encountered. The Morris K. Udall foundation provided generous financial assistance for my final year of writing. Additional financial assistance and in kind support were provided by The University of Colorado's Center for Science and Technology

Policy Research, Center for Humanities and Arts, and Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences.

I owe the greatest debt and thanks to my parents James and Linda Cherney for their understanding and encouragement in helping me pursue my dreams. I would not be here today without their support. Lastly, but certainly not least, my brother Michael's friendship, humor, and continued encouragement help push me through the difficult times of this project.

Chapter 1: Environmental Saviors?

Do environmental outcomes matter to conservation nonprofits?

While an emphatic 'yes' is the answer we might expect, numerous examples suggest otherwise. If environmental outcomes mattered to conservation nonprofits, why would:

- The Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council support the Kerry-Lieberman Climate Bill, which increases subsidies to the fossil fuel industry by more than $100 billion? (Anda 2010).
- The Nature Conservancy engage in land deals that increases natural gas and housing development in ecologically sensitive areas? (Ottaway and Stephens 2003a).
- The Audubon Society, Conservation International, and Environmental Defense Fund partner with major environmental polluters such BP (AWWI 2010)? And, why would such organizations actively defend these partnerships in the face of environmental disasters, such the Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (e.g. Tereck 2010)?

With such evidence, it is easy for us to rush to judgment and attribute sinister motivations to these environmental organizations. We do not need to look far to find examples of environmentalists casting stones at their own house. In 2008, Christine MacDonald's *Green, Inc.* chastised major environmental groups for having "abandoned their missions" and "selling out" to corporate interests (236). Jeffery St. Clair (2007) accused the environmental movement of becoming "what it once despised: a risk-aversive, depersonalized, hyper-analytical, humorless, access-driven, intolerant, centralized, technocratic, dealmaking, passionless, direct-mailing, lawyer-laden monolith to mediocrity." James "Gus" Speth (2008) charges that the environmental movement currently faces a deeply troubling paradox, arguing "our environmental organizations have grown in strength and sophistication, but the environment has continued to go downhill."

He believes that the current strategies employed by environmental nonprofits are not sufficient to secure the environmental future these organizations seek.

My opening question is intentionally inflammatory. *Of course, conservation nonprofits care about environmental outcomes*. It is almost unfathomable to argue otherwise. At first glance, the critiques of MacDonald, St. Clair, and Speth further fan the flames. However, we must consider these criticisms in context. There is an ongoing struggle in the environmental movement to answer two simple questions: What is a pro-environmental outcome? And, what are the most effective means to secure them?

I posed these two questions to the individuals I interviewed for this manuscript. A staff member of largest regional nonprofit in Greater Yellowstone responded with a representative answer. He stated, "If it walks like a duck, if it talks like duck, then it must be a duck." To many people pro-environmental outcomes are hard to describe, but patently obvious. The walks-like-a-duck argument implies that is not worth our time to think about these types of questions. Environmentalists simply know what is good for the environment. There is logic to this response. We do not need much information to understand that the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the Exxon Valdez disaster were environmentally destructive outcomes. More generally, we know that the extinction of a species is a far cry from the type of environmental results most conservationists desire. Likewise, it takes little thought to come to the conclusion that the passage of the 1970 National Environmental Protection Act was a pro-environmental victory. Similarly, we know that environmentalists tend to view the purchasing and protection of private lands to be pro-environmental outcomes.

There are many instances where environmental successes and failures are self-evident. However, environmental outcomes are more often muddled in shades of grey, rather than black

and white instances of victory and failure. Why might an environmental nonprofit, such as The Nature Conservancy, partner with a major environmental polluter? Many environmental organizations believe that changing corporate behavior is best achieved through educating and informing executives on environmentally responsible business practices rather than forcing such corporations into compliance. This rationale is similar to the old adage: keep your friends close and your enemies closer. Competing environmental priorities also cause environmental outcomes to be clouded in shades of grey. For example, what happens when a solar plant threatens the viability of endangered species (e.g. Woody 2009)? Which environmental outcome should take precedence: saving a species or decarbonizing our economy? You will likely receive very different answers from staff members of the environmental nonprofits Defenders of Wildlife and Clean Energy Now.

Over the past 10 years, the effectiveness of environmental nonprofits have come under increased scrutiny. The most notable incident was a series of *Washington Post* articles, in 2003, highly critical of The Nature Conservancy. The Nature Conservancy is the largest environmental nonprofit in the world. The organization's revenue in 2006 ($1.2 billion) was greater than the combined revenues of the five next largest environmental nonprofits. The *Washington Post* questioned the organization's transparency in financial management, willingness to report organizational failures, and strategic oversight (Ottoway and Stephens 2003a; 2003b; Stephens 2003; Stephens and Ottoway 2003a; 2003b).

More importantly from the perspective of this manuscript, numerous critiques of environmental organizations have also come from within the environmental movement. Mac Chapin (2004) highlighted dubious behavior on the part of environmental nonprofits in developing countries. Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger (2004; 2007) explicitly called

into doubt the ability of environmental nonprofits to achieve their desired outcomes. Jeffery St. Clair (2003; 2008) and Mark Dowie (1991; 1996) suggest that environmentalists are struggling to make an impact. Christine MacDonald (2008) argues that the environmental elite are more interested in maintaining an affluent lifestyle than achieving organizational goals. Gus Speth (2008) believes that modern environmental organizations have largely failed at meeting their purposes. The failure to clarify what constitutes an environmental outcome and what are effective organizational strategies are often central to such inquiries.

Opponents of the environmental movement hoist these accounts as evidence environmentalism has gone wrong. Such interpretations twist the facts and intentions of these critics. In a 2004 speech at the Common Wealth Club in San Francisco, Adam Werbach, the youngest ever president of the Sierra Club, gave a chilling assessment of the environmental movement. In anticipation to the responses of detractors Werbach (2004) asserted, "My critique is not with those of us who have put our hearts into this thing we love—it's with those who want to freeze environmentalism in the 1970s and not let it evolve." In 1974, Senator Morris K. Udall gave a similar speech to the National Wildlife Federation entitled "The Environment at Valley Forge." In his address, Udall asserted that American environmentalism needed more "critical lovers" of the environmental movement. By critical lovers he meant self-reflective and vocal individuals who are willing challenge mainstream environmentalism in pursuit of a simple goal: trying to find ways to do better.

Consistent with the goal of being a critical lover, this dissertation explores why conservation nonprofits often have trouble securing the environmental outcomes they desire. I use the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem as a case study to understand two questions:

- Why do conservation nonprofits often fail to meet their goals?

- And, how can these organizations do better?

The purpose of this analysis is to encourage thoughtful reflection and strategic thinking on high order factors hindering the success of conservation nonprofits. This analysis is not intended to develop a causal model of why certain nonprofits have failed to achieve their organizational mission, determine what makes one nonprofit 'better' than another, or develop a theory of the 'perfect' structure for a nonprofit or nonprofit community. Rather, this analysis is concerned with institutional barriers to environmental nonprofit success. Nonprofit scholar Stephen Block (2004: x) contends that "common problem-solving approaches may not always work and that we may need to use other frameworks to see problems in a different light." He believes we need to expand our viewpoint to consider nontraditional explanations of why nonprofits fail. This viewpoint does not invalidate the work of other nonprofit scholars. Rather than dismiss past findings, the challenge for a nonprofit manager is finding the most applicable explanation for nonprofit failure within the context they are working. This manuscript continues Block's call to expand our available choices by considering nontraditional explanations for organizational failure.

1.1 Why care about (environmental) nonprofits?

The last half century witnessed an explosion of nonprofits in both the United States and abroad. In 1940, less than 13,000 nonprofits registered with the United States' Internal Revenue Service (Hall 2006). To date, more than 1.4 million nonprofit organizations register with the agency, declaring more than $1.4 trillion in revenue and $3.2 trillion in assets (Wing et al 2008). The American nonprofit community—often referred to as the third sector—equates to over one-tenth of the United States' gross domestic product. Political scientist and historian Akira Iriye (1999: 424) argues that to ignore the influence of NGOs [non-governmental organizing] in both

world and domestic politics "is to misread the history of the twentieth-century world." Lester Salamon (1994: 109) agrees that "[t]he proliferations of these groups may be permanently altering the relationship between states and citizens."

Whereas the upsurge of non-governmental organizations is a relatively recent phenomenon, such associations have a deep rooted history in the United States. Alexis de Tocqueville (1901: 593-4) noted in his landmark study of democracy in America:

> Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminutive….I met with several kinds of associations in America, of which I confess I had no previous notion; and I have often admired the extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object to the exertions of a great many men, and in getting them voluntarily to pursue it.

While some authors suggest de Tocqueville overstated his case (Hall, 2006), the role of non-governmental organizations in the history of politics in the United States is undisputed. The Freemasons, a voluntary secret society, was instrumental in networking early American leaders during the Revolutionary War. The Underground Railroad and the American Anti-Slavery Society were critical in the abolition of slavery. The National Woman Suffrage Association and the American Woman Suffrage Association played important roles in securing women the right to vote. This is not to say the history of all non-governmental organizations in the United States is benevolent by today's moral standards (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). The formation and actions of groups such as the Ku Klux Clan, Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, and the World Church of the Creator have also had lasting impacts on American society.

The fundamental characteristics that define an organization or association as non-governmental is contested. Interpreting the term at face value would describe just about any association of individuals outside of government; Environmental organizations such as The

Nature Conservancy, for-profit ventures such as Exxon Mobil, and political parties such as Democratic Party would all fall under the NGO umbrella. Most scholars of NGOs refine the term to include only nonprofit associations, but further consensus on distilling the term is lacking. Some researchers exclude non-international organizations (Werker and Ahmend, 2008), political parties (Iriye, 1999), violent associations (Beyer 2007), or other nonproprietary groups (Yamin 2001). Peter Dobkin Hall (2006: 32) notes, "None of the contemporary definitions does justice to the complex historical development of these entities." He asserts that a definition is "at best, of only temporary usefulness."

For the purpose of this dissertation, the scope of analysis focuses on NGOs who register with the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as a charity or nonprofit. Nonprofits are organizations incorporated (formally recognized by the government) to pursue charitable goals without financial benefit. There are two major reasons for selectively targeting these organizations. First, nonprofits have an explicit contract with the American people to pursue objectives in the public good in exchange for their special status with the IRS. The special status a nonprofit may enjoy includes exception from taxation, the ability to accept public funding, protection of personal liability from the nonprofits debts and liabilities, and more depending on the nonprofit's specific designation with the IRS. Second, nonprofits that register with the IRS are the most organized, well-funded, and influential environmental nongovernmental organizations in Greater Yellowstone. These organizations by definition are supported by more than one person—either through donations, staff, or board of directors. In other words, this analysis is concerned with organizations that are supported by a collection of likeminded citizens who are attempting to influence environmental outcomes in the public good.

Learning how environmental nonprofits can improve their practices has significant implications for individuals with no interest in the environment. It is nearly impossible to name a major issue of social relevance in the United States that is not associated with multitude of nonprofits. There are approximately 78,000 nonprofits registered with the IRS that focused on education; 50,000 on healthcare related issues; 45,000 on community improvement and capacity building; 43,000 on arts, humanities in culture; and, the list goes on (Wing et al 2008).[1] The lessons in the manuscript are not isolated to the environmental movement. In discussions with colleagues in other substantive fields, they recognize similar dynamics to what I highlight in this manuscript occurring in their areas of interest. The broad question is *how can we better use civic groups (nonprofits) to reach democratic ideals?*

The role nonprofits play in modern society is complex and nuanced. What is clear, however, is that nonprofits' role in politics and democratic discourse is increasingly contested. It is routine across the political spectrum to dismiss opposing groups' views as simply 'narrow special interests.' There is a general sentiment what we should limit the influence of special interest groups in democratic discourse. For example, in the 2010 mid-term elections, the Obama Administration's Press Secretary Robert Gibbs stated that unnamed donations to nonprofits—particular from foreign sources—is "a threat to our democracy" (Wagner 2010) The administration accused Republicans of improperly using such donations to influence the election (Lichtblau 2010). Similarly, in 2008, Senator Inhofe (R-OK) released a report entitled *Political Activity of Environmental Groups and Their Supporting Foundations* (USSEWPC 2008). The senator argued environmental nonprofits are illegitimate stealth advocates for the Democratic Party despite the fact environmental organizations claim to serve public interests. The implication of such arguments is that advocacy groups improperly impact political and policy

[1] This list only includes nonprofits that reported more than $25,000 in annual revenue with the IRS in 2005.

outcomes. The contract that the American people have with nonprofit organizations, through the IRS, rightly limits the activities various activities that tax-exempt organizations can engage in. For example, the IRS has strict guidelines over what constitutes 'lobbying.' Nonprofits that fail to comply with IRS' lobbying rules can find themselves in hot water. Social negotiations over such rules are expected and should be encouraged. The American public has the right to determine the terms of the social contract.

While most nonprofits like to frame themselves as being "non-advocacy" or "nonpartisan," all nonprofits are advocacy groups by definition. Individuals that band together in pursuit of a common cause are engaged in advocacy—they seek to effect political or policy outcomes. This includes nonprofits such as hospitals, schools, and community groups. For example, a nonprofit hospital is an advocate for improved health outcomes; a school is an advocate for educational outcomes. A hospital's advocacy for improved health outcomes might share broader public support than a group in favor or opposed to Obamacare. However a hospital seeking to achieve its mission is engaged in advocacy. Advocacy does not necessarily mean attempting to influence the political process, although that is one strategy that some groups try to employee. Advocacy is an attempt to influence outcomes in the policy process. Such outcomes are possible outside of the confines of the political process. How modern nonprofits aid or detract from democratic standards such as effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the public agenda, and inclusiveness is impacts us all. Learning the role that conservation nonprofits play in Greater Yellowstone's policy process can help draw insight to how the rise of nonprofits is impacting the American democratic system.

1.2 Environmental nonprofits

Many environmentalists consider the early 1970s as birth of the modern environmental movement, often declaring its inception on April 22, 1970—the first earth day. However, the history of environmental nonprofits in the United States is much richer.[2] The Boone and Crocket Club, established in 1887, is the second oldest modern environmental nonprofit in the United States.[3] President Theodore Roosevelt and fellow conservationists founded the organization to eliminate the unregulated killing of wildlife in North America, specifically hunting within Yellowstone's boundaries. Conservationists continued to organize their efforts in subsequent years founding the National Audubon Society in 1886 and the Sierra Club in 1892.[4] These nonprofits were instrumental in a number of major environmental victories including the creation of Kings Canyon National Park and the upholding of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.

During this era, often referred to as the first wave of the environmental movement, most conservation nonprofits were founded by sportsmen and naturalists concerned about the future of wildlife in North America. Other modern conservation organizations founded in this period include the Izaak Walton League (1922), Wilderness Society (1935), Duck's Unlimited (1936), and National Wildlife Federation (1936). Membership of these environmental nonprofits was highly skewed toward wealthy and well-educated white men, as conservation was largely

[2] There are two general trends within the environmental movement that we must acknowledge. First, environmental nonprofits are often referred to as 'environmental' at the national and international levels and 'conservation' at the local. Second, nonprofits are often called 'environmental' when referring to liberal organizations and 'conservation' when referring to conservative. Rather than quibble which word label is the most appropriate and engage in a symbolic battle, I freely interchange use of these terms. Rather, I define a conservation/ environmental nonprofit as those organization whose self-defined purpose (e.g. mission) relates to the environment.

[3] The Appalachian Mountain Club (1876) is the oldest environmental nonprofit in the United States. However, I chose to highlight the Boone and Crocket Club, since it was the first environmental nonprofit to focus on Yellowstone—the subject of this analysis.

[4] Many environmental nonprofits have complex histories. The Audubon Society is a perfect example. The Audubon Society was first formed in 1886 by George Bird Grinnell, who wrote an editorial in the February edition of *Forest and Stream* calling on readers join him in creating the Audubon Society. Nearly 40,000 members joined, administratively over taking Grinnell's capacity. Due to the inability to manage such a large following, the group disbanded in 1888. However, a number of individuals formed Audubon Societies at the State level. In 1905, the National Audubon Society was incorporated—the organization that has survived until today.

considered a gentleman's pursuit (Taylor 2002). This era also marks the first major conflicts between environmental nonprofits over what constitutes a pro-environmental outcome, with wise-use conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot and Teddy Roosevelt battling preservationists such as John Muir and Henry Senger (Norton 1991).

The second wave of conservation nonprofits is marked by David Brower' appointment as the first executive director of Sierra Club in 1952 (after serving as an active volunteer and board member since 1941). Brower was fierce advocate for environmental protection and transformed the Sierra Club into one of country's most aggressive environmental nonprofits. In 1966, the Sierra Club took out full page ads in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* advocating against the development of a new dam in the Grand Canyon (Long 2004). The following day, the IRS withdrew the Sierra Club's tax exempt status for engaging in legislative advocacy (Fox 1985). This action enraged many Americans, leading to the doubling of the Sierra Club's membership in the following three years (Ostertag 2006).

Brower's tenure as executive director (1952-1969) coincides with a major shift in American environmentalism. Highly visible environmental disasters, such as the deadly smog episodes in St. Louis (1939), Donora (1948), and London (1952) and the Cuyahoga River Fire (1969) coupled with the publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962), Stewart Udall's *The Quiet Crises* (1963), Ralph Nader's *Unsafe at Any Speed* (1965), and Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* (1968) helped expand the focus of environmental nonprofits beyond simple land and wildlife protection. Pollution and toxins became an important focus. However, the most notable innovation in the environmental nonprofit sector was the rise of both grassroots and litigation-based environmental nonprofits. Examples of grassroots organizations from the period include Friends of the Earth (1969) and Greenpeace (1971). Litigation-based nonprofits include

the Environmental Defense Fund (1967), Natural Resource Defense Council (1970), and Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (1971; renamed Earthjustice in 1997). These organizations were major catalysts in the nationwide ban of the pesticide DDT, vital in networking international organization for the development of the Montreal Protocol, and the primary driver behind the Wilderness Act of 1964. The membership of conservation nonprofits in the 1950s through 1960s still consisted of mostly middle class white Americans (Taylor 2002). However, the membership base exploded during this time (Mackenzie and Weisbrot 2008). Between 1966 and 1979, the combined membership of eight of the most influential nonprofits grew from approximately 439,000 members to more than 707,000 (Fox 1985).[5] By 1975, the total membership in these eight organizations grew to more than 1.2 million people.

The 1980s marks a third transformative period for environmental nonprofits. The movement began to diversity, with a drastic increase in the number of splinter groups focused on issues such as eco-feminism, bioregionalism, environmental justice, and deep ecology (Taylor 2002). However, "wildlife, wilderness, and waterway protection dominated agendas" of mainstream environmental organizations "both in terms of importance of the issues to the organization and the percentage of the organizations resources spent on the issues" (Taylor 2002: 12). However, the sheer growth in size of the environmental nonprofit community is the most notable aspect of this period. The number of environmental nonprofits formally recognized by the Internal Revenue Service increased to more than 10,000 in 2007 (Wing, Pollak and Blackwood 2008). Paul Hawken (2007) estimates that one to two million environmental and social justice nonprofits operate worldwide. These environmental nonprofits actively work on issues such as climate change, energy use, environmental health, genetic engineering, invasive

[5] Environmental Defense Fund, Izaak Walton League, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, National Parks and Conservation Association, National Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and The Wilderness Society.

species, land use change, nanotechnology, nuclear power, overpopulation, pollution and beyond. Learning how these organizations can do better has broad implications for the effectiveness of the environmental movement.

1.3 Greater Yellowstone's conservation organizations

Yellowstone National Park—the world's first national park—was established in 1872 by the United States' Congress as a means to preserve the region's wildlife and unique geological features for the enjoyment of the American people. The region is known for its geologic wonders such as the Old Faithful Geyser and the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone River. Yellowstone is also highly prized for its flagship megafauna, such as bison, elk, grey wolves, and grizzly bears. Yellowstone, however, is much more than just a place and assemblage of wildlife. Yale University's Susan Clark (2008: 1) asserts Yellowstone is also an "idea about nature and our relationship to it, as well as an ethic, calling to mind our responsibility for our world." Noted Yellowstone historian Paul Schullery (1997: 5) agrees emphasizing, "While a lot of people still view it [Yellowstone] as a place where certain things are right to do and others are not, a growing number of people recognize that the park is the site of something much more dynamic in human culture, a kind of perpetual experiment that will never end."

The Yellowstone experiment is a microcosm of the larger American conservation battle over what constitutes a pro-environmental outcome and what strategies are the best means to secure them. Pro-environmental outcomes within the Yellowstone system have varied substantially over time. Perhaps the starkest example is the treatment of predator species within Yellowstone's borders. From 1916 to 1935, Yellowstone implemented a predator control policy to protect the park's elk and bison herds. The result of Yellowstone's policy was the complete extirpation of wolves within the park, with cougars nearly sharing the same fate (Craighead

1991). On January 14, 1995, 14 wolves were reintroduced in Yellowstone (Nystrom 2009). Sixty years had passed since the last wolf sighting in the region (Clark and Minta 1994). Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt declared at the reintroduction, "At last the wolves are coming home, and Yellowstone will be a complete ecosystem....It's an extraordinary achievement and it's an important statement about who we are as Americans" (Milstein 1995). Yellowstone's native ungulates (hoofed mammals) were no longer the defining characteristic of successful conservation; biodiversity was now considered a legitimate conservation target.

The unwritten social negotiation of what constitutes environmental success is primarily carried out through public and private organizations that manage and care about the region. In 1872, Yellowstone National Park was managed by a civilian governmental agency that was authorized no funds by the federal government. As a result, the park's first superintendent Nathaniel Langford was unable to hire a staff to enforce the park's rules (DOI 1916). By today's conservation standards Yellowstone was merely a 'paper park;' a region designed in name only. During this period poaching and other abuses to the landscape were rampant. In 1886, Congress sought to solve this problem by designating the United States Army at the park's official administrator (Whittlesey and Watry 2008). The Army significantly increased law enforcement, helping remedy the challenges of the park's early years. In 1916, the United Park Service was established and Yellowstone was transferred back to civilian management (Wagner 2006).

In the early 1880s, some conservationists believed that Yellowstone was insufficient in size to effectively protect the region's wildlife. In 1882, General Philip Sheridan proposed doubling the size of the park to protect many of the migrating species (Craighead 1991). While Sheridan's proposal (and many others since then) failed to expand Yellowstone, much of the region's landscape was protected by President Benjamin Harrison in 1891 through an executive

order creating the Yellowstone Timberland Reserve. The Timberland Reserve protected approximately an additional 1.2 million acres to the east and south of Yellowstone, in no small part to the effective advocacy of the Boone and Crocket Club (Brinkley 2009). In 1902, the reserve was expanded to 6.5 million acres (three times the size of Yellowstone) and renamed the Yellowstone Forest Reserve. The Forest Service chose to administratively reorganize the land in 1908 into several national forests including the Absaroka, Beartooth, Targhee, and Teton National Forests.

While the term *Greater Yellowstone* first occurred in print in 1919 to describe the public lands beyond Yellowstone's borders, the region's national forests and parks were largely viewed as separate administration until the 1960s (Schullery 2010). In 1964, the National Park Service signed a memorandum of understanding with the Forest Service establishing the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC), a collaborative body that seeks "to pursue opportunities of mutual cooperation and coordination in the management of core federal lands in the Greater Yellowstone." Represented on the committee are the superintendents of two national parks (Yellowstone and Grand Teton), the forest supervisors of six national forests (Beaverhead-Deerlodge, Bridger-Teton, Caribou-Targhee, Custer, Gallatin, and Shoshone), and the managers of two national wildlife refuges (Red Rock Lakes and the National Elk Refuge). The formation of this committee signified a major symbolic shift to manage the region as a single ecosystem. The GYCC calls this region the Greater Yellowstone Area. In 1986, the area encompassed approximately 14 million acres—compared to the mere 2.2 million acres of Yellowstone. Today, many conservationists view the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem as a system larger than the ten major federal landowners. While there is no precise definition, it is generally accepted that the Greater Yellowstone includes up to 20 million acres of federal, state, and private land. All told,

22 different federal and 12 different state organizations/agency units are authorized to make conservation decisions in the region. This figure does not include the 25 county governments and private landowners.

The highly fragmented decision making structure makes it difficult for citizens to effectively engage in the policy process. For example, if you are interested in wolf conservation, one of the first questions you might ask is *who is in charge of managing wolves?* While you might hope for a simple answer, wolf management in Greater Yellowstone is heavily influenced by a vast array of government agencies. Federal agencies include the National Park Service (NPS), U.S. Animal and Plants Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and U.S. National Forest Service (USFS). Major state agencies include Idaho Fish and Game (IFG), Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP), and the Wyoming Game and Fish Department (WGF). If you have a question regarding wolf conservation, it is often puzzling to determine which agency is appropriate to contact.

In response to such complexity, conservation nonprofits have emerged as regional leaders to help solve Greater Yellowstone's conservation failures. While conservation nonprofits have been active in Yellowstone since 1887, the size and scope of the nonprofit community has exploded over the past 25 years. Today there are at least 183 conservation nonprofits who claim to work in the Yellowstone region. Two-thirds of these organizations were founded after 1986 (Figure 1.1). The combined regional annual revenue of these organizations likely exceeds $150 million per year.[6] These organizations employ at least 267 full-time and 175 part-time employees who focus on the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Additionally, there are at least 647 board of

[6] A more detailed description of how I arrived at this figure can be found in Chapter 4 under the subheading "Lack of Resources."

director positions.[7] If we combined paid staff with board of directors, there are nearly 1,100 conservation related positions in the GYE. In short, the mere size of Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community suggests it is a major force for conservation in the region.

Despite the significant resources at the disposal of conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone, these organizations have trouble meeting many of their formally designated goals. Chapter three makes the case that there is room for improvement in the Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community. Irrespective of this analysis, we do not need to look far to find members of the environmental nonprofit community who agree. A staff member at the Natural Resource Defense Council in Livingston, MT states, "A lot of conservation issues [in Greater Yellowstone] are stuck in the mud—they are derailed in their tracks. We need to find new ways to push these issues forwards." An employee of Defenders of Wildlife agrees, "We need to find better ways to work together…our community could be much stronger." A conservationist with the Greater Yellowstone Coalition perhaps says it best, "Over the last 35 years, the players have changed but the issues have stayed the same." Environmental nonprofits are having trouble securing the outcomes they desire.

[7] Employee and founding data was drawn from the Greater Yellowstone Conservation Directory at http://www.gycoi.org



Figure 1.1. The cumulative total and yearly addition of environmental nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone. The data is limited to the 175 of 183 nonprofits for which founding data was available.

1.4 Conclusion and overview

Environmental nonprofits, ranging from the Sierra Club to the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, are uniquely suited to help our society achieve environmental outcomes in the public interest. These organizations do more than 'speak for the trees.' They represent the views of an important segment of the American public who believe that environmental protection and conservation is a necessity for our country. The fundamental premise of this manuscript is that (environmental) nonprofit organizations can do better at achieving their organizational goals. We can expect more, and deserve more, from these organizations.

Chapter two presents an overview of the methodologies used for this analysis. I utilize the policy sciences framework as the primary research framework for my analysis. However, the use of these tools will not be evident beyond chapter two of this analysis to individuals unfamiliar with this style of research. In 1971, Harold Lasswell (82) suggested that "the policy scientist who desires an opportunity to serve a client must find ways of affecting the client's

cognitive map." This means communicating research findings in language familiar to the intended audience. In the case of this dissertation, intended audience is nonprofit professionals and academics. As a whole, these communities do not have familiarity with the specialized jargon shared by policy scientists. Chapter two outlines my approach for those unfamiliar.

Chapter three asks the question: does a problem exist for Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofit organizations? The chapter explores various methodologies for evaluating nonprofits performance and concludes that measuring progress towards formal organizational goals (e.g. mission statements) is the most appropriate basis to understand the effectiveness of both individual organizations and the conservation nonprofit community in Greater Yellowstone. In this chapter, I survey the goals of Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits and evaluate progress towards four examples. The chapter concludes that progress towards formal organizational goals is mixed leaving room for better organizational performance.

Chapter four explores conventional explanations for why nonprofits fail to achieve their organizational objectives. I identify four major factors that I call 'the holy trinity (plus one) of environmental nonprofit failure:' Lack of resources, lack of political will, a robust opposition, and poor management. I argue that these conditioning factors only partially explain the inability of Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits to meet formal organizational objectives. I conclude that the disproportionate focus on these four factors by nonprofit staff, funders and academics artificially restricts interventions to improve performance and that effective nonprofits must consider a range of other explanations.

Chapters five and six highlight alternative explanations for nonprofits failure. Chapter five considers inter-organizational dynamics prevalent in Greater Yellowstone that hinders the realization nonprofit goals. Three broad challenges are identified: the homogenization of

organizational strategies, parasitic organizations, and communities of meaning. Chapter six narrows the unit of analysis to focus on specific challenges in organizational decision making. Three additional challenges are identified: identity augmentation, problem blind strategies, and foundation drag. The purpose of these two chapters is not to highlight every problem that a nonprofit might face or fully replace conventional explanations. Rather, these chapters serve to argue conventional wisdom is not sufficient to improve nonprofit performance.

Chapter seven explores six solutions environmental nonprofits might utilize to leverage greater effectiveness. The first three alternatives explored are the most popular ideas advanced within the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. These solutions are improving efficiency, mergers and acquisitions, and collaboration. While useful in improving performance, these strategies do not effectively address the alternative explanations for nonprofit failure highlighted in chapters five and six. To supplement these strategies, three additional alternatives are suggested for environmental nonprofits. These are encouraging innovation, community based initiatives, and goal modification.

Chapter eight concludes that the primary reason for environmental nonprofit failure is the narrow perspectives of nonprofit managers and funders. In this chapter, I review implications of the Greater Yellowstone experience in the context of the critical lovers' assessments of American Environmentalism. In addition, I discuss the implications of my finding for nonprofits more broadly. I provide several key implications of this study for the future of the environmental movement.

Chapter 2: Methods

I selected the policy sciences framework to guide my inquiry. This well-established approach to policy analysis—also referred to as the New Haven School of Jurisprudence and Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence—is based in functional anthropology and John Dewey's philosophy of Pragmatism (Lasswell 1971; Lasswell & Kaplan 1963; Lasswell & McDougal 1992; Clark 2002). It was developed as a means to help understand and resolve public policy problems in response to reductionist methodologies that often ignored critical aspects of the policy process (Parsons 1995; Ascher 1986). Previous approaches to policy analysis tended towards developing specialized methods or fully generalizable theory versus the policy sciences embracement of all methods and knowledge that will help solve a particular problem (Brunner 1985; 1991; 1997; Schneider and Ingram 1997). There are several reasons for selecting this framework. First, it is contextual, multi-method, and problem-oriented (Lasswell 1971). This approach allows me to draw from different disciplines to gain an understanding how of participants with differing perspectives interact to make decisions in their individual and common interests. Second, this framework has been successfully applied to natural resource issues in Greater Yellowstone (e.g. Clark 1997; Clark 2008) and beyond (e.g. Brunner et al 2002; 2005; Clark 1992). Third, the framework is conducive to investigating high order decision making where inductive reasoning must be applied versus positivistic methodology focused on reductionism.

The three central tenants of the policy sciences are being problem oriented, contextual, and multi-method. Problem orientation refers to the underlying philosophy that the appropriate guiding force behind any knowledge based-inquiry should be the resolution of a problem. The policy sciences defined a problem is defined as a discrepancy between current or projected trends

and a desired outcome. Contextuality refers to the principle that every situation is unique and the fully generalizable theory likely does not exist. Multi-method refers to the need to utilize on multiple mid-level theories and methods to help ones understanding and resolution of a policy problem. The policy sciences recognize that most policy problems are not amenable to single disciplinary problem solving approaches. Wildavasky (1979: 15) argues that the content of any policy analysis "cannot be determined by disciplinary boundaries but by whatever appears appropriate to the circumstances of the time and nature of [a] problem." He calls policy analysis and "art" with no set formula for success. The policy sciences framework seeks to remain versatile in the use of conceptual tools to allow the analysis a maximum amount of creativity in trying to solve a policy problem. (Lasswell 1971). If an analyst relies on a single methodology to resolve a problem in an open system, the result will likely be failure (Holland 1992; Clark 2002). In trying to learn how environmental nonprofits can do better, it is advantageous to explore the problem in a variety of different ways.

Beyond the multi-method justification, the policy sciences framework has been successfully applied to a range of natural resources cases to elicit greater of how to improve policy. (E.g. Brewer 1995; Brewer and Clark 1994; Brunner 1991; Brunner and Lark 1996; Clark 1992; 1997; Healy and Ascher; Primm and Clark 1996; McDougal and Schneider 1975). For example, Rich Wallace (2003; Wallace and Semmens 2010) utilized the policy sciences to learn how the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission can improve its effectiveness. Jason Vogel (2004; 2005; 2006) elicited greater understanding on why it is so difficult to effectively regulate endocrine disrupting chemicals under U.S. law. Roger Pielke Jr. (2010) demonstrated how conventional understandings of climate change is unlikely to solve the problems society faces. Bill Ascher (1999) suggested that conventional explanations for government failures in

developing counties (wealth, ignorance, and greed) neglects to account for the destruction of natural resources in many countries. Garry Brewer and James Kakalik (1979) argued that the majority of federal spending on programs for handicapped children neglected strategies with the highest social payoffs. In addition to these examples, the policy sciences have been successfully applied to many cases in Greater Yellowstone. Susan Clark (1997) highlighted why science is often manipulated by government bureaucracies. Murray Rutherford (2003) described how the Bridger Teton National Forest symbolically incorporated the ecosystem management paradigm without substantively changing their practices. Christina Cromley (2000) illustrated why the killing of a single grizzly bear (209) sparked massive outrage. David Cherney (In press; Cherney and Clark 2009) explained why the conservation of a pronghorn antelope migration with broad public support erupted in controversy. This study continues the work of such analysts.

Consistent with the principle of contextuality, the policy sciences is conductive to investigate high order decision making where inductive reasoning must be applied versus positivistic methodology focused on reductionism. The policy sciences framework distinguishes between two forms of decision makings: ordinary and constitutive (Cherney et al 2009; Clark 2008; McDougal et al 1981). Ordinary decision making refers to day-to-day decisions. In contrast, constitutive decisions are higher-order and govern the dynamics of ordinary decisions. The constitutive process is decision making about how to make decisions. In other words, constitutive decision process sets the rules for the game. When problem solving it is usually more expedient to engage in ordinary decision making to elicit policy change, as constitutive change is more difficult in general. However, there are times when decision making is constrained by constitutive rules or there is a systemic problem in an open system. In such circumstances, changes to constitutive dynamics must occur. This manuscript argues that

nonprofit failure is systemic in the Greater Yellowstone system. As such, we must focus on these higher order tasks. The policy sciences framework provides a way to think about such dynamics.

Despite these advantages, numerous policy scholars have criticized the policy sciences (E.g. Crick 1959; Davies 1973; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993; Little 1974; Marvick 1980; Merelman 1981; Morgenthau 1952; Sabatier 1999; Horowitz 1962; Ross 1991; Rustow 1966; Falk 1995; 1995; Farr et al 2006). After reviewing all major critiques, Matt Auer (2007) classifies arguments into five factors he calls the linearity critiques, public expectations and the policy cycle, decision process as top-down and legalistic, the insufficient comprehensives of the decision process, and the decision process and causal theory. For example, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) argue that the decision process framework implies linearity in the policy process, when the real world rarely operates this way. Falk (1995) claims that the policy sciences seeks elevate science as a means to discover unconditional truth in the policy process, despite his contention that the complexities of policy making construct significant barriers for how science can improve policy making. Similarly, Rustow (1966) argues that the policy sciences seek to find quantitative methodologies to predict a future on which action can be based. Such models are ultimately doomed to fail (Ascher 1978; Sarewitz et al 2000; Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis 2007). Others have criticized the writing (Marvick 1980) and conceptual (Davies 1973) style of Lasswell. Farr, Hacker and Kazee (2006) claim the works of Lasswell are rife with contradictions. However, Matt Auer's (2007) analysis concludes that all major critics of the policy sciences stem from either a partial understanding or misinterpretation of policy sciences literature and thought. Ron Brunner (2008: 4) argues that such critics select "from Lasswell's rich biography and voluminous published works pieces relevant to their own specialized purpose and perspectives. In doing so, they overlooked or misconstrued the main points of Lasswell's

interdisciplinary career which spanned more than 50 years and produced approximately 50 books, 1,000 published articles, and countless consultations on problems in public affairs with private citizens and public officials." For example, the policy sciences framework does not seek to develop universal theory as Falk suggests. Nor does the policy sciences seek to predict the future as Rustow claims. Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier's critique of the decision process framework stem from a misunderstanding the framework as a theory.

I collected data through four primary methods. I reviewed scientific articles, management plans, environmental impact statements, local and national periodicals, technical reports, websites, organizational promotional material, and other sources regarding nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. This included more than 400 scientific articles and reviewing over 300 newsletters from Greater Yellowstone nonprofits. Second, I conducted 77 semi-structured interviews with a diverse group of participants, including, but not limited to, individuals from the energy industry, environmental community, local and state governments, private landowners, ranching community, National Park Service, and US Forest Service. I engaged in over 200 informal conservations with staff and members of environmental nonprofits. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the topics discussed in my interviews and discussions, I do not quote anyone by name. Organizational affiliations are only referred to when they will not identify the person involved. This is also a condition of my approval from the University of Colorado's Institutional Review Board for this research. Names are only attributed to quotes when there is a previous public record. Third, I attended 28 public meetings and presentations by Greater Yellowstone nonprofits. Fourth, I utilized participant observation during two meetings I co-organized on the effectiveness of environmental nonprofits in Yellowstone (Table 2.1).

Category of Data	Number
Interviews	77
Informal Conversations	200+
Nonprofits Represented in interviews	72
Agencies Represented in interviews	12
Public Meetings Attended	28
Websites Reviewed	151
Nonprofit Newsletters	300+
Scientific Articles	400+
Organized Workshops	2

Table 2.1. Summary of data sources

One of the major challenges with utilizing the policy sciences framework is communicating findings to a conventional audience. As Lasswell (1971) articulated, the astute policy scientist will utilize the framework in ways invisible to those unfamiliar with the specialized jargon of the field. This chapter serves to outline how the methodology was used in this analysis from a broad scale perspective. Finer scale methodological descriptions are integrated in the text.

2.1 Overall structure

This dissertation is structured around problem orientation. Problem orientation is both a philosophical outlook that practical problems should be the primary focus of any academic inquiry and a way to be procedurally rational when deconstructing a problem definition. At its most basic level, problem orientation guides us through understanding if there is a discrepancy between projected trends and a desired outcome. The five intellectual tasks of problem orientation are goals, trends, conditioning factors, projections and alternatives. The chapters follow the basic structure of problem orientation:

- Chapter 1: General Overview: Initial characterization of the problem.
- Chapter 2: Methods.

- Chapter 3: Goals/Trends/Projections: Does a problem exist?
- Chapter 4: Conditioning Factors: Conventional explanations.
- Chapter 5: Conditioning Factors: Constitutive social process analysis.
- Chapter 6: Conditioning Factors: Selective decision process analysis.
- Chapter 7: Alternatives.
- Chapter 8: Conclusion and Implications.

2.2 Problem definition (chapter 3)

Chapter three assesses the effectiveness of conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. The purpose of chapter three is to make the case that there is room for environmental nonprofits to improve their effectiveness at meeting organizational goals. This chapter does not focus on conditioning factors. Rather, it compares organizational goals against relevant (projected) trends. This chapter is also not trying to generalize what proportion of goals is being met by conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. Such analysis is unnecessary for the pragmatic pursue of determining if further analysis is warranted in this case.

The first major section of the chapter is a literature review on appraising the effectiveness of organizations. I highlight the five major methodologies for apprising nonprofit effectiveness: the goals, system resource, internal process, participant satisfaction, and program evaluation models. After surveying the literature, I come to the conclusion that the goals model of appraisal is the most appropriate for the purpose of this analysis. The second part of this chapter focuses on identifying and summarizing the formal goal statements made by Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits. Data for this analysis is drawn from the Greater Yellowstone Conservation Directory, organizational websites and promotional material in the form of mission and vision statements. The primary methodology used to analyze goals statements was a content analysis. I used word

counting software to perform a basic analysis of counting the number of times each word was referenced by a mission statement. After the electronic analysis, I reviewed each statement for duplicates. To create a visual representation of the data I utilized the website http://www.worditout.com. The third section of the chapter selects four goals for appraisal as a means to judge the effectiveness of conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone. To conduct this analysis I modified mission and vision statements to remove any reference to specific organizations, divided the statements into simpler chunks when the missions/vision statements contained multiple goals, and slightly edited for readability when the previous changes created awkward phrasing. I then used excel to randomly select four goal statements for appraisal.

I used the goals model for appraisal to judge success. In its simplest form, this model judges relevant trends against the goals an organization claims to be seeking. It is very similar to problem orientation in the policy sciences. All four goal statements lacked specificity to create single quantitative criteria. As a result, I selected multiple criteria for each goal to judge success or failure. These criteria were determined by interviewing nonprofit staff members and surveying the literature over possible metrics. The analysis of the first goal uses trends in environmental litigation, publications referencing conflict, and perceptions of conflict and cooperation by informed practitioners as a means to judge if all people in the region are working together to secure conservation outcomes. The analysis of the second goal uses trends in grizzly bear numbers and projected threats to those trends as a means for judging the long-term viability of grizzly bears in the region. The analysis of the third goal uses trends in the relevance of science to decision making and of the manipulation of science to judge how well conservation science is contributing to improve conservation decision making. The analysis of the fourth goal uses

trends in carnivore-livestock conflicts, carnivore-human conflicts, and social tolerance as a means to judge wildlife co-exists in the region.

Success is defined as an organization's ability to meet or make progress towards its formally defined goals. Such evaluation does not require that the organization has already met its desired outcome. Rather, this criterion conservatively defines success as making progress towards formal goals. Using such criteria creates three potential evaluative outcomes. First is unqualified success. In such a case, all indicators demonstrate progress towards formal goals (or that the goals have been met). Second is mixed results. This indicates nonprofits can still likely improve upon the current outcome. The final outcome is failure. In this case, trends indicate that trends are unaltered or, in the worst case scenario, moving in the wrong direction.

2.3 Conventional explanations (chapter 4)

Chapter four reviews conventional explanations for why nonprofits fail to meet their goals. There are two primary purposes to engage in this analysis. First is to survey Greater Yellowstone experts for why they believe conservation nonprofits often have trouble meeting their formally defined goals. This provides insight into the conventional wisdom in the region for improving nonprofit performance. This allows us to understand what nonprofit practitioners are currently trying to do to improve performance. Second—and more importantly— this survey of conventional wisdom creates as a baseline for further analysis. If these explanations are sufficient to understand failure, perhaps the nonprofits community is doing the best possible to improve performance. If conventional wisdom is insufficient, we can identify new ways of improving performance.

Data was collected through interviews and a literature review of nonprofit management. I explore two types of cases. First, I asked every interviewee why specific formal goals of their

organization were not being met. Second, I reviewed six ordinary case studies (bison, elk, grizzly bear, pronghorn migration, snowmobile, and wolf management) and asked the same questions to individuals involved in those cases. I categorized different arguments for failure and counted the relative frequency of the arguments in my interviews. While a wide range of factors were cited, four explanatory factors dominated my interviews. I labeled these the holy trinity (plus one). The holy trinity were the dominate factors by nonprofit staff and plus one was the main explanatory factor by boards and donors. In this chapter, I briefly outline each factor and then conduct a surface level analysis to determine the robustness of each explanation. I did this by outlining the claim each explanatory factor made and then reviewed a wide range of evidence to ask, does this explanation hold up in all cases? The general assessment is that all four factors have relatively weak explanatory power. This finding opened up the door to a broader analysis.

One of the major values of the policy sciences' logically comprehensive framework is the ability of a policy analyst to ask the question 'what might have I missed?' In the context of chapter four, I am asking the question: what are the Greater Yellowstone and nonprofit management communities missing from their self-assessments? I classified the holy trinity (plus one) in a variety of different ways using the policy sciences social and decision process frameworks (outlined in the next section of this chapter). I did this by creating a series of tables trying to deconstruct where the arguments fit in the policy sciences framework to see if the factors clustered around certain topics or were missing potentially key ideas. The most useful category proved to be the values category in the social process framework. Virtually all conventional conditioning factors primarily focus on the wealth and power categories (and skill to a lesser extent), which misses 75% of the other values at play in every social situation. Affection, respect, rectitude, enlightenment and well-being are major values at play in any policy

setting, yet the holy trinity (plus) ignore these factors. In chapters five and six, I conduct a more in depth social and decision process analysis with particular attention to the other six values ignored in the holy trinity (plus one).

2.4 Alternative conditioning factors

The analysis presented in chapters five and six attempts to identify major conditioning factors for conservation nonprofit failure that are overlooked by both nonprofit practitioners and academics. Chapter four provided the empirical basis identifying potential gaps in conventional conditioning factor arguments. Once I had identified the major conditioning factors identified in the literature and by my interview subjects, I contextually mapped these factors using the policy sciences' decision and social process frameworks. These served as my baseline explanations for failure. Using the same cases and data in chapter four, I used a case study approach to identify alternative conditioning factors. I demonstrate how the alternative conditioning factors have more explanatory power than the conventional explanations by comparing them in specific cases.

It is worth briefly outlining the policy sciences decision and social process frameworks. The decision process framework is a cognitive tool that allows the analyst to organize information about decisions and focus attention to the potentially relevant aspects. It is not a prescriptive model of the decision process, rather a functional guide to the types of tasks carried out in decision making. The seven functions are:

> *Intelligence* is the "gathering, processing, and dissemination of information for the use of all who participate in the decision process" (Lasswell 1971: 28-29). This function governs the use of information in decision making.

Promotion is "recommending and mobilizing support for policy alternatives (Clark 2002: 61). This function accounts for ‘politics’ in decision making.

Prescription is “the stabilization of expectations concerning the norms to be severely sanctioned if challenged in various contingencies.” (Lasswell 1971: 29). This function most easily understood as rulemaking.

Invocation is the “provisional characterization of a concrete situation in terms of an alleged prescription” (Lasswell and McDougal 1992: 359). This function is often referred to as policing.

Application is the “final characterization of concrete circumstances in terms of prescriptions” (Lasswell 1971: 29). This function refers to judging.

Appraisal is “the assessment of the success and failure of policy” (Lasswell 1956: 2). In other words, this is the evaluation function.

Termination is the “ending of prescriptions and of arrangements entered into within their framework” (Lasswell 1956: 2). This function can be thought of as the transition from one rule to the next.

The generalized social process framework is structured around the concept that participants (people) with differing perspectives seek to maximize values (gratifying outcomes) by utilizing institutions to affect resources (Lasswell 1971: 18). The seven functional categories are:

Participants refer to individuals and groups (both official and unofficial) relevant to any decision making process (Lasswell 1971: 19).

Perspectives are the identities, expectations and demands of participants. This category includes political myth, which is "the stable patterns of personal as well as group perspectives" (Lasswell and McDougal 1992: 353).

Situations are arenas of interaction between two or more participants. Situations (arenas) "can be understood as centralized or decentralized, continuous or short-lived, focusing on specialized topics or general interests, organized or unorganized, and open or closed to broad participation" (Cherney et al 2009: 696).

Strategies refer to "the management of base values to affect valued outcomes" (Lasswell 1971: 26). Strategies are persuasive or coercive (engaged in value indulgence or deprivation).

Values are factors "sought as an end or employed as a means" (Lasswell and McDougal 1992: 340). Scope values are those sought; base values are those available to the participant. The policy sciences recommend utilizing eight values: power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect and rectitude.

> *Outcomes* refer to the immediate value indulges and deprivations obtained though the seven decision process functions (Lasswell 1971: 19).
>
> *Effects* are the long-term outcomes of a particular decision process. For example, an environmental nonprofit may win a lawsuit relisting wolves under the Endangered Species Act (outcome). However, the resulting effect may be the institutionalization of ill-will and distrust of the opposition. (Lasswell 1971: 19).

While a slight oversimplification, chapter five explores generalized social process challenges and chapter six focuses on organizational decision making.

To make the inferences in chapter five, I narrowed my inquiry by using the situations category of the social process to look at cases where multiple groups were interacting in pursuit of similar (or directly conflicting) goals. To make my inferences, I reviewed six different cases where multiple groups were interacting. These included including bison, elk, grizzly bear, pronghorn migration, snowmobile, and wolf management. In each case, I determined that conventional explanations were not strong enough to leverage greater performance. I distilled the alternative conditioning factors I identified in to three explanatory factors. The resulting three conditioning factors are not all inclusive. However, they appeared to be the most significant under-attended factors that the community face. To make the inferences in chapter six, I used two different methods. I reviewed specific challenges that the Buffalo Field Campaign, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and The Nature Conservancy faced in 11 different campaigns. Second, I supplemented these analyses through interviews that represented 24 other environmental nonprofits. I then

selected what appeared to be the three most influential conditioning factors that are under-attended to by conservation nonprofits.

The purpose of identifying these six conditioning factors is not to highlight every possible explanatory factor for nonprofit failure. In contrast, I use these six factors as a means to show that the holy trinity (plus one) are insufficient to explain nonprofit failure. Using the perspectives category of the social process, I made determination that the fundamental conditioning factor for nonprofit failure relates to formulae. The perspectives category can be broken down into identity, expectations and demands (Clark 2002). Identity is the fundamental characteristics that define who a person's perspective. Expectations are what an individual believes is likely to happen in the future. Demands relate to value indulgences and deprivations; it is what a person wants. The identity is fundamentally shaped by political myth, which gives meaning to a person's life. Political myth includes the general philosophy an individual believes in, the formulae to achieve success, and the folklore they believe. The holy trinity (plus one) is suggestive that the formulae of those involved with environmental nonprofits are lacking to meet their personal and organizational goals.

Again, the purpose of this dissertation is to expand the options that conservation nonprofits have in trying to meet their organizational objectives; the purpose is to expand the range of possible choices that nonprofit leaders have at their disposal. In terms of the policy sciences, this dissertation seeks to shed light on critical factors that are under-attended in thought and action by nonprofit scholars.

Chapter 3: Mission Failure: Is there room for improvement?

During the winter of 1996-1997, the Montana Department of Livestock slaughtered 1,084 bison that migrated outside of Yellowstone National Park in search of winter forage. The scale of this management removal was unprecedented the memory of contemporaneous environmental activists. Paul Pritchard, former president of the National Parks and Conservation Association, said at the time, "We fear…we could be witnessing the beginning of the end of the bison herd in portions of the park's interior" (Wilkinson 1997, p.3). The average number of bison slaughtered during the previous ten years was 186 per year. The drastic reduction of the Yellowstone bison herd prompted activist Michael Mease to found the Buffalo Field Campaign—an environmental nonprofit with an explicit mission "to stop the slaughter of Yellowstone's wild buffalo" (NRCC & CI 2007) After returning to the historic average for the subsequent seven years, 2,699 bison were slaughtered in the winters of 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 combined (BFC 2008).

The failure of the Buffalo Field Campaign to realize their self-defined purpose is not unique among environmental nonprofits in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. In 1987, the Defenders of Wildlife created the Wolf Compensation Trust to reduce political opposition to wolf recovery by compensating ranchers for livestock lost to wolf depredation. From August 1987 to June 2008, the fund distributed $1,100,122 to 776 ranchers (DW 2008). In a study of political conflict in greater Yellowstone, Mark MacBeth and Elizabeth Shanahan (2004) found that the economic compensation program has not "reduced the intensity of the conflict over wolf reintroduction." In 2005, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition began a campaign to eliminate Wyoming's winter feeding of elk. After a three year effort led the Coalition, the US Forest Service reauthorized Wyoming's winter feeding of elk for the next 20 years (Hatch 2008b). Since 1998, The Wilderness Society has attempted to force Yellowstone National Park to phase

out recreational snowmobiling. In 2008, after a more than 10-year campaign, Yellowstone National Park made a decision to allow approximately double the number of snowmobiles permitted in 2003 (Brown 2008).

The preceding examples are mere snapshots of bison, wolf, elk and snowmobile controversies in Greater Yellowstone. Each case is ongoing and much more complex than simply chalking up wins or loses to a particular interest group. There are many notable examples of conservation nonprofits success in Greater Yellowstone as well. For example, The Nature Conservancy and partner organizations increased the protection of private land in the Centennial Valley in western Montana from 1,800 acres in 1998 to 55,000 acres in 2010; a 30-fold increase. In 1996, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition helped prevent the development of the New World Mine that threatened to pollute Yellowstone's waterways (Gedicks 2001; Hofrichter 2000). In 2009, a coalition of over 11 environmental nonprofits helped push forth the Wyoming Range Legacy Act, which protected 1.2 million acres from mineral development (Gearino 2009).

The conservationists I interviewed believe that such victories highlight the success of environmental organizations. These same conservationists argue that failures highlighted above are taken out of context and are far from the norm. Is this really the case? This chapter suggests otherwise. I argue that despite notable success stories, environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone are still far from meeting their self-defined purposes, and the failure to meet their organizations' purposes means one thing: there is room for improvement in the effectiveness of conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. This chapter sets out to accomplish three tasks. First, I explore the challenges in evaluating nonprofit performance. Second, I provide an overview of what Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofits claim to seek. Third, I evaluate performance towards these goals as an indicator of whether Greater Yellowstone's

environmental nonprofits face a collective problem. The central question is: in the aggregate are these organizations performing as well as they can?

3.1 How to evaluate nonprofits

Evaluating how nonprofits perform is a troubling endeavor. The academic literature on nonprofit appraisals is complex and contentious. There is little agreement on how to classify the different approaches to evaluation, let alone obtain consensus on even the simplest criteria (Cameron 1980; Herman and Renz 1994, 2004; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981, 1983; Scott 1977; Seashore 1979 Sowa et al 2004). Climbing down from the ivory tower, we might look for guidance from foundations and philanthropic advisors who wrestle with this question on a daily basis. The answer in the philanthropic sector is equally contested. No two foundations or advisors seem to judge nonprofits in the same way. Often, these professionals are highly critical of the methodologies used by their peers. Fortunately, the lack of consensus on evaluation does not cripple us from trying to improve the performance of nonprofits. This section reviews different ideas on nonprofit evaluation and justifies the methods used in this analysis.

The first major development in the evaluations of nonprofits is referred to as the *goals model* (Herman and Renz 1998; 1999). This methodology asserts that to evaluate a nonprofit's effectiveness we must judge the organization against how well it achieves its goals. The goals model is equally prevalent in the for-profit and governmental sectors. For example, we might assume that a for-profit organization seeks to maximize shareholder wealth. This is often the assumption made by individuals trained in business schools across the United States. Evaluation often takes the form of asking, is a corporation maximizing their return on investment? Using a single quantitative metric to measure effectiveness makes judging relatively simple. It also makes inter-organizational comparisons easy. If we compare two businesses, the company that

has a higher return on investment is generally considered to be more effective than the organization with lower returns.

In practice, the goals model of organizational effectiveness is not so straightforward, even for corporations. In *Built to Last*, Jim Collins and Jerry Porras survey 18 visionary (highly effective) for-profit organizations to determine what factors distinguish them a control group of 18 corporations that the authors consider merely effective. Collins and Porras argue that return on investment and other similar measures of profit maximization are useful metrics to measure organizational effectiveness. However, these metrics are insufficient to capture what makes the most effective for-profit organizations more effective than others. In fact, Collins and Porras (2004: 55) state:

> *We did not find "maximizing shareholder wealth" or "profit maximization" as the dominant driving force or primary objective through the history of most of the visionary companies*. They tended to pursue a cluster of objectives, of which making money is only one—and not necessarily the primary one. [emphasis in original]

In short, there is rarely a simple, single goal for which we can evaluate progress. The trouble with the goals model is further compounded when we look at nonprofits. It is widely recognized that nonprofits also seek a wide range of goals. However, it is rarely clear what goals are the most appropriate to measure. The most obvious place to look is a nonprofit's mission statement, but such statements are often a murky entanglement of goals, strategies, values, symbols, identifications and demands. Without a clear statement of goals, it is difficult to develop indicators that measure progress towards organizational effectiveness.

The *systems resource model* of evaluation (Pfeffer 1973; Provan 1980; Yuchtman and Seashore 1967) is an attempt to sidestep the goals model by proposing that organizational effectiveness should be measured by an organization's ability "to exploit its environment to acquire scarce resources" (Herman and Renz 2004: 695). For a nonprofit, this means that

effectiveness takes the form of acquiring more funding than peer organizations or recruiting more highly desirable candidates for staff. Indeed, environmental nonprofits use this model for justification of their effectiveness—even in the scientific literature. For example, a paper in the journal *Science* (authored by Conservation International scientists) argued for the effectiveness of their conservation prioritization tool "hot spots," in part, by demonstrating that the concept of "hot spots alone have mobilized at least $750 million of funding for conservation" (Brooks et al 2006: 60).

Conservation nonprofits need financial resources to run effectively. But, it is easy to see the limitations measuring effectiveness this way. Continuing the previous example, it is not hard to imagine that a donor of Conservation International is more interested in whether the concept of hot spots actually improves conservation biodiversity in practice versus being impressed with how effectively the concept fundraises. In other words, the acquisition of capital "may be the most important criterion of effectiveness for chief executives or board members (though they would never say so)…it seems unlikely to be important to other stakeholders" (Herman and Renz 2004: 695).

The *internal process model* of evaluation focuses on how well the decision processes within an organization operate (Herman and Renz 2006; 2008). The idea being that a nonprofit cannot effectively operate without efficient communication, human resource management, healthy power dynamics, information management, and other similar variables. Proponents of this style of evaluation tend to focus on getting the right management practices in place and the striving for compliance within the organization. For example, many small nonprofits lack the requisite skills, such as accounting, to efficiently run their corporation. Proponents of the internal process model would focus on outsourcing or developing such skills within the organization.

There is a significant allure to trying to find the right management practices for nonprofits. Indeed, there is a vast popular literature on experts claiming to know the best management practices for nonprofits (and organizations in general), but there is signification reason for caution in this approach. While good management practices are necessary for an organization to be effective, there is a growing body of literature suggesting that best management practices are not universal (Herman and Renz 2008). Rather, the most effective management practices are contextual depending on the organization's needs. This finding should not be terribly surprising. The internal management processes for an enforcement-based environmental nonprofit (e.g. Natural Resources Defense Council) are likely to be different than a local land trust (e.g. Jackson Hole Land Trust). In other words, how an organization manages its staff and resources to most effectively prevail in a lawsuit (enforcement based) is different than how an organization manages for purchasing land and conservation easements (land trust).

The *participant satisfaction model* recognizes that nonprofits serve a range of different constituencies, often with highly variable goals. For example, a soup kitchen serves both the needs of the homeless (e.g. providing food to the hungry) and the donors who choose to endow the soup kitchen with operating funds (e.g. a sense of self-virtue). This model of nonprofit effectiveness defines organizational effectiveness in terms of an organization's ability to satisfy the needs (goals) of all relevant constituencies (Boschken 1994; D'Aunno 1992; Kaplan 2001; Kanter and Brinerhoff 1981; Zsammuto 1984). In other words, this methodology is an expanded version of the goals model of effectiveness. Rather than just focusing on the formal goals of an organization, this form of evaluation suggests that we identify all relevant stakeholders and identify how well the organization is serving their needs.

The participant satisfaction model is often favored by academic evaluators due to its comprehensive nature of including all relevant stakeholders—including the stakeholders' formally stated and informally unstated goals. This model recognizes that quite often the formal goals of an organization are really symbolic in nature and that the driving force behind an organization is to meet unarticulated goals of certain key stakeholders. There are two primary challenges with this model. First, trying to identify all goals from every relevant actor can be overwhelming. While being comprehensive is one goal for evaluations, timeliness is another criterion that we must consider (Lasswell 1971). Second, being fully comprehensive introduces the concepts of goal legitimacy and goal hierarchy. In other words, all goals of stakeholders are not equally legitimate or important. Reverting back to the soup kitchen example, should an evaluator consider the formally stated goals of an organization (e.g. providing food to the hungry) equally legitimate to informal goals of a donors (e.g. creating a sense of self-virtue)? The answer is likely no.

The most common means to evaluate nonprofits by foundations and government agencies slightly deviates from these models. Often evaluations are focused "program evaluation rather than more general organizational effectiveness" (Herman and Renz 2004:694). In other words, foundations tend to be less concerned with overall nonprofit performance and more interested in understand what the foundation's donation produced. We can use land trusts as an example. Donors tend to be more interested in the number of acres their donation was able to secure through a conservation easement versus how effective the land trust is at meeting its organizational goals.

With such diverse methods to evaluate nonprofits, how do we decide on which method to use (Table 3.1)? It should be evident that every method evaluation has its benefits and drawbacks

(Carlsson and Hedman 2007). Because of this reality, some scholars argue that there is no one size fits all model of organizational effectiveness (Sowa et al 2004). Rather, the challenge for appraising effectiveness and improving organizational practices is more about "finding the right fit" versus than "doing things the 'right way'" (Herman and Renz 2004: 694). The best methodology for assessing effectiveness depends on the purposes of your evaluation. A development director—responsible for raising donations—might find the systems resource model to be the most relevant form of evaluation for their duties. In contrast, an executive director might use the internal process model to determine if resources are being allocated efficiently within the organization. A foundation might evaluate its grantees through the goals model, trying to learn if an organization met the responsibilities of a conditional grant.

Nonprofit leaders inherently understand that there are multiple ways to evaluate their organization and tend view such appraisals as serving three primary three functions: as a drain on the organization's resources, as an external promotional device, and as a strategic management tool (Carman and Fredericks 2008). It is worth revisiting the purposes of this analysis in light of our understanding on how to evaluate nonprofits. The purpose of this analysis is to aid in to encourage thoughtful reflection and strategic thinking on high-order factors hindering conservation nonprofits from meeting their goals. This analysis is not intended to develop a causal model of why certain nonprofits have failed to achieve their organizational mission, determine what makes one nonprofit 'better' than another, or develop a theory of the 'perfect' structure for a nonprofit or nonprofit community. Rather, this analysis is concerned with barriers to environmental nonprofits achieving their formally stated goals. This makes the goals model the most appropriate choice for this evaluation.

Since this analysis uses the goals model, the next question we must ask is what goals? For the purposes of this study, I use each nonprofit's self-defined mission statement as the primary basis for evaluation. In other words, a nonprofit's mission is the organization's bottom line. Effective organizations are ones that have met, or are on track to meet, the highest order formally articulated goals. The use of mission statements is justified due to nonprofit's contract with the IRS. Pursuing the mission statement is the commitment an organization makes with the American people. In other words, "nonprofits should be accountable for how well they meet a need in society rather than how well they raise funds or control expenses" (Kaplan 2001: 369).

Model	**Evaluation Criteria**
Goals	Formal Organizational Goals
System Resource	Resources Acquired
Internal Process	Management Function
Participant Satisfaction	Goals of All Stakeholders
Program Evaluation	Program Goals

Table 3.1. Summary of Table of Nonprofit Evaluation Models

Contrarians to my approach will correctly point out that nonprofits pursue a range of legitimate goals beyond their mission, just as Jim Collin's argued that for-profit organizations. Unofficial goals are equally legitimate and necessary for a nonprofit to function properly. In fact, informal goals tell us the real story of what an individual or organization is actually interested in achieving through their actions. We can think about fundraising as a simplistic example. Most nonprofits will set fundraising targets and actively pursue these goals for the good of the organization. However, the goal of fundraising will rarely be incorporated into the organization's formal mission. I do not ignore these possibilities; rather, I view them as secondary goals in pursuit of the organization's mission. My evaluation accounts for these secondary goals by looking at how they support or detract from an organization's mission. The seemingly more damaging critique to my approach is that a nonprofit's primary goal not be captured in their

organizational mission. However, we can quickly dispense with this critique as well. Nonprofit who seek hidden purposes in lieu of their formal goals are committing fraud on the American people.

3.2 Yellowstone's conservation nonprofit goals

What are conservation nonprofits trying to accomplish in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem? Formal goal statements are usually presented through organizational mission statements and written promotional material. While mission statements change over time and are often symbolic in nature, they are the highest order goal that an organization publicizes. As argued in the previous section, formal goals are the social contract nonprofits have with their organization's constituency and the broad public. We can start to understand what Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits community wants to accomplish by looking at both the breath (diversity) and intensity (concentration) of goals.

The formal goals articulated by Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofit community are highly diverse (see Appendix 1). The Defenders of Wildlife's mission, for example, is to be "a national, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to the protection of all native animals and plants in their natural communities." While we might expect that all conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone are concerned with species and ecosystem conservation, there are numerous nonprofits concerned with other aspects of conservation. The Yellowstone-Teton Clean Energy Coalition is a prime example. The Coalition's mission is to "displace the use of petroleum in the Greater Yellowstone region's transportation sector." While both organizations are interested in conservation, the goals they seek have little direct overlap. The Greater Yellowstone Conservation Directory (2007) provides a starting point to understand the breath of goal diversity. The directory asked all conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone to self-

report what types of issues their organization is focuses on. The results of this survey included 27 different conservation sectors: agriculture, aquatics and fisheries, art and music, business and economics, fire, forestry, GIS and mapping, grazing, growth and development, history and heritage, hunting and fishing, land use planning, mining, oil and gas, outfitting, private lands, public lands, public policy, recreation, resource management, restoration, rivers and wetlands, spirituality, sustainability, transportation, wilderness, and wildlife.

The mere diversity of formal goals does not tell the full story of what conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone want to accomplish. We also need to look at goal intensity. In other words, do the formal goals of nonprofits cluster around certain topics? This type of analysis can help us understand where the majority of conservation profits focus their attention and resources. The simplest way to do this is through a content analysis of mission statements using word frequency—simply counting the number of mission statements that mention a particular word. The results are striking. Of greater Yellowstone's 183 conservation nonprofits, 97 nonprofits (53%) mention "wildlife" as a key term. The second most frequently referenced word is "conservation," which is included in 53 mission statements (31%). The next most frequently cited terms are natural, mission, protect, and environmental (see Table 3.2; Figure 3.1).

Term	Number of Mission Statements	Percentage of Mission Statements	Term	Number of Mission Statements	Percentage of Mission Statements
Wildlife	94	51%	Future	28	15%
Conservation	57	31%	Water	27	15%
Natural	50	27%	Promote	26	14%
Mission	48	26%	Communities	23	13%
Protect	43	23%	Generations	23	13%
Environmental	35	19%	Education	23	13%
Habitat	32	17%	Wyoming	22	12%
Montana	30	16%	Foundation	22	12%
Wild	30	16%	Management	21	11%
People	29	16%	Resources	21	11%
Land	29	16%	National	20	11%

Table 3.2. The most frequent terms used in Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit mission statements.

To understand the meaning of this content analysis, we need think carefully of how these words are used in context. “Wildlife” is a clear content-based term. This means that wildlife is primary subject of focus within these mission statements. Consider the excerpts from the following mission statements:

> …working for wild bears and **wildlife**.
> …advocates the protection of Montana's **wildlife** and its habitats.
> …dedicated to protecting **wildlife** and wild places…
> …protecting the rich biodiversity and the public lands, streams, **wildlife**…
> … promote awareness and sensitivity to the conservation of **wildlife**…

In contrast, the second most popular term “conservation” tends to modify the subject of a goal. It is important for us to note the term “conservation,” but does not let us know the subject of focus on the nonprofit. Consider the excerpts from the following mission statements:

> …ensure the **conservation** of mule deer, blacktail deer, and their habitats.
> …provide agricultural landowners with land **conservation** options…
> … provides leadership for the **conservation** of Wyoming's soil…
> …dedicated to the **conservation** of open space…
> … dedicated to the long-term **conservation** of the Yellowstone grizzly bear…

These five missions all focus on the conservation of different things (i.e. mule deer, land, soil, open space, and grizzly bears). If we look at content-based words in the goal statements, the second most referenced term is “habitat” with 32 mentions in unique mission’s statements. Wildlife is mentioned in three times as many missions as habitat. The results are even more dramatic when we consider that many missions focus on a single species versus all wildlife (e.g. …the long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear…). If we add mission statements that focus on a single species to the “wildlife” count, we arrive at a total of 118 (65%) mission that mention wildlife in some form. Following wildlife, habitat (17%), land (16%), and water (16%) are the next most cited content based terms. This is suggestive that the majority of organizations focus issues related to the first wave of environmental nonprofits—wildlife and land conservation. However, people (16%) and communities (13%) also appear to be significant concerns for the conservation community.

Figure 3.1. Visual representation of most frequently cited words in organizational mission and vision statements.

It should be clear that while a diversity of goals are sought be the Greater Yellowstone conservation community, wildlife and land are the dominate issue focus. However, not all mission statements are pure goal statements. Often goals are conflated with strategies. A Naturalist's World provides a clear example. The organization's mission statement reads, "A Naturalist's World is dedicated to providing educational programs and materials about natural history and ecology." Most individuals can infer what the goals of A Naturalist's World might be; however, it is not directly clear from the mission statement. Why is A Naturalist's World dedicated to providing educational programs and materials? Is it because the organization seeks an ecologically educated population? Is the organization interested in changing the way people view the natural world? Is the organization trying to promote a particular worldview, in place of one they deem insufficient? Is the organization trying to encourage students to become scientists? Conservationists? Environmentalists? There are a number of great reasons (goals) that providing natural history and ecological materials might help achieve. However, the strategies of providing educational materials and programs might not be the best—or the most effective—to achieve those desired goals. We can still evaluate such organizations by asking if they are implementing the strategies the claim to implement. The most common strategies mentioned in mission statements are education, advocacy, and litigation.

3.3 Mission appraisal

Do Greater Yellowstone's nonprofits face a problem in achieving their self-defined purposes? If these organizations are on track to meet their objectives, further analysis of these organizations is not warranted. However, if these organizations are not meeting (or on track to meet) their organization's formal goals then there is room to suggest improvement in how they operate. At this point, we are not trying to diagnose why a particular organization is failing to

meet its organizational objectives. Rather, we are trying to identify broad trends of success and failure in the conservation community.

There are a number of ways to approach this analysis. The most intuitive is to select a subset of the 183 conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone and directly appraise the effectiveness the selected organizations. Indeed, this is the approach I took initially for this analysis. To do this, I selected five organizations to evaluate based on a set of criteria to capture a wide range of nonprofit types and practices. These organizations were the Buffalo Field Campaign, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and The Nature Conservancy. As I began conducting organizational appraisals, a serious concern surfaced in my interviews. Conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone perceive themselves to be in extreme competition for resources. They viewed my research as a way to develop a scorecard to determine what organizations are good or bad at achieving their organizational goals. This type of interpretation is a distraction from the purpose of this manuscript's analysis. This analysis is attempting to identify broad trends in the conservation community, not embarrass or praise specific nonprofits. In short, this analysis is organizational blind.

In view of this concern, I choose to pursue an alternative method to evaluate progress towards official goals. I took the official goal statements from Yellowstone's 183 conservation nonprofits and modified the mission and vision statements in two ways. First, I eliminated all references to specific organizations to make the statements anonymous. The purpose is to make this analysis organizational blind. Second, when official goal statements had multiple objectives articulated, I separated the statements into units more easily construed as a single goal statement.

This was done to aid evaluation. These statements can be found in Appendix 1. I then randomly selected four goals to evaluate. The four goal statements are:

1. We envision a day when all people work together to protect the ecological integrity and beauty of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.

2. Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat.

3. Contribute new knowledge toward improving the management and preservation of our natural environment by pursuing innovative, long-term research on key ecosystem components.

4. Help people and wildlife coexist.

This methodology is justified on several grounds. First, we must remember that the central purpose of this chapter is to determine if there is sufficient empirical basis to warrant exploration of environmental nonprofit effectiveness in Greater Yellowstone. If these organizations appear to be on track to meet their goals, further analysis is not warranted. This chapter does not attempt to quantify the percentage of goals met by conservation or determine why failure occurred. Rather, I am arguing that there is sufficient evidence to justify exploration the problem of improving environmental nonprofit performance.

We must note that most nonprofits do no clearly articulate their goals in a way that can easily be quantified. For example, we can examine the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance's mission:

> The Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance is dedicated to responsible land stewardship in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to ensure that human activities are in harmony with the area's irreplaceable wildlife, scenic and other natural resources.

On the surface, this type of mission statement appears to be strong. We can infer that this organization believes in protecting the environment. We might also correctly infer that this is a watchdog group, focused on how people interact with the environment in the Jackson Hole. However, if we want to evaluate this organization's progress towards its mission, we are at a loss. What does it mean for human activities to be "in harmony" with the region's wildlife? What is responsible land stewardship? A quantitative analysis is challenging. Consider this against The Nature Conservancy's mission:

> The mission of The Nature Conservancy is to preserve plants, animals and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive. We are dedicated to preserving biological diversity, and, as described below, our values compel us to find ways to ensure that human activities can be conducted harmoniously with the preservation of natural diversity. We aspire to the vision articulated so wisely more than 50 years ago by Aldo Leopold in his book, *A Sand County Almanac*: conservation is a state of harmony between man and nature.

The Nature Conservancy also strives to have human activities in harmony with nature. However, the first sentence of their mission provides a basis for a much more rigorous quantitative analysis. For evaluation we can ask: has the Nature Conservancy actually preserved plants, animals and natural communities? Unfortunately, most of the goal statements of environmental nonprofit operating in Greater Yellowstone do not follow this pattern. However, this does not cripple our ability to evaluate them.

The central challenge in any appraisal is judging success and failure. Since most formal goal statements in this analysis do not have a single quantitative metric we can use to determine success, conservation nonprofits cannot be judged in this way. We can, however, judge them in a qualitative manner. So, how can we know that our assessments are correct? Policy scientist Ron Brunner equates this challenge to the task astronomers face when trying to verify the existence of a new planet. In astronomy, singular direct evidence is rarely available to determine the existence

of a planet. Rather, discoveries occur through the "convergence of multiple independent streams of information on the same context" (Brunner 2006: 145). The same is true in policy analysis. Using different sources of data we can triangulate on what is likely happening in any particular context to judge success and failure.

However, we must acknowledge that failure is a big word. It conjures up certain emotions and expectations in our minds. As such, it is worth briefly discussing what I mean by failure and success in the context of this analysis. As previously defined, a problem is a discrepancy between a desired state of affairs (goals) and the current or projected state of affairs (trends). I use this definition of a problem to create criteria for success and failure of environmental nonprofits. Success is making progress towards formal goals or having achieved those goals. In other words, the relevant trends are moving in a direction consistent with the stated goal. Failure is making progress away from formal goal or having trends remain stagnant. A third possibly exists that I call mixed results. Mixed results occur when conflicting trends make it difficult to definitively determine success or failure. It is important to note that these definitions of success and failure are biased towards nonprofit success. Nonprofits do not need to achieve their goals to be successful. Rather, trends related to high-order formal goals that an organization commits to must show minimal progress. It is important to acknowledge that trends related to these high-order goals are often subject to exogenous factors or other shocks that may seem beyond the control of the nonprofit. For example, a nonprofit may commit to the formal goal of having a long-term viable population of elk in the Greater Yellowstone. Despite the hard work of this nonprofit, an unforeseen disease may hypothetically reduce the elk population or cause localized extinction. While a nonprofit does not have control of such exogenous factors, we must judge

success and failure by the formal goal commitments an organization makes regardless if the trends are altered by the nonprofit.

The words success and failure also invoke questions of whether or not the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem is a better place because of environmental nonprofits. In other words, have these nonprofits actually contributed to the conservation of this region compared to a status quo baseline of conservation outcomes without the presence of environmental nonprofits? Such an analysis would provide interesting results, but they are a distraction from the purposes of this chapter. This chapter seeks to determine if Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits face a problem in achieving their stated objectives. The purpose is not to determine if environmental nonprofits have contributed to successful outcomes in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. The way I have defined success and failure, causality is irrelevant in the context of this chapter. It is possible for the trends related to conservation nonprofit goals to be positive (successful) without active intervention by a nonprofit. Similar, failure is possible with heavy nonprofit activity. This chapter is concerned about the likelihood of formal goals to be achieved. Nonprofits that fail to achieve or make progress towards their formal goals face a problem.

There are two important implications for the following four goal evaluations. First, rather than view each evaluation as a comprehensive determination, we are simply trying to determine the likelihood of the goal being met. All four goals are complex enough to merit an analysis that fills an entire volume. We are trying to determine what the data suggests. Second, the purpose of evaluating four random goals is to triangulate if a trend exists for in achieving organizational goals. We can view the four evaluations as independent streams of knowledge on the central question: does a problem exists for environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone?

Goal # 1: We envision a day when all people work together to protect the ecological integrity and beauty of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.

Not all goal statements made by conservation nonprofits can be fully realized in practice. Formal goals such as "envisioning a day when all people work together" are statements of ideal. While we might wish for such a future, informed experience in our democracy suggests that we can rarely expect uniform action on any issue. Our inability to completely realize such principles does not invalidate the importance of striving for these types of important outcomes. For example, most Americans would argue that all citizens should have equal rights. Regardless of our best intentions and policy, discriminatory practices are likely impossible to completely eradicate in any society. The challenge in practice is to minimize discriminatory behavior in pursuit of equal protection for all.

An organization that strives to have all people working together to protect Greater Yellowstone's ecological integrity and beauty faces an identical challenge. While such a goal is not fully realizable in practice, we can track indicators that suggest if we are making progress towards or away from this goal. There are two simple measures was can use as criteria. First, is political conflict escalating or decreasing the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem? If political conflict is escalating, we can infer that people are not working together. Second, has Yellowstone's conservation nonprofit community been working together to protect the region's ecological integrity and beauty? In other words, if Yellowstone's nonprofit community is not working together, certainly we cannot expect the broader community to do so.

Just looking at a few indicators of conflict suggests Greater Yellowstone has balkanized over the last 30 years. Between 1970 and 2006, there was a 350% increase in the number of lawsuits per year that mention the phrase 'Yellowstone National Park" (see figure 3.2) In fact, the specific conservation nonprofit that is has "all people working together" as a goal is a

complainant in a number of these lawsuits. A similar count of articles from major United States' newspapers from 1980 to 2007 shows a 1050% increase in the number of articles that mention both the terms 'Yellowstone' and 'conflict.' We see the same trend when we look the major conservation cases in Greater Yellowstone. In the last 15 years of wolf management, major authoritative decisions reversed ten times (e.g. wolves on or removed from the endangered species list). Additionally, 11 major lawsuits were filed. Prior to 1995, there was not a single lawsuit or reversal of authoritative decision. The same pattern holds true in bison, grizzly bear, and snowmobile management.



Figure 3.2. Metrics of increase conflict in Greater Yellowstone. Data drawn from Lexis-Nexus searches.

Academics and writers who focus Greater Yellowstone have documented similar trends. Professors Mark McBeth and Elizabeth Shanahan (2004: 334) from Idaho and Montana State Universities portray Greater Yellowstone as "a political battlefield characterized by minimal trust, trading, or compromise between the competing perspectives," and projects that the

situation is likely to intensify in the future. Yale University's Susan Clark (2008: 2) states, "One thing is clear [in Greater Yellowstone]: people in the region are finding it difficult to identify, secure, and sustain their common interests. Interactions are often politicized and conflict-ridden and rigid ideologies crash against one another." Law professor Bob Keiter (1991: 3) argues that "the entire Yellowstone region has been a principal battleground" over ideological perspectives on how to manage the West. Jack Turner (2008: 4) believes that "most visitors to the Yellowstone country do not realize how serious the conflict has become." He paints a sobering picture that Greater Yellowstone's future "will make the conflict over drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge seem like child's play" (Turner 2008: 7). Perhaps Steve Primm (2000: 6) summarizes the situation best when he argues that grizzly bear conservation in Greater Yellowstone "looks more like a bar room brawl than a professional, scientific undertaking."

Conflict is not just limited to political and policy rhetoric. There has been significant non-sanctioned violence directed towards wolves, primarily through illegal poaching and poisoning. Additionally, there is concern—and surprise by some—that no one has shot at the federal wolf managers. The threat of violence cannot just be attributed to those who oppose wolves. In 1998, when the 10th Circuit was hearing arguments over the reintroduction of wolves, eco-terrorists threatened to blow-up the Farm Bureau's national office (Richardson 1998). While just outside of the Yellowstone system, in 1974, Glacier National Park ranger Art Sedlack shot a snowmobile with his pistol out of frustration over illegal snowmobiling (Yochim 2003). In the brucellosis case, members of the Buffalo Field Campaign often attempt to provoke bison hunters by following hunters into the field. Clearly, all people are not working together. Conflict appears to be escalating.

If we narrow the scope of the original goal statement from "all people" to "all people in the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit community," do we see a positive trend the ability of Greater Yellowstone's nonprofit community to work together? Abundant examples exist of the Greater Yellowstone environmental community working together. Recent successful campaigns for Wyoming Range Legacy Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and the Path of the Pronghorn are prime examples. In every one of my interview for this analysis, at least one of these cases were mentioned at the best example of collaboration in the region. Collaboration and comradery clearly exist among some organizations. This does not mean that all is well. A subset of my interviews included long-term members of Greater Yellowstone's nonprofit community (individuals who are active for more than 25 years). These conservationists all asserted that conflict, territorialism, and balkanization have substantially increased within the nonprofit community during their tenure in the region. A research scientist, with 42 years of experience with Greater Yellowstone's nonprofits remarked, "Early on [referring to the 1970s], there used to be a lot more openness and sharing of ideas and data among nonprofits. Now sharing is counterproductive. Our organization has been 'scooped' by others; stealing our ideas and selling them to funders." His small nonprofit (staff of two) only works with a group of long-time, trustworthy friends. He rarely considers collaborating with new organizations. The executive director of one of the region's largest conservation nonprofits shared a similar sentiment. In this director's 35 years in Greater Yellowstone he acknowledges that effective collaboration occur among conservation nonprofits, but believes the general trend is negative. He states:

> There is no question. Our community is increasing dysfunctional….One of the greatest lessons over the last 20 years is that our community needs to be less concerned about who gets the credit for a particular victory. We need to be focused on what is good for the ecosystem, not our organizations. When we do this, we win. However, things are often muddied due to turf, ego, and identity. As our community has grown, so has this issue—battles over turf seem to be getting worse.

An employee at Natural Resources Defense Council has a cynical take. He stated, “Conflict is inevitable between conservation nonprofits. We compete for funds and attention. This will never change.” A member of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance agrees that “too much division and alienation has been created” in the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community and that “we need to find ways to more effectively engage each other.” A survey of conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone found that 51% of organizations claim the community collaborates ‘somewhat well,’ concluding that “there is clearly room for improvement in how organizations work together” (GYCOI 2009: 8). There is room for improvement in meeting this first goal, as the majority of indices suggest failure.

Goal # 2: Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat.

In 1975, grizzly bears received protection under the Endangered Species Act as a ‘threatened’ species. The major precipitating event was a drastic increase in grizzly bear mortality and diminished reproductive rates due to the closure of Yellowstone’s open-pit trash dumps (Craighead et al 1995; Stringham 1986). Prior to 1968, Yellowstone’s dumps were the primary food source for grizzly bears (Craighead et al 1995). Following the publication of A. Starker Leopold’s seminal paper "Wildlife Management in the National Parks,” the United States Park Service transition to a new management philosophy called natural regulation (Chase 1987). Natural regulation attempts to mimic natural processes by minimizing human influence on wildlife and landscapes. Yellowstone phased out the use of dumps within the park’s boundaries between 1968 and 1971. The park’s intention was to slowly wean bears off of trash and onto more traditional food sources. While well intentioned, the result of this policy was the death of 189 grizzly bears between 1968 and 1973—half of Yellowstone’s grizzly population (Chase 1987).

At the most basic level, we can use population estimates of grizzly bears that inhabit Greater Yellowstone as a metric to evaluate the long-term success of grizzly bear conservation. Between 1975 and 2007, the protection of grizzly bears under the Endangered Species Act significantly reduced grizzly bear deaths in the Yellowstone region (Mattson and Merrill 2002). In 1975, the Greater Yellowstone grizzly bear population was approximately 200 individuals (Haroldson et al. 2008). By 2010 the population increased three-fold, with roughly 600 grizzly bears in the region (Brown 2010). This remarkable recovery prompted the delisting of grizzlies from the Endangered Species Act in 2007. Grizzly bear recovery coordinator Dr. Chris Servheen called the population increase "the biggest success story under the Endangered Species Act" (Robbins 2005). Yellowstone National Park Superintendent Suzanne Lewis (2008: 1) agreed, stating "we owe ourselves a modest pat on our collective back" for this "success story." From a population perspective the long-term conservation of grizzly bears appears successful.

If we dig deeper into the story of grizzly bear conservation, another chapter emerges. Many conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone who focus on large carnivores believe that population numbers alone do not paint the full picture of grizzly bears' future. Natural Resources Defense Council grizzly bear advocate Louisa Willcox argues that grizzly bear mortality has increased in the last 10 years, likely due to the decline in grizzly food sources. Willcox (2009) maintains, "No one can deny that the population will go into a tailspin if current trends continue." The Greater Yellowstone Coalition's Jeff Welsch (2010: 10-11) concurs with Willcox's opinion stating, "the bear's future is still far too tenuous….of particular concern is the dramatic loss of the whitebark pine." The general argument conservationists make is: If grizzly bears' three major food sources in Yellowstone (white bark pine, army cutworm moth, and Yellowstone cutthroat trout) continue to decline, we may experience a scenario similar to the

dump closures of 1968 to 1971. As grizzly bears search to find new food sources, they are more likely to come into deadly contact with humans. The Greater Yellowstone Coalition (2010) makes this argument explicitly:

> even with the species protected, it's still threatened: By the end of October 2010, 48 bears in Greater Yellowstone had died or were moved to zoos—equaling the previous record set just in 2008. Most of the mortalities are the result of conflicts with humans—bears killing livestock or frequenting homes and campsites for food, or being killed in encounters with deer and elk hunters in the fall.

This argument is not new. Pease and Mattson argued in 1999 that "threats posed by diminishing whitebark pine and increasing numbers of people are inconsistent with an optimistic long-term prognosis for the Yellowstone grizzly bear population." These authors demonstrate that grizzly bear mortality was nearly three times higher in years with poor whitebark pine seed crops than during bumper years. The USFWS has downplayed this projection argument, claiming that grizzly bears will adapt to other food sources.

In response to the delisting, nine environmental groups filed a lawsuit to relist grizzly bears under the endangered species list in 2007.[8] On September 21, 2009 U.S. District Judge Donald Molloy sided with environmental nonprofits ordering that grizzly bears be relisted under the Endangered Species Act. Among his rationale for relisting, Molloy (2009: 31) focused on a lack of consideration for the decline of grizzlies' food sources:

> Deference to an agency's scientific expertise is mandated when the agency articulates a rational connection between the facts and its conclusion. The science relied on by the [US Fish and Wildlife] Service does not support its conclusion that declines in the availability of whitebark pine will not negatively affect grizzly bears. In fact, much of the cited science directly contradicts the Service's conclusions. While the agency's discretion is broad in its area of expertise, the discretion is not unlimited. The record supports the Service's own statements that the extent of declines in whitebark pine and the grizzlies'

[8] Earthjustice, Advocates for the West, Western Watersheds Project, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Alliance for the Wild Rockies, Center for Biological Diversity, Great Bear Foundation, and the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance.

> response is "uncertain." Where the agency's conclusions contradict the science, the conclusions are not reasonable and the Court need not defer to the agency's decision. Such is the case here.

When appraising progress towards the goal of securing the long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear we must determine if a trend (population numbers) or projection (food source) argument is more appropriate, or both. Increasing bear numbers is certainly encouraging in measuring progress towards the long-term viability of grizzlies. However, we must give the projections argument more weight in the context of this appraisal for a simple reason: Yellowstone conservation nonprofits are the primary interest group pushing forth the food source argument. If the assessment of conservation nonprofits is that their goal has not yet been met, we can assume there is room for improvement in meeting this goal.

> *Goal # 3: Contribute new knowledge toward improving the management and preservation of our natural environment by pursuing innovative, long-term research on key ecosystem components.*

The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem is one of the most studied ecological regions in the world. Several organizations maintain bibliographic databases of scientific and popular articles pertaining to the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. The Washington State University's *Yellowstone Park Science Bibliographic Database* contains 14,060 entries (WSU 2010). The University of Wyoming's *Greater Yellowstone Bibliography* boasts 28,900 citations (UW 2001). Clearly, Greater Yellowstone is the geographic focus of a large amount of scientific research. Rather than focus on the quality of scientific information, let's assume that Greater Yellowstone is home to many distinguished scientists conducting excellent scientific research—including innovative, long-term research on key ecosystem components. However, the goal we are evaluating requires that this increasing base of knowledge *to improve both the management and preservation of the natural environment*.

Evaluating the effect of science on management is challenging for at least three reasons. First, for scientific knowledge to contribute to improving management it be must be relevant to decision making (McNie 2007). While this statement may seem like a non sequitur, this fact is often neglected in practice. Ask any scientist 'is your research is relevant to decision making?' and the answer you will likely receive is 'yes.' Scientific research is nearly always presumed to be relevant topically by scientists, but often fails to meet the needs of decision makers (Sarewitz and Pielke 2007). A more appropriate question to ask a scientist—or of a particular scientific study—is 'how will this scientific information change a particular decision?' For example, how will, and what type of, scientific research on Yellowstone National Park's wolf population will actually alter the management of wolves in within the boundaries of Yellowstone? Since Yellowstone is a protected refuge for wolves, the reality is that scientific research on wolves has little decision relevance for the superintendent of Yellowstone. The second challenge we must contend with is the actual use of scientific information. Even if research is relevant to a decision, it is not a guarantee that it will be used to improve management (Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2005; Sarewitz et al., 2004; Clark 2009). Extra-scientific factors such as political manipulation, poor comprehension, and competing priories may hinder the use of research by decision makers (Ascher and Steelman 2010; Pielke 1995; Lemos 2002; Lemos and Morehouse 2005). Third, the relationship between science and decision making is highly complex. Science can be appropriately utilized in the decision making process in multiple ways (Pielke 2007). Often, it is not apparent exactly how scientific information is (or should be) used by decision makers.

When speaking with nonprofits that focus on research, there appears to be little thought on how scientific information will improve decision making. For example, at a public presentation a lynx researcher at a Teton County nonprofit was asked how their organization's

research might affect lynx management, the individual did not have an answer. A scientist for the Wildlife Conservation Society made a comment typical of scientists in the region, "We focus on doing good science, not influencing policy." A researcher for a nonprofit in Bozeman, MT had a much more cynical take. He said, "Our research is influenced by what our funders want, not what are the most scientifically appropriate questions." He continued that he believes that this trend is systemic amongst organizations reliant on soft money (donor support).

The use of science in decision making is a hotly contested issue in Greater Yellowstone and in environmental policy more broadly. Numerous individuals have lambasted governmental decision makers for abusing science in the decision making process in Greater Yellowstone (e.g. Chase 1987, Clark 1997, Clark et al 1999, Wagner 2006). Long-term regional reporter Todd Wilkinson documented the intimidation of governmental scientists by the USFWS when those scientists' professional judgments did not justify predetermined policy alternatives supported by the agency. The most egregious example was the treatment of grizzly bear biologist Dave Mattson in 1993. Mattson's data demonstrated that logging roads present a significant challenge to grizzly recovery, which was in contrast to the USFWS official position. In the middle of the night, Mattson's superior's raided his office. The USFWS (Wilkinson 1998: 85):

> deleted data files and confiscated floppy discs from Mattson's computer, tore out pages of research from his notebook binders, and removed field data from office filing cabinets….Ten years' worth of accumulated data—the results of thousands of hours afield gaining an intimate view of bears—was taken away from the scientists most capable of interpreting it

The USFWS is not the only agency accused of ignoring or manipulating science that does not conform to agency positions. In 1970, grizzly bear biologist Frank and John Craighead were banned from research in Yellowstone due to their studies conflicting with NPS's official bear policy (Chase 1987). At the time, the Craighead brothers were the most knowledgeable grizzly

bear biologists in the park and the world. Utah State University professor Fredric Wagner intensively studied the northern Yellowstone elk herd. Wagner (2006: 308) found "the weight of the evidence since 1970 failing to support much (if not most), of the park-supported scientific inference on the northern range [elk] issue." As a result of their misinterpretation of the science, management was not informed by the empirical biologic realities. Susan Clark (1997) documented a similar problem with the Wyoming Game and Fish Department in her study of endangered black-footed ferrets in southeastern Greater Yellowstone. Susan found the agency ignored critical scientific information in order to maintain the agency's power position in ferret recovery.

There appears to be a systemic trend in Greater Yellowstone of scientific information being ignored when it does not conform to pre-held political positions (Clark 2000). Conservation nonprofit leaders recognize this dilemma and many suggest it is getting worse. The executive director of one of the GYE's large environmental nonprofits stated:

> Compared to 30 years ago, we have a lot more good science. This has greatly benefited the conservation community. However, the scientific information is more fragmented. Due to the large body of literature, it is more bewildering to figure out what is going on. This makes it tricky to use the best available science in our conservation strategies.

He continued that the opposition often cherry picks scientific data, not taking the full scientific context into account. Science policy Dan Sarewitz (2004) has documented this phenomenon across a number of scientific contexts and calls it the excess of objectivity. Sarewitz argues that we are inundated with scientific information today. The sheer volume of information virtually guarantees that information will be cherry picked—intentionally or not—to support our predisposed political perspectives. Using the case of wolves as an example, an ongoing debate in Greater Yellowstone is the effect wolves have on elk. Anti-wolf advocates often claim that wolves decimate elk populations and pro-wolf advocates counter-claiming that wolves have

minimal impact. Since these claims directly contradict each other, it is easy for us to assume side must be supported by scientific fact and the other by mere conjecture. However, the science provides a much more nuanced answer. From 1984 to 2009, overall elk population increased 5% in Idaho, 35% in Wyoming, and 66% in Montana (RMEF 2009).[9] During the same time period, several elk herds in Greater Yellowstone declined. From 1995 and 2008, the Northern Yellowstone elk herd decreased by 68%, the Gallatin Canyon elk herd by 67%, and the Madison Firehole elk herd by 78% (Allen 2010). A number of factors are responsible for these declining populations. However, wolves are certainly a major factor. Both sides are able to develop scientifically supportable positions by ignoring the full context.

While nonprofits contribute to scientific information related to conservation, there are clearly major roadblock to the use of science in conservation decision making. In short, there is substantial room for improvement in the realization of this goal. The improving the use of science in management is a failure.

Goal # 4: Help people and wildlife coexist.

The concept of wildlife coexistence has expanded in popularity over the last 15 years. Many conservationists believe that humans are a primary cause of species' mortality. To these individuals, ensuring the long-term conservation of Greater Yellowstone's wildlife requires reducing human-wildlife conflicts on private and public lands. For example, when wolves kill livestock the offending wolves are usually killed by government officials. Wolf-livestock coexistence strategies have the potential to reduce livestock depredations by wolves and thereby minimize wolf mortality. More broadly, some coexistence advocates are interested in producing broad social change. In the context of carnivore coexistence, Susan Clark and Murray Rutherford

[9] Wolves were reintroduced in 1995.

(2005: 6-7) argue coexistence requires finding ways to “minimize local, on-the-ground conflicts between people and predators” and “finding ways to change what carnivores mean and symbolize.” In fact, minimizing actual conflicts is an explicit strategy to build social tolerance for highly charged politically species (Clark and Mattson 2005). Using this definition, successful coexistence strategies requires (1) pragmatic programs that change outcomes related to wildlife and people, and (2) help ameliorate negative social perceptions of wildlife.

Most of the leading conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone currently have coexistence programs. For example, Defenders of Wildlife’s (2010: n.p.) Coexisting with Carnivores Program seeks "to develop both a better understanding of how to prevent conflicts with wild carnivores, as well as tools for living harmoniously with them.” The Greater Yellowstone Coalition claims to work with “state agencies, ranchers, hunters and fellow conservationists….to help wolves and people coexist” (Clark 2010a: n.p.). Similarly, The Wildlife Conservation Society (2010: n.p.) claims it is “devising creative ways to help people and wildlife coexist.” The sheer number of such programs is a positive indication that this goal is a worthwhile objective. However, do such programs help reduce wildlife conflicts and change social perceptions? We can use carnivore coexistence as a surrogate for understanding the goal of wildlife coexistence in Greater Yellowstone.

At small scales, coexistence programs have shown to be effective at reducing human-wildlife conflicts. For example, the Blackfoot Challenge Initiative has reduced grizzly bear conflicts in the Blackfoot region of Montana by 93% between 2003 and 2009 by reducing the vulnerability of food sources to bears (Porter and Wilson 2010). The Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative is involved in similar efforts in the Gravelly Mountains of western Montana (Primm 2010). These types of programs are a positive step; however, broad scale trends

related to wildlife coexistence have not been significantly impacted by such efforts. For example, wolf conflict has escalated since wolves were reintroduced in 1995 and grizzly bear conflicts have remained steady (Figure 3.3). Additionally, human caused wolf and grizzly bear mortality has steadily increased over time (Figure 3.4). These trends do not bode well for the current influence of coexist strategies across the entire ecosystem. Susan Clark and Murray Rutherford (2005: 19) argue "if the current situation continues, things may get much worse as wolves and grizzlies expand their densities and range." In light of this trend, some coexistence advocates are frustrated by what they perceive to be the symbolic uptake of coexistence strategies with little change on the ground. To them, coexistence is a "practical problem that needs local, lawful and low-cost responses" that actually solves the problem (Chaney 2009: n.p.). They argue that coexistence is the new buzz concept in Greater Yellowstone, and that very few organizations have the capacity to actually achieve coexistence goals. This dynamic is discussed in more detail in chapter five under the heading parasitic organizations.



Figure 3.3. Wolf and grizzly bear conflicts. Wolf conflicts include numbers of cattle and sheep killed per year (USFWS 2001-2010). Grizzly bear conflicts include damage to property,

anthropogenic foods, human injury, gardens/orchards, beehives, and livestock depredation (Schwartz and Haroldson 2002-2004; Schwartz et al 2005-2010).

Similar to the challenge of actually reducing metrics physical human-wildlife conflicts, social opinion over many mega-fauna species has not changed significantly in recent years. In 1987, the Defenders of Wildlife created the Wolf Compensation Trust to reduce political opposition to wolf recovery by compensating ranchers for livestock lost to wolf depredation. This is a coexistence strategy to build social tolerance. From August 1987 to June 2008, the fund distributed $1,100,122 to 776 ranchers (DW 2008). In a study of political conflict in greater Yellowstone, Mark MacBeth and Elizabeth Shanahan (2004) found that the economic compensation program has not "reduced the intensity of the conflict over wolf reintroduction." Tolerance towards large carnivores in Greater Yellowstone does not seem to be improving (Clark et al 2005; Nie 2003). Mike Clark (2010c: n.p.), executive director of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, bluntly states, "Anti-wolf rhetoric is at an all time high in Greater Yellowstone."

Coexistence strategies often require one-on-one diplomacy in order to change the practices of private actors (Wilmot and Clark 2005). In this sense, they are a slow means to elicit change and we should not expect significant gains at the landscape scale at a rapid pace. However, if the ultimate goal of coexistence is to reduce human-wildlife conflict and change the symbolic politics of these species, there is still room for significant process. In other words, the nonprofit community is failing to meet this goal at the system wide level.



Figure 3.4. Human caused wolf and grizzly bear mortality in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. (Schwartz and Haroldson 2002-2004; Schwartz et al 2005-2010; USFWS 2001-2010).

Summary of goals

The aim of this chapter is to make the case that there is substantial room for improvement in the realization of Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits' goals. For the purposes of developing a case for improvement it is not necessary to develop a generalized model of what how many goals are lagging. Rather, all four goals in this chapter's analysis suggest that nonprofits can do better. We are not on track to meet any of the four goals. The first goal is an outright failure. Political conflict is escalating in Greater Yellowstone. It appears increasingly unlikely that all people (or even a majority) will likely work together to protect the region's ecological integrity and beauty—despite the fact a majority of the region is in support of such protection. This dynamic is discussed in more detail in chapter four. The second goal is equally unmet. While grizzly bear numbers increased substantially over the last 40 years, conservation nonprofits share concern over the future viability of the species. As the bears' major food sources decline, it is likely that the species will have increased deadly encounters with humans. Overall

in the ecosystem, there is little grounded work being done to address this future problem. The third goal is the most positive. There is no question Greater Yellowstone is home to extensive, cutting-edge, long-term scientific research. However, there appears to be significant disconnect between research and decision making. Often research is used to justify an *a priori* political position. The use of science to justify worldviews is further discussed in chapter six. The fourth goal is also associated with mixed trends. There are a number of innovative wildlife coexistence strategies being implemented by the Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community. However, these strategies are often symbolic in nature with little grounding in the realities that wildlife and people face. In short: *Substantial room for improvement exists within the Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community*. The community is failing to make progress towards all four goals surveyed (Table 3.3).

	Goal	Criteria	Trend	Verdict
#1	**All People Work Together**	↓ environmental litigation ↓ conflict publications ↓ perception of conflict ↑ perception of cooperation	↑environmental litigation ↑conflict publications ↑perception of conflict ↓perception of cooperation	***Failure***
#2	**Grizzly Bear Conservation**	↑ or stable bear population ↓ threats	↑ bear population food source decline	***Mixed Results****
#3	**Science in Decision Making**	↑ relevance of science to decision making ↓ manipulation of science	Unclear; no likely change Unclear; no likely change	***Failure***
#4	**(Carnivore) Coexistence**	↓ carnivore-livestock conflicts ↓ carnivore-human conflicts ↑ social tolerance	↑ carnivore-livestock conflicts ↑ carnivore-human conflicts ↓ social tolerance	***Failure***

Table 3.3. Summary of goal achievement. *Grizzly bear conservation must be considered a failure as the threats (projection) criteria the primary measure of success articulated by the environmental nonprofit community.

It is worth briefly discussing the interplay between individual and community goals. At the individual organizational level, the analysis in this chapter suggests that failure to achieve

formal organizational goals is occurring. This is problematic from the standpoint of any particular organization. However, in aggregating goals, we are able to infer a larger problem. The goal of his dissertation is for nonprofits to achieve their organizational mission. The failure of the four goals appraised in this chapter suggests a large collective action problem in the environmental nonprofit community. The failure of these four goals suggests a systemic problem in the environmental nonprofit community in the ability of all environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone to achieve their formal organizational goal commitments. In other words, the broad community faces a crisis in goal obtainment. One way to understand this is the likelihood all four goals failing from randomly four goals from the list of 194 in Appendix A (assuming a 50% failure rate in the overall population). A binomial probability demonstrates that the chance or randomly selecting four goals as failures (with a 50% failure rate) is 6.25%. This is suggestive that the actual failure rate for environmental nonprofits is actually much higher.

3.4 Do nonprofits agree?

Early on in my interview process, a Defenders of Wildlife employee discounted my research. He asserted that, "I cannot possibly imagine how we could be more effective." This person explained that his self-assessment pertained to both Defenders of Wildlife and the Greater Yellowstone conservation community. Similarly, I was told by an employee of the Nature Conservancy that evaluating the effectiveness of a nonprofit community was like "comparing apples to oranges." How could one possibly evaluate the effectiveness of a land trust (e.g. The Nature Conservancy) and an advocacy organization (e.g. Sierra Club) in the same analysis? He told me it was told it is an "impossible task" that was "not worth taking on." The purpose of this chapter is to argue against such critics, making the case that there is room for improvement in the ability of Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofit community to achieve the conservation

outcomes they desire. The goals evaluated suggest that there is room for these organizations to do better. However, beyond the analysis offered in the chapter, many Yellowstone conservationists agree.

In virtually every case I examined, a member of the nonprofit community asserted that there was room for improvement within their organization or within the community. For example, the executive director of one of the largest nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone asserted, “Every time we file a lawsuit it is an admission of political failure on our part.” He continued that the increased reliance on litigation by the environmental community suggests that they have lost touch with political strategies that work. Similarly, a 33-year staff member of a Bozeman based nonprofit asserted that “we underestimated the psychological impacts of the introduction of wolves.” He argued that environmental nonprofits often fail to take into account the symbolic politics of their opposition, stating “we should be more political savvy.” One of the preeminent regional conservation leaders asserted, “We have learned it takes eight to ten years to even come close to solving an issue. The New World Mine; The Wyoming Legacy Act—both took ten-year campaigns. However, some issues will be with us forever. Wolves are the prime example. What we need to do on those issues is find better ways to find common ground.”

The Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and the Charture Institute conducted two survey’s that support this conclusion. In May 2008, these two organizations surveyed 23 Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofits and asked respondents to rate the effectiveness of their environmental nonprofit and how effective the environmental nonprofit community is as a whole. Only one respondent gave their organization a perfect score. On a scale with zero being neutral and five being the most effective, respondents’ average rating for their own organizations was 2.96 and the overall community at 1.96. While respondents obviously favored their own

organizations, there appears to be broad agreement that the community can improve. The Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and Charture Institute conducted a followed up survey in 2009. The results of the second survey are even more striking. Respondents were asked open-ended questions on what were the greatest Greater Yellowstone conservation success and failure in 2008. After condensing the response into categories of similar responses an interesting trend emerged. There appeared to be conflicting assessments between organizations in four major categories (Figure 3.5). In virtually every issue that was considered a major success, other nonprofit community members saw the issue as a failure. This is suggestive that there is a "wide divergence of opinion in the conservation community regarding what constitutes a conservation success or failure, even on the same issue" (GYCOI 2009: 1). In other words, while a number of respondents saw improvement in a particular issue, there are community members who believe that more is possible.



Figure 3.5. Responses to the questions: "During 2008, what were the most significant conservation successes in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem?" And, "During 2008, what were the most significant conservation failures in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem?" (NRCC and CI 2009).

While we may be tempted to assign responsibility for the achievement and failure of nonprofit goals to specific organizations or programs, it is irrelevant for this chapter's analysis. The central issue is that nonprofits in Yellowstone can do better. We can and should expect more from these organizations. As argued in the first chapter, such a critique is not a slight on these organizations or evidence that organizations are incompetent or mismanaged. Rather, these Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits have a special responsibility to improve the conditions of conservation in the region. Just as the world's best athletes can continue to strive to do better, so can Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits. Nonprofits are subject to a number of institutional pressures that obstruct these organizations from achieving their formal goals; the formal goals being their organization's contract with the American people. The next three chapters discuss why Greater Yellowstone's nonprofits are failing to meet their potential.

Chapter 4: Why Nonprofits Claim to Fail: The holy trinity (plus one)

The previous chapter argues that conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone could be more effective at achieving their formal organizational goals. In order for us to understand how nonprofits can do better, we must first answer a simple question: *Why do nonprofits fail to achieve (or make progress towards) their formal goals?* The next three chapters are dedicated to answering this question.

Reasons for nonprofit failure are highly diverse. However, explanatory factors tend to cluster around certain topics. For example, failure to achieve organizational goals is often attributed to financial short falls or mismanagement within an organization. Extra-organizational factors ascribed to failure include an uneducated public (or decision maker) or a powerful opposition. This chapter explores conventional explanations for nonprofit failure, which I simplify into four factors. I call the first three explanations the holy trinity of conservation nonprofit failure. These three factors for organizational short comings are so often repeated within Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofit community—and within the larger environmental movement—that the explanations approach dogma. The first explanation is that conservation nonprofits fail due to a lack of resources. It is assumed that if a nonprofit only had more money the organization would be better able to achieve its organizational goals. Second is that political will is lacking for conservation by the public or politicians. Educating 'uninformed' citizens is generally the solution prescribed. Third is the presence of a well-funded and politically powerful enemy. In other words, the environment would be in better shape if corporate special interests did not actively oppose environmental interests. A fourth explanation, which I label poor management, is also addressed. Many foundations and academics believe that nonprofits often falter due to the lack of business skills by well-meaning nonprofit staff.

This chapter critically examines these four factors and asks: are these sufficient explanations to explain why nonprofits fail to achieve their goals? The answer this analysis arrives at is no. While each of these four factors may be useful for describing failure in certain circumstances, there is sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that we should be cautious in employing these explanations. Chapters five and six compare these four factors against alternative explanations in specific contexts. The general premise being that if we want to improve the performance of conservation nonprofits, we must look beyond conventional explanations for failure so we can innovate and develop alternative solutions for success.

4.1 The holy trinity of conservation nonprofit failure

In our search for answers to why Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits have trouble meeting their goals, speaking directly with staff and board members is the most appropriate place to start. A nonprofit's workforce is the greatest reservoir of knowledge regarding the minute details of the conservation cases they work on, as they are the individuals who actually implement a nonprofit's programs. More importantly, the conservation outcomes a nonprofit achieves are dictated directly by the performance of its employees. Board members help set strategic directions for nonprofits and are well attuned to the big picture questions a nonprofits face. Rather than rely on theoretical basis for poor performance, practitioners provide an empirical basis for understanding failure. It is their perspectives that matter in securing conservation outcomes.

My interviews revealed three major explanations by conservationists for environmental nonprofit failures. In every interview I conducted for this manuscript, at least one of these factors was highlighted by the interviewee. I call these explanations the holy trinity of nonprofit failure: lack of resources, lack of political will, and a robust opposition. These three factors are also

described, in part, in the academic literature. While these explanations are primarily derived from my interviews, the full account of each factor is supplemented by the nonprofit literature.

4.1.1 Lack of resources

In 2008, the Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and the Charture Institute hosted a conference called *Conservation 2.0: Greater Yellowstone past, present and future*. All 183 conservation nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone were invited to participate. Every organization that attended was invited to partake in a five minute 'brag session.' During the allotted time, each organization was asked to describe their mission, accomplishments and greatest challenges. There was a clear theme among the challenges nonprofits claimed to face: a lack of resources. For example, Steve Hoffman (2008) of the Montana Audubon Society stated, "organizationally, of course, our greatest challenge is probably sustainable funding." Bob Inman (2008) of the Wildlife Conservation Society agreed, "One of our challenges is multi-year funding and the willingness for funders to stick with it." Louise Lasley (2008) of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance echoed that "One of our challenges…is sustainable funding." Penelope Pierce (2008) of the Yellowstone to Yukon Initiative agreed that a central challenge of her organization is to "sustain and diversity our funding base." Lil Erickson (2008) of Corporation for the Northern Rockies was of the same opinion, "We are challenged by funding."

My interviews with nonprofit leaders revealed a similar attitude. In every single interview with a nonprofit executive director, failure to achieve organizational goals was attributed in part to a lack of funds. For example, the director of a Jackson Hole wildlife based nonprofit stated, "our organization does not have the funding necessary to appropriately staff our programs…[as a result,] we spread ourselves too thin." She argued that with an appropriate amount of funding, her organization could effectively tackle all problems they face. The executive director of an

environmental advocacy nonprofit based in Laramie, WY asserted, “Many of our projects require a multi-year [financial] commitment. Our grant makers are unwilling to commit to multi-year funding.” He maintained that his staff was insecure in their job, due to a lack of organizational stability. With the right amount of funding, his staff would be able to relax and “concentrate on their performance.” The regional program director (based in Bozeman, MT) for a national environmental nonprofit attributed his organization’s lack of effectiveness on combatting natural gas development in Greater Yellowstone to the fact “we can’t get traction with funders on this issue.” He asserted that few funders were willing to even touch the issue for political reasons. Without funding, there is no way his organization could “take on big oil.”

Money is the lifeblood of a nonprofit. Without sufficient resources, it is impossible for a director to hire staff and pursue the organization’s objectives. As such, revenue is always a principle concern for nonprofit managers. The statements mentioned above are hardly unexpected. However, we must ask the question: is the lack of resources as reasonable explanation for why nonprofits fail to meet their organizational objectives in Greater Yellowstone? It is easy to argue that if any particular nonprofit had more resources the organization could expand the services they offer. Certainly, this is the case to some extent. The more resources an organization has, the more likely the organization can devote additional resources to their mission. It is near heretical to argue otherwise.

However, this does not necessarily mean a lack of resources is a reasonable explanation for nonprofit failure. All organizations and people face resource constraints. For example, the United States’ Census Bureau publishes guidelines every year for defining the poverty thresholds for American citizens. People who earn below a certain income (e.g. below $10,991 for a one-person household in 2008) are presumed to lack the appropriate resources to meet their basic

human needs.[10] These basic needs (personal goals) include food, shelter and water. People also have countless other goals that extend beyond these basic needs. For example, an individual may have a personal goal to visit family across the country. It is often difficult for those in poverty to meet their extended goals compared with more wealthy individuals. Chapter three defined failure as the inability to meet or make significant progress towards an organization's formal goals. With so many complaints of funding, we might assume that Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofits are resource starved to the point where they are in organizational poverty. In other words, we might believe these organizations are in such dire straits that their lack of resources prevents them from making progress toward their formal goals. They must struggle to stay in business. The question we must ask to determine if a lack of resources is reasonable explanation is: are these organizations truly resource starved? Do they have enough resources pursue their formal goals, or are they truly hindered by a lack of resources?

We can answer these questions by looking at both the nonprofit community and individual organizations. Nonprofits are required to file tax returns with the IRS, commonly referred to as 990s. We can use these tax documents to estimate the total revenue of the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. The IRS does not require a nonprofit describe the revenue received or spent in a specific geographic location. So, for example, it is not possible to use these forms to determine the revenue streamsVof large national nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone (E.g. Sierra Club, National Parks Conservation Association, Natural Resources Defense Council, The Nature Conservancy, or Wildlife Conservation Society). These organizations do not geographically separate their revenue for the IRS. Fortunately, 34 of Greater Yellowstone's 183 conservation nonprofits exclusively focus their efforts on the Greater

[10] http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/thresh08.html

Yellowstone Ecosystem. We can look at this subset of the community to get a sense of Greater Yellowstone's nonprofit funding.

Using tax documents from 1998-2006, the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit community appears to be extremely well funded.[11] The combined average annual revenue of the 34 Greater Yellowstone centric nonprofits is approximately $50 million per year. Since these 34 organizations only represent 18.5% of the total number of organizations operating in the region and does not include any of major national nonprofits, tripling this number ($150 million per year) gives us a relatively conservative estimate of the regional environmental nonprofit revenue. In my interviews and informal discussions, nonprofit staff members tend to be shocked by this figure. They simply do not believe that this figure is anywhere close to accurate. In contrast, program officers at one of the largest foundations who work in the region agree that this figure is reasonable. In fact, a former grant maker at another Yellowstone centered foundation said, "I wouldn't be surprised if the total revenue exceeds $300 million." To put this figure in context, the estimated yearly nonprofit community's revenue of $150 million equates to just over $800,000 per organization. This means that over the last 10 years at least $1.2 billion was spent in the conservation nonprofit sector in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Major federal land management agencies serve as a reasonable basis for comparison to determine the scope of this figure. The National Park Service spends approximately $40 million per year in the region. All major federal agencies in the region (the GYCC) spend on average $130 million per year including fire suppression (Clark 2008). The nonprofit community's revenue is nearly equivalent to the major federal landowners in the region. Clearly, the environmental nonprofit community as a whole is well funded.

[11] The nonprofit GuideStar catalogs nonprofit 990s. The largest time period for which a complete set of Greater Yellowstone 990s were available was the nine year period of 1998-2006.

There are few areas in the world where conservation nonprofits can boast such an impressive figure. As such, it is difficult to argue that the system as a whole lacks resources for conservation—even if specific organizations have trouble. Further solidifying this argument is the fact the Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community is running on a surplus. During the 1998-2006 time period the average combined annual expenditures for the 34 conservation nonprofits that exclusively focus on Greater Yellowstone was approximately $40 million per year, leaving a $10 million yearly surplus. This surplus is consistent with 50 largest national nonprofits whose combined operating surplus was approximately one-fifth of their combined revenue in the same time period.[12] If the community were in dire straits we would expect them to be running a deficit, or at least breaking even.

There are, however, environmental nonprofits with financial challenges. These organizations below the 'poverty line' clearly can reasonably claim that resources are a principle reason for their failure to achieve their formal goals. Since the beginning of the 2008 recession, at least two nonprofits have closed their doors due to lack of funding in Greater Yellowstone. These two organizations represent only one-percent of the regional nonprofit community. The vast majority of organizations, in contrast, are well funded enough that we can expect them to make progress towards their goals—even if more money would help. The plight of a few conservation nonprofits is not evidence that community as a whole is in trouble. Just as some business fail, we must expect that some nonprofits will end up closing their doors. With only one-percent of the region's environmental nonprofits dissolving during a major financial crisis, it is unlikely that the majority of organizations are in trouble.

[12] These figure were determined by examining the claimed revenue and expenditures on the 990s for the 34 nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone and the top 50 conservation nonprofits (defined by income) registered with the IRS.

Following the money as an explanation for failure is challenged in a number of contexts beyond nonprofit performance. For example, the issue of campaign finance reform is a hot topic in American politics. There is a general assumption that the more money a political candidate is able to fundraise, the more successful the candidate's election prospects; money equals effectiveness. Columnist David Brooks challenges this conventional wisdom arguing that tracking spending of political campaigns is a poor way to explain electoral success. Brooks (2010: A25) explains that in the 2010 election cycle "Democrats in the most competitive races have raised an average of 47 percent more than Republicans. They have spent 66 percent more, and have about 53 percent more in their war chest." In the face of this considerable advantage, Brooks points out that the polls showed Democrats plummeting compared to their Republican counter parts. In the context of these electoral races, money does not equal effectiveness. He concludes (2010: A25):

> In the end, however, money is a talisman. It makes people feel good because they think it has magical properties…In this day and age, money is almost never the difference between victory and defeat. It's just the primitive mythology of the political class.

The same can be said for the environmental nonprofit community in Greater Yellowstone. Financial resources are an invaluable factor in contributing to nonprofit success. Without money, nonprofits are unable to even attempt to achieve their organizational mission. Of course, increased funding and efficiency of resource use are important factors for a nonprofit to consider. However, financial resources cannot full explain the failure of Yellowstone nonprofits to achieve their organizational mission. There are simply too many resources available for the community to use a lack of resources as a scapegoat. As David Brook's articulates, money is a talisman. With well-funded nonprofits, money is rarely the difference between an organization achieving its goals and organizational failure.

4.1.2 Lack of political will

In his 2007 film, *An Inconvenient Truth*, former vice-president Al Gore argued that in solving the global issue of climate change, "we have everything we need, save perhaps political will" (Guggenheim 2006). Political will is a common popular explanatory factor for why political campaigns fail, particularly from within the environmental community. There is a general assumption that environmental policies will fail to be implemented if some undefined threshold of public opinion is not crossed, due to policy makers lacking the incentive to take the requisite actions. When a lack of political will is identified, the standard prescription within the environmental community is to engage in education campaigns to increase the awareness or educate the public in the scientific facts of the issue.

In my interviews with environmental nonprofit staff, political will was a prevalent theme to describe political failure. For example, a staff member of the Sierra Club argued that there is "political apathy for conservation" in the region. She said that "people just don't care." Another respondent who works for The Wilderness Society argued that "mobilizing the public is difficult." He believes that when people have competing priorities with conservation, "conservation always loses." Ember Hall (2008) of the Teton Science Schools argues the problem is getting worse:

> Looking forward into the future, I think the biggest challenges for us as an organization and for the GYE [Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem] are connecting with a public that is becoming more and more disconnected from the landscape. That is a big challenge and it is difficult to foster a conservation ethic in people that maybe don't experience the landscape that often and don't understand the connections between ecosystem function and water and food and all of those things we naturally need.

To solve the issue of political will, most organizations focus on education campaigns. Anna Trentadue of Valley Advocates for Responsible Development (2008) argues that to improve conservation outcomes "we need to get the messaging out there." An employee of the Jackson

Hole Land Trust believes that "educating people is central to our role as conservationists." The executive director of a Bozeman based nonprofit argues that "as a community, we need to get better at public outreach and education." He continued that "we are not good at broadening our political base. Without increased public support from nontraditional partners, conservation [in Greater Yellowstone] will ultimately be unsuccessful."

There are two questions we must ask in regard to political will in Greater Yellowstone: Is the public unsupportive of (or have little concern about) conservation outcomes in the region? And, is political will actually a good explanation of conservation failure in general? The answer to both of these questions is no. Conservation in Greater Yellowstone is highly supported by both people in the region and throughout the United States. Irrespective of the answer to this question, we must also acknowledge that political will is a poor explanatory factor to why conservation policies fail.

Political will is a difficult concept to define and thus measure. However, we can understand political will as support for a particular policy outcome. In doing so, we must also acknowledge that support for a particular outcome can be differentiated from support for particular policy alternatives. In other words, we can differentiate goals from actions. For example, the longest land mammal migration in North and South America (excluding migrating caribou in the Yukon) is a pronghorn antelope migration in the southern portion of Greater Yellowstone. Securing this migration in perpetuity is of high concern from all political perspectives involved in the issue (Cherney and Clark 2009). In short, there is very high political support for the goal of maintaining the migration in perpetuity. However, this case has been highly controversial. Political opponents battled over the best way to secure the future of the migration. In general, environmentalist wished for the development of a new protected area and

individuals interested in local rights wanted a bottom-up landowner driven solution. Political will existed from multiple political perspectives on the overriding goal. Yet, conflicting stakeholders were deadlocked over the most appropriate solutions. In other words, there was political will for a conservation outcome, but not for any solution in particular. Since perspectives on good policy alternatives (solutions that are technically proficient, morally justifiable and politically viable) will always differ both between and within different political groups, the appropriate question we must ask is: Is there a lack of support for conservation goals in Greater Yellowstone?

The first way to answer this question is to take a broad scale look at support for conservation within the United States. Prior to 1960, environmental issues were virtually ignored by both pollsters and academic surveys on American public opinion. However, the early environmental polls in the mid-1960s to 1970 show a drastic increase in the number of Americans who care about environmental issues (Taylor 2009). This is consistent with the rise of environmental nonprofits during the same time period. For example, from 1973 to 2006, the General Social Survey asked respondents if the US Government is spending "too much, too little, or about the right amount" on protecting the environment. Over the three decades, public opinion remained relatively constant that government is under spending on environmental protection (Figure 4.1). In fact, public opinion has never dropped below 50% (Davis and Smith 2009). Similarly, Gallup has surveyed American citizens asking if they support environmental protection over economic growth. Between 1984 and 2006, opinion only dropped below 50% once (49% in 2004; Figure 4.1).

Public opinion on greater Yellowstone shows similar trends. In 2001, the Los Angeles Times conducted a telephone survey asking adults in nine western states[13] if they favored "protecting the areas where wolves and grizzly bears are still living now, even if it means

[13] Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.

limiting commercial activities such as logging, building roads, mining and oil or gas drilling in those areas?" The public's response was 69% in favor with only 21% opposed. The same survey asked the public's opinion on the restoration of wolves and grizzly bears, with 53% responding it was a good idea and only 36% a bad idea (Los Angeles Times Poll 2001). Similar trends are seen in Greater Yellowstone. Prior to the reintroduction of wolves 56% of Idaho residents, 48.5% of Wyoming residents, and 43.7% of Montana residents favored wolf reintroduction (Bath and Philips 1990; Bath 1990). Wyoming Game and Fish Department's pre-reintroduction survey found 44% of the Wyoming public supportive of wolf conservation with only 34.5% opposed (Thompson 1991). The opposition to environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone often shares a strong affinity to pro-environmental outcomes. For example, in regard to the issue of wolves, Jackson Hole hunting outfitter B.J. Hill states, "I have three boys…I would have liked to see if they could have learned to like that animal" (Hatch 2010, n.p.). Most members of the environmental nonprofit community would not expect an anti-wolf advocate to make such a statement. "We're not against predators," Hill explains, "We're against the politics of the predators" (Hatch 2010, n.p.).

There seems to be a broad agreement by the public that conservation in the Greater Yellowstone region is important. Even if political will were weak, we still must be careful in relying too heavily on this explanatory factor for nonprofit failure. The simple reasoning being: political will is an amorphous concept with little empirical grounding. Many political scholars are at a loss at how to understand the concept of political will. For example Linn Hammergren (1998: 12) argues that political will is:

> ...the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon. It is the sina qua non of policy success which is never defined except by its absence. It thus becomes the explanation for every policy failure despite the fact that so many programs are undertaken where it certainly does not seem present.

Lori Post, Amber Raile, and Eric Raile (2010: 654) share a similar view point, arguing that the ambiguity of political will makes "it ideal for achieving political aims and for labeling political failures when the diagnosis is unclear." They (*Ibid*) continue:

> interest groups are fond of invoking the term to account for a lack of policy change….The way the term "political will" is bandied about is a reflection of its presumed centrality in achieving policy change, but such casual usage is troublesome for those concerned with crafting, promoting, implementing, and analyzing public policies.

Post, Raile and Raile develop a comprehensive a framework for assessing political will. Central to their argument is that political will is a concept measuring agreement among decision makers to support a particular course of action. This definition strays from how political will is used by the vast majority of individuals I interviewed. The nongovernmental community in Greater Yellowstone addresses political will as a concept of willingness of the public to take action. Hence, this is why I evaluated the concept through public opinion.



Figure 4.1. Public opinion on environmental protection (Davis and Smith 2009; Gallup 2007).[14]

[14] The General Social Survey's question is: "With which one of these statements about the environment and the economy do you most agree? Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth. OR, Economic growth should be given priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent." Gallup Poll asked, "are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving and protecting the environment?"

A number of scholars have evaluated the relationship between public opinion and political action. For example, environmental advocates often argue that political will is lacking for action on climate change. This is reflected in previous quote by Al Gore. In contrast, Roger Pielke Jr. (2010: 41) argues that "public opinion on climate is not a fundamental limiting factor holding back action. Political will is not lacking." Pielke suggests that we lack good policy alternatives, not support for action. In another study, Paul Burstein (2006) studied examined 34 bills before Congress and compared them with public opinion data. He found that in only 50% of the cases, the legislative decision was congruent with polling data. The other 50% of cases, the legislative decision moved against public opinion. This should not be interpreted that public opinion does not matter in policy decisions. However, after a critical threshold public opinion likely only provides marginal returns to the likelihood of political success—just as David Brook's argues with the magical talisman of more money.

While a slippery concept, political will is a necessary component for long-term conservation success. The public must value environmental outcomes. While it is convenient to blame the public as complicit in environmentally damaging outcomes, the data presented in this chapter suggests that the American public (and the Greater Yellowstone community) highly values the environment. Enough political will exists for environmental action in Greater Yellowstone. The public does not need to be convinced of the importance of the region. However, the fact political will exists does not guarantee pro-environmental outcomes. Political decision makers must balance competing interests with the environment. The key for environmental nonprofits is to find solutions that both met the environmental agenda and the interests of competitors.[15] Blaming the black box of political will for political nonprofit failures

[15] Coexistence strategies, for example, are centered on this type of outcome (discussed in chapter three, under goal number four). Wolf coexistence focuses on reducing the vulnerability of livestock to wolves (minimizing

has little real empirical grounding. It is a poor explanatory factor for nonprofit success and failure.

4.1.3 A robust opposition

Environmental nonprofits often explain failure as the result of a strong and well-funded enemy. This generalized mythology is widespread in environmentalism and easily recognizable as a modified version of the biblical story of David versus Goliath. The story tends to unfold that greedy corporate interests are to blame for environmental destruction. It is the responsibility of underfunded environmental nonprofits to stand up and—as Dr. Seuss' Lorax says—speak for the trees. For example, in fighting natural gas development in southwestern Wyoming the environmental community developed a narrative of the 'big bad oil companies' versus migration pronghorn and mule deer (Cherney 2011). The same narrative occurs in Alaska over oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge where migrating caribou are pitted against fossil fuel extraction.

Greater Yellowstone is no exception to this narrative with most conservationists I interviewed attributing organizational failure to a strong opposition. For example, a program manager at the Wilderness Society lamented, "With increasing pressures for oil and gas exploration and use of our natural resources, we are going to be fighting bigger battles with big oil." He believes that successful outcomes will be rarer in the future, as more industry comes to the region. Lisa McGee (2008) of the Wyoming Outdoor Council states, "We're up against the oil and gas industry. They have a lot of money and a lot of power." However, the wealthy cooperation's are not the only opposition blamed for failure by conservation nonprofits.

---

depredation). By solving the problems ranchers face, the hope is fewer wolves will be killed. Wolves, in general, are killed through management actions when they are documented attacking cattle and sheep. If less livestock are killed, less wolves will be removed—a pro-environmental outcome.

Ranching also receives similar complaints. An employee of a Lander, WY based nonprofit argues, “They [ranchers] have the political power in Wyoming.” She argues most politicians consider the agricultural industry’s interests before conservationists. A board member for the Greater Yellowstone Coalition agrees. She states, “We need politicians who understand us; not ranchers.”

We must ask, once again, is a robust opposition a reasonable explanation for environmental nonprofit failure? Certainly, most interest groups would prefer not to face a well-funded and political strong opposition. Environmental groups are no different in this respect. As we explored in the first two factors of the holy trinity of nonprofit failure, there are times where a robust opposition may be a reasonable explanatory factor. It is easy to attribute failures to the strength of the other team. However, a strong opposition is not necessarily a contributing factor to nonprofit failure on at least two accounts. First, it assumes that the strategies a nonprofit utilizes are fixed and uncreative; that conservation is a game of black and white victories and failures. Second, a robust opposition often further motivates nonprofit constituencies to engage in action.

The strategies a nonprofit utilizes are critical to the organization’s success. Most nonprofit managers inherently understand this fact and strive to pursue strategies they believe to be the most effective. In spite of this, most nonprofits utilize relatively fixed strategies with creativity around the margins. This is evident in the way nonprofits market themselves to their donors. For example, rather than be problem oriented and describe organizational goals, most nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone appear to be strategy or solution oriented in their marketing. Conservation nonprofits describe their organizational activities through terms such as being education-based, centered on land acquisition, focused on legislative advocacy, or litigation.

Nonprofits tend specialize on a single one of these strategy and innovate within their area of expertise. When a nonprofits strategy fails, the generalized alternative is to fundraise harder and put more force behind the nonprofit's primary strategy. Little effort is place on determining if the organization's primary strategy is the right tool for the job. As management Guru Peter Drucker argues if a strategy fails—try once more. After the second failure, it is time to move on to a new strategy. In regard to nonprofits effectiveness, Drucker (2005: 71) states:

> There is only so much time and so many resources, and there is so much work to be done. There are also true believers who are dedicated to a cause where success, failure, and results are irrelevant, and we need such people. They are our conscience. But very few of them achieve. Maybe their rewards are in Heaven. But that's not sure, either.

As Drucker recommends, some environmental nonprofit in Greater Yellowstone utilize alternative strategies to secure their desired outcomes when the first methods fail. This is particularly important when battling an opposition with significantly more resources, financial or political. For example, rather than taking on the entire livestock industry, some nonprofits that focus on carnivore-livestock coexistence try to develop strategies in the interest of both environmental and ranching communities. Similarly, rather than try to prevent fossil fuel extraction in Greater Yellowstone, some organizations focus on encouraging what they view as responsible development. For example, some organizations advocate for directional natural drilling to minimize surface habitat disruption versus arguing against all development. Or, trying to minimize drilling during time periods and places where wildlife is most vulnerable (e.g. during the winter of critical winter range habitat). Many national environmental nonprofits utilize these basic strategies in other contexts. For example, working with Wal-Mart or Shell Oil to minimize environmental impacts versus advocating against all of the actions these corporation undertake.

A second major problem with this explanatory factor is that a robust opposition often serves to galvanize environmental constituencies rather than hinder them. One of the most influential individuals in the growth of environmental nonprofits was President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of the Interior James Watt. Secretary Watt was infamous for his anti-environmentalist rhetoric and policies, often attributed to such quips as "We don't have to protect the environment, the Second Coming is at hand" (Dawkins 2006: 288). Watt served as a lightning rod for fund raising and membership growth for environmental nonprofits. During Watt's tenure as Secretary of the Interior, membership of the Sierra Club approximately doubled (1980-3), the Wilderness Society tripled (1980-4, and Greenpeace quadrupled (1980-5) (Rosenberg 2008: 288). Many other large environmental nonprofits followed this same trend. (Youth 1989). Ronald Shaiko (1999: 28) states that "to this day, veteran staffers in the environmental community still refer to a significant cohort of members who joined their organizations in the early 1908s at 'Watt babies.'"

The anti-Bush rhetoric in the environmental community from 2000-2008 served a very similar function. In Greater Yellowstone, a development director for a Bozeman based nonprofit referred to the Bush Administration as "the good years." This individual lamented the relative ease of using President Bush as a symbolic fundraising tool. The executive director of a small scientific nonprofit agreed. He stated that "Lots of people still blame Bush for the challenges we face [in Greater Yellowstone]. This makes relating to donors easy." We can see this trend in Gallup poll data on the percentage of American's who claim to be members of a national or local environmental group. Since the Watt era, public opinion polls show that there are on average 10 million more members of environmental nonprofits during Republican presidential

administrations than during Democratic administrations (Figure 4.2). Clearly, a robust opposition is good for environmental nonprofit business.

There is little question that at times a robust opposition hinders conservation success. However, the frequency at which this explanatory factor is cited by conservation professionals in Greater Yellowstone is at odd with the robustness of the actual explanatory power of this variable. In many cases, environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone face a strong enemy. The natural gas industry, for example, has more resources at their disposal than environmental nonprofits. However, blaming failure on the opposition highlights a lack of creativity and innovation on the part of some environmental nonprofits. Success can be achieved without destroying the perceived enemy. Additionally, blaming a robust opposition serves an important symbolic function for environmental nonprofits. It allows environmental nonprofits to fundraise and increase organization membership by using the symbolic value of the opposition as means to galvanize support.



Figure 4.2. American environmental nonprofit membership (Gallup 2006).[16]

4.2 Plus one: Poor management

In my interviews with nonprofit staff, poor management was rarely discussed as a rationale for failure. This is hardly surprising, as most nonprofit managers likely believe they are effective managers. However, this explanatory factor was mentioned in every interview I conducted with grant makers (both foundations and individual donors). Additionally, poor management is the dominant explanatory factor in the academic literature on nonprofit effectiveness. This is likely due to the increased focus on nonprofit management and performance by business schools in the United States.

The field of nonprofit management is highly diverse and nuanced. However, for our purposes, poor management falls into two major categories. The first is philanthropic amateurism. That is, the idea that nonprofits are often made up of well-meaning individuals who are extremely passionate about their cause, but have limited experience running and managing an

[16] Data for the percentage of the population claiming to belong to an environmental group was aggregated through several Gallup Polls. Total membership was determined by multiplying the estimated percentage of the population with U.S. Census estimates for polling years.

organization. In other words, failure is due to a lack of skill in managing finances, marketing the organization, or human-resource management. The majority of academic and grant making thought on nonprofit failure falls into this category. The basic alternative to this conditioning factor is to increase the level of professionalism within nonprofits. The second category is professional mismanagement. That is, nonprofit managers who have the requisite skills to effectively manage but still make mistakes such as over expanding the nonprofit, poor strategic planning, or inattention to detail. The generalized alternative suggested is to increase nonprofit accountability.

Within both philanthropic amateurism and professional mismanagement, research is heavily oriented toward organizational governance and financial management. In general, the field of organizational governance focuses on unearthing basic principles for managerial success and the development of ideal organizational structures. For example, scholars are interested in finding the best structures for board governance, strategic planning, and human resource management. There is general agreement nonprofits who use 'best management practices' are more likely to be successful than those who do not. However, broad agreement ends there. The most recent reviews of the literature find that consensus on best practices is limited. In a review study of strategic management in nonprofit organizations, Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden (1999: 379) found that "few connections have been made among research studies, contributing to fragmentation of the field rather than consolidation." They argue that the findings within the field are so disparate that few generalizable concepts can be reliably applied in practice. Herman and Renz (2004) came to a similar conclusion in their study of nonprofit effectiveness. These authors (701) assert that "many sources that claim to offer best practices about nonprofit board or management provide little or no basis for assertions about best practices." In other words, there

is little empirical evidence for what best practices a nonprofit should employ. Crutchfield and Grant (2008: 208) further that:

> Even the most efficiently managed nonprofits, the groups that are 'run like a business,' will fail to reach their full potential if they only shore up their internal capacity to deliver programs. You can't neglect your organization, but neither should you let it eclipse your large purpose: to have impact…to achieve greater social change you must also focus on the things that are external to your organization.

Generalizable concepts on best practices for nonprofit management are likely highly context specific to individual organizations. While poor management is likely an important conditioning factor on why nonprofits fail to achieve organizational goals, pin-pointing reliable empirical evidence on poor performance is impossible save for the most egregious cases of mismanagement. We refer to such cases as fraud. As such, the conditioning factor of poor management is a weak explanatory factor for nonprofit failure. If we cannot identify poor management (except for the most glaring cases) and there is little evidence for how organizations can improve, it does not give us a reliable means to improve nonprofit performance. In contrast, the excess of contradictory studies presents the opportunity for current managers and board members to symbolically justify the status quo management of their organization.

The field of nonprofit financial management also argues that American nonprofits face a fundraising crisis (Eisenberg 1997). There is the perception that nonprofits often lack the skills necessary to fundraise effectively. This argument is often supplemented by a perceived accountability crisis; the belief that Americans are losing faith in nonprofits due to poor accountability and scandals within the nonprofit sector. The argument suggests that if a dishonest nonprofit commits fraud, it may disgust donors to the point where they will not donate their money or time to any organization including organizations beyond the perpetrator (Synder 2006). The academic literature focuses heavily on how to overcome philanthropic insufficiency

through improved fundraising techniques and improving accountability to minimize nonprofit fraud.

While novel means of fundraising are advantageous to capture funds from potential donors, those of us interested in the nonprofit sector as a whole should be aware that trends in overall giving are relatively stable. In constant dollars, the amount of charitable giving has increased substantially over the last 30 years (Figure 4.3). Additionally, as a percentage of personal income, giving has remained constant. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that a fundraising crisis exists for nonprofits. The amount of money available to nonprofits is increasing. If a true crisis were occurring, we would expect giving a percentage of income to decrease. This trend is consistent with environmental nonprofit revenue in Greater Yellowstone. Using the 990 data from the 34 environmental nonprofits exclusive focused on Greater Yellowstone, total revenue in constant dollars is increasing at a rate of approximately 8.4%.

Scholars focusing on improved fundraising miss-define the problem as a lack of resources and ignore the more important question of how those resources are used. Increased proficiency in nonprofit fundraising likely gives any particular nonprofit a competitive advantage over another, but does not necessarily improve the situation for securing the outcomes nonprofits claim to seek. Since American's have not devoted greater portions of their income to philanthropic charities over time, increased nonprofit fundraising has likely little benefit for nonprofit communities as a whole. As a result, improved fundraising is about the reallocation of resources among a nonprofit community and not a reasonable explanation for failure.



Figure 4.3. American nonprofit giving (Wing, Pollak, and Blackwood 2008).

4.3 Conclusion

Political scientist Graham Allison's (1971) classic study, *The Essence of Decision*, uses multiple explanatory models to understand decision making surrounding the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time his manuscript was published, the conventional wisdom for modeling decision making was the rational actor model. This theory of decision making assumes that individuals (and governments) make decisions to maximize expected payoffs in respect to a particular set of goals. In the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, rational actor models suggested that the possibility of nuclear war between the United States and USSR was unrealistic due to the rational actor concept of mutually assured destruction. In other words, no government would make a nuclear strike first because the consequences would result in nuclear annihilation for both countries. Allison disproved the idea of mutual assured destruction by showing the rational actor model ignored critical information needed by the Kennedy administration to make the most informed decision about the USSR and Cuba's actions. He did this by offering two other empirical models that arrived at different conclusions. Allison argued that reliance on the rational

actor model could have had catastrophic consequences. For example, prior to 1941, Japan was aware that their military power could not stand up to a full war with the United States. The rational actor model would predict—similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis—that the Japanese's government would not strike the United States first, since the resulting outcome would likely be the devastation of Japan. A military commander using conventional wisdom would never have considered the possibility of the attack on Pearl Harbor; the results were disastrous for our Pacific Fleet. Allison's other two models consider a range of alternative explanations for the actions of Russia and Cuba during the crisis. He does not claim that these two models fully explain what occurred during the military standoff, nor does Allison argue that we can develop a perfect model of decision making. Rather, his major point is that decision makers would have benefited from considering alternative explanations beyond conventional wisdom.

The question on the table in Greater Yellowstone is does the holy trinity (plus one) of conservation nonprofit failure fully explain why nonprofits are lagging in progress towards their formal goals? In other words, if a nonprofit is well-funded, enjoys broad public support, does not face a strong enemy, and utilizes effective management principles does that mean the organization is likely to achieve its organizational goals? The answer to this question—as Allison argues in *The Essence of Decision*—is maybe. In certain circumstances these explanations may in fact be correct. Nonprofits should consider these four factors. However, this chapter argued that there is significant evidence to suggest these generalized factors are not full accounts of nonprofit failure. While no single explanation will ever likely be enough to fully account for failure, the disproportionate reliance on these factors by nonprofit staff, boards, and donors skews attention away from potentially more robust explanations. If nonprofits want to improve their performance, reaching beyond pet explanations for failure is necessary. The

ultimate test for understanding and modifying performance is action (Brunner 2006). Reliance on conventional explanations has failed to solve the problems nonprofits face.

The next logical question is how can we reach past conventional explanations and find alternative conditioning factors for nonprofit failure? The next two chapters utilize the policy sciences framework as a means to expand our perspective. The generalized argument throughout the rest of the manuscript is that conventional explanations—the holy trinity (plus one) of environmental nonprofit failure—are disproportionally focused on manipulating two major variables: power and wealth. The bias in these explanatory factors is also evident in the various models of organizational effectiveness discussed in chapter three. The system resource model (judging success by the ability to fundraise) presupposes that the most influential factor for organizational success is financial resources (wealth). This model reduces the scope of choice for management interventions to questions about increasing total fundraising and efficiently using organizational funds. The internal process model (judging success by indicators of organizational governance) similarly assumes that poor management is the driving factor behind nonprofit failure. This model again restricts organizational interventions to choices over corporate governance (power). The participant satisfaction model (judging success by how well the interests of all relevant stakeholders are met) allows for a wider view of alternatives than the system resource and internal process models. However, it is still based in power dynamics.

While not discussed in chapter three, these biases are one of the major reasons for selecting the goals model of organizational appraisal for this analysis. This model allows for a broader set of explanatory factors for nonprofit failure—beyond wealth and power dynamics. To be clear, I am not dismissing wealth and power as factors leading to nonprofit failure. In contrast, I am suggesting that these are important factors for any nonprofit to consider when judging the

success of their own organization. However, the holy trinity (plus one) of conservation nonprofit failure are incomplete explanations of why conservation nonprofits fall short of meeting their organizational objectives. Nonprofit staff and officers that want to improve their organization's performance should consider these as serious possibilities, but also recognize that they are not necessarily full accounts of why their organization may be failing to meet organizational objectives. The next two chapters explore alternative explanations beyond conventional wisdom.

Chapter 5: Alternative Explanations: Challenges of the community

Imagine that you are appraising the effectiveness of a soup kitchen. What should be the primary measure of success? The first thing that may come to mind is quantifying number of meals served. A soup kitchen that serves more meals than another, or the most meals at the least cost, is likely to be considered the more effective organization. However, what does this metric say about addressing the larger issue of homelessness? Does serving more meals mean that we are effectively combating the issue of homelessness? The correct answer is no. We cannot understand the effectiveness of a soup kitchen's role in addressing the problem of homelessness without understanding dynamics between complementary organizations with similar goals. Homeless shelters, job training programs, and substance abuse centers programs matter too. Similarly, we must look at the dynamics of the larger conservation community to understand why environmental nonprofits often have trouble achieving their goals.

When looking at the broad dynamics of a nonprofit community, the first response of most analysts is look for gaps and redundancies in practice. For example we might ask: Is the Greater Yellowstone conservation community over or under attending to strategies such as advocacy, conservation easements, direct action, or lawsuits? Or, are there too many nonprofits focused on wildlife conservation and a dearth of organizations focused on clean energy? Large foundations are particularly prone to such thinking. A program officer for a foundation that funds over 20 Greater Yellowstone nonprofits explicitly states that her organization's job it to "make sure there are no redundancies" in the system.

This formula for effectiveness assumes two critical features. First is that an optimal set of strategies exist for any particular nonprofit community in the realization of their formal goals. Second, is that we can identify these optimal strategies for any particular nonprofit community.

Perhaps, in a carefully controlled experimental setting such conditions could be met. However, Greater Yellowstone's nonprofits operate in a real-world setting where the context is uncontrolled, complex and constantly evolving. Holland (1992: 20) argues that in such cases:

> the aggregate behavior of the system is usually far from optimal, if indeed optimality can even be defined for the system as a whole. For this reason, standard theories in physics, economics, and elsewhere, are of little help because they concentrate on optimal end-points, whereas complex adaptive systems "never get there." They continue to evolve, and they steadily exhibit new forms of emergent behavior….It is the process of becoming, rather than the never-reached end points, that we must study if we are to gain insight.

It is easy for us to succumb to the "the considerable temptations of the optimal or best solutions the conventional disciplines seem able to provide" (Brewer and DeLeon 1983: 4). However, these optimal approaches often fail in practice due to oversimplifying or misconstruing the context. We must acknowledge that problems in open systems have "no objective, scientifically verifiable, optimal solution…yet the problems are real and demand solution" (Clark 2002: 4). While many people have tried to elicit general principles for optimal nonprofit performance, this analysis approaches the problem of improving nonprofit performance from an alternative perspective. Through empirical observation and analysis, the next two chapters seek to expand the scope of thought and choice that nonprofits have in appraising their own performance rather than develop a generalized model of nonprofit success. Optimal performance is not sought. Rather, the chapters are conserved with how to continually strive to do better.

In this chapter, I offer three alternative explanations for the failure of Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits to achieve their organizational goals. This chapter looks at the dynamics of the broad community. For each of the three alternative conditioning factors, I explain the general concept and demonstrate how each factor has stronger explanatory power over conventional explanations in specific contexts. Chapter six is a parallel analysis looking at

inner-organizational challenges. The purpose of these analyses is to demonstrate that conventional perspectives on nonprofit effectiveness are inadequate if our goal is to improve the performance of these organizations.

5.1 Parasitic organizations

In the previous chapter, I highlighted that the most frequently articulated reason for nonprofit failure is a lack of financial resources. The conventional response to this challenge is upgrading the fundraising skills of development personnel within a nonprofit. Certainly, educating and training staff in expertise such as grant writing, funder diversification and marketing will likely help an organization stay afloat. However, Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits face a significant resource challenge beyond the proficiency of any single organization's ability to fundraise. A chronic challenge for the Yellowstone nonprofit community is parasitic organizations.

Parasitic nonprofits drain scarce resources away from other organizations with similar goals. The most straightforward form is an organization that fundraises on a particular issue, but devotes no resources addressing that issue in practice. For example, of the 183 conservation nonprofits that claim to operate in Greater Yellowstone, eleven nonprofits do not maintain a physical presence in Idaho, Montana, or Wyoming. For nine of the organizations, I could not verify that the nonprofit currently or previously had any substantial program focused on conservation in Greater Yellowstone. We can infer that these nine organizations use the widely recognized symbol of Greater Yellowstone as a means to secure funding from their donor base. As a result, these organizations draw resources away from efforts intended to secure conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone. Richard Steinberg (2006: 126) describes these types organizations as "for-profits-in-disguise," arguing such organizations reduce nonprofit

effectiveness by causing other "nonprofits that wish to provide the promised [services]…[to] have increasing trouble breaking even." This often forces the nonprofit intending to provide the promised service to "compromise on quality or leave the market" (Ibid).

When I describe the phenomena of parasitic organizations to Yellowstone's nonprofit leaders, their first response is typically to ask me for the names of those nine organizations. They want to smoke out the perpetrators and recapture the funding streams. My response is straightforward: I use these nine organizations as an example to illustrate the concept of a parasitic nonprofit. Thankfully, these nine parasitic organizations are all relatively small with minimal funding streams. Understanding the basic concept of a parasitic nonprofit allows us to better grasp the more insidious and damaging form. Often organizations claim to be engaged in work on a particular issue in Greater Yellowstone, but can provide no evidence demonstrating grounded programs on a particular issue beyond the promotional material for their organization. There are many instances where this behavior has perverse outcomes for the conservation community. Carnivore conservation in Greater Yellowstone provides a good example of how traditional explanations fail to account for parasitic organizations.[17]

On January 14, 1995, 14 wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone and 15 in central Idaho. Bruce Babbitt, former Secretary of the Interior under President Clinton, declared at the reintroduction in Yellowstone, "At last the wolves are coming home, and Yellowstone will be a complete ecosystem ... It's an extraordinary achievement and it's an important statement about who we are as Americans" (Milstein 1995). Sixty years had passed since the last wolf sighting in the Northern Rockies. The effective management policy at the time was eradication. The reintroduction under the Endangered Species Act shifted the policy to protection. In 2005, ten

[17] Goal #2 in Chapter three is: Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat. For the purpose of the analysis in this chapter we can substitute large carnivores for simply grizzly bears.

years later, more than 1,000 wolves inhabited the Northern Rockies; 325 in the public lands of greater Yellowstone. By 2009, the total Northern Rockies population exceeded 1,500 wolves (USFWS et al 2010). The reintroduction is considered a major achievement by the environmental community. For example, the media has depicted recovery as “Something's [that is] right with the world” (Corrigan 2005), “a marquee success story for wilderness ecology, park tourism and the federal Endangered Species Act” (O'Driscoll 2001), and “the preeminent symbol of all that is wild, free, and majestic” (Lloyd 1997).

On the surface, the reintroduction of wolves appears to be a success story of the Endangered Species Act. Wolves in the Yellowstone system are effectively recovered. However, a closer look at the reintroduction and delisting decision making processes reveals another story (Clark and Gillesberg 2001). Most communities surrounding Yellowstone see the reintroduction of wolves as a threat to their way of life. Charles Price, a rancher in Daniel, WY, states, “Wolves have no business in this country. It was almost a crime to reintroduce wolves in Yellowstone. There is no place here for them” (Robbins 2006). Such vehement opposition is usually justified on economic grounds. Steve Gordon, a rancher in Dubois, WY argues, "We are paying the price for society's desire to have wolves right here…[a]nd it's costing us a ton of money" (Stein 2003). Most environmentalists do not agree with this story. Louisa Willcox, of the Natural Resources Defense Council, counters, “These are just more fairy tales about wolves…What we've actually seen over the last nine years since the Yellowstone reintroduction is that wolves are barely making a dent on livestock and elk, and tourism revenues are up year after year, in large part because wolves are attracting so many visitors from all over the country" (ENS 2004).

Since 1994, 13 separate lawsuits over the reintroduction and delisting of wolves were filed. Seven of the lawsuits exclusively address the reintroduction. Most notably, in 1996, the

Farm Bureau Federation sued the UWFWS asking the court to order the removal of all reintroduced wolves. The district court found in favor of the Farm Bureau, and ordered the USFWS to remove the experimental population. This ruling was overturned by 10th Circuit Court in 1998. Dismayed with the Circuit Court's ruling, one Idaho (Custer), five Montana (Fergus, Wheatland, Blaine, Phillips, and Valley), and three Wyoming (Carbon, Park, and Freemont) counties passed resolutions calling wolves an 'unacceptable species' and 'outlawing' wolves within the county boundaries. For example, Phillips County, MT explicitly banned the "the presence, introduction or reintroduction of wolves" (AP 2003). While these resolutions are not enforceable, the counties' declarations—and the lawsuits—demonstrate an expectation of the unlawfulness of the reintroduction by many participants. Today, there is a battle over the listing of wolves under the Endangered Species Act, with five pieces of legislation in front of congress to potentially exclude wolves from consideration under the Act.

Nearly everyone involved in wolf conservation argues that political conflict over wolf management is escalating and highly problematic. Wolves are a highly polarizing symbolic species (Casey and Clark 1996). While the population count of wolves in the region suggests conservation success, the rise in social conflict creates fear that the current outcome is tenuous at best. For example, as a direct result of the political conflict, Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer (D) has actively encouraged ranchers to shoot wolves that harass livestock and directed Montana game wardens to suspend all investigations of wolf shootings north of Interstate 90 (Brown 2011). This occurred while wolves were listed under the Endangered Species Act. Similarly, former Idaho gubernatorial candidate Rex Rammell (R) urged Idaho County commissioners to pass an emergency ordinance to allowing county Sheriff Doug Giddings to kill wolves as a means to eradicate them from the county (Barker 2010).

As a means to reduce both human-wolf conflicts and social intolerance, a number of nonprofits have engaged in developing coexistence strategies for human wolf conflict. As discussed in chapter three, coexistence is an explicit conservation innovation to both improve environmental and social outcomes. Beyond wolves, some conservationists see a need to engage in wolf coexistence as a means to improve outcomes in other conservation issues. The director of a large carnivore focused nonprofit states that it "much more intense and politically vindictive out here [on other issues] because of wolves." A long-time staff member for the Greater Yellowstone Coalition agrees that "The wolf issue invades every other issue in the region."

My appraisal of the fourth goal in chapter three—helping people and wildlife coexist—concluded that there is still room for significant process in meeting this goal. As demonstrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, livestock-wolf conflicts and human caused wolf mortality has increased substantially over the last 15 years. To reverse this trend, there are a few individuals and nonprofits actively prototyping wolf coexistence strategies on the ground. Examples include Steve Primm's in the Madison Valley, MT and Timm Kaminski's similar efforts in the Upper Green in western Wyoming. Their general efforts included using innovative depredation-avoidance techniques that correspond to the home ranges of actual wolves versus trying to develop strategies applicable to the whole region. Such innovations include electrified fencing, fladery,[18] guard dogs, patrolling pastures, and finding alternative grazing areas. Additionally, these coexistence programs aim to build forums where ranchers are able to share their experiences of what actually worked in their personal experiences to minimize depredation events. While limited in scope, the perceived positive impacts of such coexistence programs have gained notoriety in the broader Greater Yellowstone conservation community. As a result,

[18] Fladery is a technique that uses fencing (often electrified) with small flags tightly spaced along the fence line as a means to deter wolves from crossing.

more nonprofits are attempting to engage in coexistence work. On the surface this may appear to be a positive trend. However, as we dig deeper another story emerges.

In my interviews with individuals who are engaged in coexistence strategies, their primary explanatory factor for failure is a lack of funding. One practitioner explained that coexistence strategies are "more than a technical fix." He argues that the most successful examples share a common feature, trust among the ranching community and the conservation practitioner. He claims that it took some of his colleagues over 15 years of working with these communities to build enough trust even engage in the simplest projects. He argues that "working with people takes time. It seems like the foundations aren't willing to support the type of work we do." Another individual laments that he is constantly living hand-to-mouth. He states, "I wouldn't be here if I didn't truly care about both people and bears…we are making an impact, but can barely get by due to the limited funding we can raise."

While more funding would certainly help, one of the primary challenges these individuals face is moving beyond the debilitating stereotypes ranchers have of environmentalists. It is necessary for coexistence practitioners to build trust and respect with ranchers and agency staff. This is the true currency of their work. Often this requires the coexistence practitioner remain in the background and allow other to take credit for grounded projects. However, one long-time coexistence practitioner is frustrated by what he calls the "disproportionate attribution of success" by environmental nonprofits. This individual was able to describe multiple instances where environmental nonprofits took full credit for success of coexistence projects, despite the fact the nonprofits only participated in a minor fashion. One clear case occurred where a national nonprofit approached his organization and asked, "Can we pay for a few electric fences [to keep out wolves]?" After allowing the national nonprofit to help pay for a small part of his work, the

national organizations began claiming success throughout the national nonprofits promotional material on carnivore coexistence. The national nonprofit never showed up to install the fence, nor did it put in the ten years of work to build trust in the local community. The result is what another conservationist calls “green blowback.” A number of ranchers got wind of the national nonprofit’s claims and responded furiously to the coexistence practitioner. In this instance, he claims it took nearly eight months to deal with the fall out. The practitioner argues that “the social capital we have amassed has taken years to develop. We have been there in good times and bad.” He argues that when other organizations take credit of the community’s hard work, it often causes challenges for him in future iterations. Another wolf coexistence expert observer, “the national groups often exacerbate the wolf conflict by fundraising on wolves. They do this because it works [for raising money], but is often very politically damaging to local grassroots efforts. Often the local people we work with get confused.” Another coexistence specialist argues that “often the ranching community doesn’t distinguish between me and an environmentalist in New York City. When groups fundraise on issues and don’t show up to do the work…It makes my job worse.”

Parasitic nonprofits do not just siphon off potential wealth. These organizations engage in behaviors that actually make resolving the problem more difficult by reducing other resources such as social capital. There are two primary explanations for this behavior. The least charitable possibility is that nonprofits actively seek out success stories with complete disregard for the work of others. Nonprofits that have been ‘scooped’ in Greater Yellowstone default to this explanation. The more charitable explanation is that the staff members of parasitic organizations truly believe they are doing the same work. A coexistence conservationist believes that conservationists “often give themselves a black eye….a lot of it has to do with naiveté and

innocence." He explained that a lot of "green blowback" has to due to misunderstandings between the ranching and environmental cultures, often over norms of respect. At times, solving this problem could be as simple as "taking your sunglasses off and looking someone directly in the eye."

When I interviewed individuals who were accused of this form of parasitic behavior, I was surprised to learn these individuals were self-aware of their impacts. An employee of a major carnivore nonprofit bluntly states, Capitalizing on the high symbolism of charismatic mega-fauna is not inherently problematic. What conservation groups must consider is the different ways the symbol of wolves plays at the national versus local level. The fundraising and promotional literature at the national level can often have detrimental effects at the local by enflaming the opposition. A program manager at Defenders of Wildlife asserts, "We understand this." He explained in great detail how past promotional material escalated local conflict over wolves, acknowledging "we could change our strategies. However, it plays well to say you can save Yellowstone's wolves….We raise a lot of money from our wolf campaign." An employee at a competing nonprofit described this dynamic in terms of his regional office tension with the national office in Washington DC:

> The national office creates an alert to send to our membership. We always vet it for accuracy. They [the national office] are always pushing the limit of what we are comfortable saying. There is a conflict between what works for fund raising and what works on the ground. We are always factual in our vetting, but sometimes the details on the ground are glossed over.

A well respected long-term Yellowstone environmentalist described the same phenomenon in another context. She described how the symbolic baggage that is attached to some well-meaning nonprofits actually causes her trouble:

> I have been involved with Y2Y [Yellowstone to Yukon Initiative] and the Wildlands Project since their inception. These organizations have undoubtedly made it more

> difficult to work in the region. The big maps and large vision of these organizations created concrete evidence for our opposition to pigeonhole all environmentalists.

She continued to describe that Y2Y is an inspiring vision for her as an environmentalist, but that the idea does not "play well" on the ground with the ranching community. Another conservationist agrees. He states, "Y2Y is a boogey man in the [United] States. The organization does not deserve that title, but it [the image] is true…being affiliated with Y2Y credibility with ranchers." In this example, Y2Y is syphoning off social capital unintentionally.

Parasitic organizations is an explanatory factor that falls outside of the range of the holy trinity (plus one) of nonprofit failure, but is an important factor hindering the success of organizations engaged in coexistence strategies and wolf conservation in general. Improving the effectiveness of some organizations will require developing strategies to contain the damage created by other well-meaning conservation nonprofits. Simply fundraising more, increasing political will, weakening an enemy, or improving organizational management cannot solve the challenge of a parasitic organization. The syphoning off of social capital and the increase in green blowback by the conservation community itself is a challenge that limits conservation success.

5.2 Cultures of meaning

Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger (2004: 8), in their landmark essay *The Death of Environmentalism,* declared that "today environmentalism is just another special interest." These authors argued that environmental leaders have arbitrarily determined what types of issues get counted as 'environmental,' often neglecting key issues of environmental importance. More troubling is Nordhaus and Shellenberger's accusation that the "movement's leading thinkers, funders and advocates do not question their most basic assumptions about who we are, what we stand for, and what it is that we should be doing" (ibid). While it is not unexpected that the

environmental elite are interested in maintaining the status quo, it is these basic assumptions that fundamentally define the identity of environmentalists and conservationists.

Nonprofit organizations, particularly advocacy organizations, are comprised of likeminded individuals banding together towards a common valued outcome. These individuals share a common identity. Often we assert—as is the basis for evaluation in this manuscript—that the primary purpose of nonprofits is to achieve the commonly valued outcomes of its members, which should take the form of a mission statement. This is the goal statement of the common identity. However, nonprofits serve other purposes beyond the organization's mission. Some of the non-mission related objectives are not tangible, as is the cases when organizations seek symbolic outcomes. One fundamental (and non-tangible) purpose of Greater Yellowstone nonprofits is to create a community of meaning to augment the identities of the individuals involved with the nonprofit. In other words, these organizations serve as a means to generate meaning in the lives of those involved with nonprofits and a sense of community by reinforcing a particular worldview among members. Such is the case for all organizations and communities. While this idea may not sit well with some readers, it is not controversial that people tend to self-select and join organizations with which they share an identity. For example, the Buffalo Field Campaign (an animal rights organization) draws a different membership base than the Mule Deer Foundation (a sportsmen's organization). Both nonprofits provide a means for their member's worldviews to be supported by likeminded individuals.

The fact people gravitate towards organizations which with they identify is no surprise. This gravitation is not inherently problematic for the regional environmental community. However, cultures of meaning can isolate themselves from other interest groups. This has the effect of further entrenching the group's perspective away from the broader community. Doing

so creates the conditions where a special interest group—even environmental—will have little room for finding workable political solutions.

This phenomenon widely recognized outside of conservation in Greater Yellowstone. Cass Sunstien (2001) describes a similar phenomenon in American Politics he calls the "echo chamber." Sunstien argues that the political left and right in America are polarizing in a way where it is possible to gather information solely from sources with which you agree. For example, a left-leaning democrat can gather all their news from blogs such as the Daily Kos or The Huffington Post. In contrast, the right-leading republicans can gather information from sources such as Fox News and the Rush Limbaugh Show. As a result, dialog and exchange between political groups is replaced by self-reinforcing knowledge that further polarizes the political landscape. In such cases, psychologist Aaron Beck (1999: 8) observes that "[p]eople in conflict perceive and react to the threat emanating from the image rather than to a realistic appraisal of the adversary…In ethnic, national, or international conflict, myths about the Enemy are propagated, giving the image further dimension." In other words, empirical knowledge of people outside the identity group is replaced by unrealistic caricatures. Andrew Rich agrees with the general phenomenon (2004: 216), arguing that often political groups will not even consider scientific information produced by scientists they perceive to be affiliated with an opposing political party:

> At the beginning of the twenty-first century, research is frequently evaluated more in terms of its ideological content and accessibility to audiences than by the quality of its contents. In interviews with longtime congressional staff, many of the best known think tanks were assessed only in terms of their ideological and marketing proclivities.

The central challenge for communities of meaning is preventing themselves from becoming entrenched as an exclusive special interest. This is especially important given that the first goal appraised in this manuscript is for "all people to work together to protect the integrity and beauty

of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem." The Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community cannot afford to establish themselves as a narrow special interest.

Unfortunately, the dynamic of community of meaning isolating the environmental community as an exclusive special interest holds true in Greater Yellowstone. Employees of environmental nonprofits often stereotype their adversaries in ways that are mere caricatures of reality. An employee of a ecology research based nonprofit stated, "I have a hard time envisioning ranchers as anything but backwards rednecks." Of course, the same holds true for the adversaries stereotyping environmentalists. Jackson Hole outfitter B.J. Hill agrees, "You do not negotiate with an environmental greenie. If you want to play, you play hardball" (Hatch 2010). Political scientists McBeth and Shanahan (2004, 334-335) explain:

> concurrent with the decline in social capital and the rise of policy marketing, consumer-oriented citizens in the GYA [Greater Yellowstone Area] live in competing social realities with mutually exclusive sources of knowledge and competing interpretations of reality. Thus, when citizens examine policy conflicts, they—like the policy marketers that provide the information—approach the conflict from diametrically opposed frames that fail to consider the values of the opposition and the larger context of Greater Yellowstone policy conflict.

The result creates a deeper divide than actually exists when a realistic appraisal of perspectives are mapped. Rather than attacking the problem, both sides are able to symbolically displace their anxiety on their opposition. This is likely the reason that a robust opposition is a common explanatory factor for environmental nonprofit failure. For conservation to be successful in the long-term, alternatives implemented in practice need to supported by a broad constituency.

The trend of cultures of meaning occurs at different scales. At the broadest scale, the trend is apparent in the concentration of nonprofits within the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. The geographic distribution of the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit community is highly skewed (Figure 5.1). Of the 183 conservation nonprofits who claim to work in Greater

Yellowstone, only 118 (64.5%) have a physical office in the 25 counties that encompass the ecosystem. Of the 118 conservation nonprofits offices in the region, 64% of nonprofits reside in two counties (Gallatin, MT and Teton, WY). If we expand to include the top five counties, these account for approximately 85% of total offices. [19] Eleven counties in Greater Yellowstone do not have a single conservation nonprofit office.



Figure 5.1. The number of environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone by county, overlaid with National Park Service and National Forest Service landownership.

[19] The counties with the highest concentration of conservation nonprofit office are: Gallatin County, MT (40); Teton County, WY (35); Park County, MT (10); Fremont County, WY (9); Teton County, ID (6).

There are multiple ways to interpret the skewed geographic location on environmental nonprofits. First is that a disproportionate amount of wealth is centered in Teton and Gallatin Counties. Teton County is the most liberal county in Wyoming[20] and has the highest per capita income the United States.[21] Similarly, Gallatin County has the fourth highest per capita income in Montana (and the highest per capita income of Montana's counties in Greater Yellowstone). Nonprofits may concentrate to areas with high personal income, as an approach to increase donations. The second explanation is Teton and Gallatin Counties have had the greatest population growth over the last 40 years. Between 1960 and 2000, Gallatin County's population grew by 160% compared with a 47% average growth for Greater Yellowstone counties in Montana.[22] Teton County grew by an amazing 496% during the same time period. This is compared with 133% average growth for Greater Yellowstone counties in Wyoming (37% if you exclude Teton County). In other words, nonprofits are also concentrated in areas with the highest population growth. These are areas where more new people have moved to the region. Regardless, both explanations highlight that nonprofits are clustered around a relatively narrow group of people: the wealthy and relative newcomers.

At the smallest scale, communities of meaning are also evident within a single organization. The Nature Conservancy's Greater Yellowstone Program provides a great example. While the public face of The Nature Conservancy is of a single national organization, state chapters are given significant autonomy to pursue their own conservation targets and fundraising

[20] Teton County, WY is the most liberal as determined by voting in the 2008 presidential election. Teton County was one of only two Wyoming counties won by Democratic candidate Barak Obama. He won Teton County by the highest margin (61% Obama; 37% McCain. Washington Post, Presidential Election Winner by County *available at* http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/campaign08/election/uscounties.html

[21] As measured by per capita income ($132,726 in 2007). Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local Area Personal Income, 68 *available at* http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2009/05%20May/0509_lapitables.pdf

[22] Data was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) by county for the 25 counties that comprise Greater Yellowstone. In Idaho: Bear Lake, Bingham, Bonneville, Caribou, Clark, Franklin, Fremont, Jefferson, Madison, and Teton Counties; In Montana: Carbon, Gallatin, Madison, Park, Sweet Grass, Stillwater, and Yellowstone Counties; In Wyoming: Fremont, Hot Springs, Lincoln, Park, Sublette, and Teton Counties.

streams. A scientist for The Nature Conservancy's national office argues that this decentralized design is a distinct advantage as it allows state chapters to conform to grounded experience within the state versus the culture of the national office. While this may be an advantage for the organization as a whole, it creates a window of opportunity to see how cultures of meaning can impact organizational results. To develop more coordination between chapters in the tri-state region of Greater Yellowstone, The Nature Conservancy formed a Greater Yellowstone Program office. While a well-meaning effort, a past director of this program called it "a train wreck from the start." He argued that there the "organizational cultures" between state chapters in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming were "so vast there was little room for cooperation." Another Nature Conservancy employee involved with this program agreed with the former director's assessment stating, "this program will never work the way it was intended." He argued this issue was not systemic within The Nature Conservancy, pointing out that the Great Lakes Program works exceptionally well across state chapters. He concluded that chapters in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming "just want different things." The chapters have distinct cultures.

While the dynamic of communities of meaning is apparent across a wide range of cases, snowmobile politics is a prime example of how communities of meanings paralyze the environmental community from resolving an issue. On November 21, 2006, the Park Service unveiled a plan that would allow 720 snowmobiles to operate daily within Yellowstone National Park. The environmental community labeled the preliminary decision as "nonsensical" (LAT 2006) and "an unfortunate U-turn" in snowmobile policy (Soraghan 2006). In contrast, Jack Welch, president of the snowmobile Blue Ribbon Coalition, stated "I don't think there is a problem with the numbers" (Jalonick 2006). This recent controversy is the most recent iteration of a 40-year battle over the appropriateness of snow machines in Yellowstone National Park.

The winter of 1963 marked a turning point for recreation in Yellowstone. This was the first year snowmobiles operated within the park boundaries (Glick and Freese 2004). By the mid-1970s, commercial tourism by snowmobile was a staple of winter operations. Superintendent Jack Anderson justified the use of snowmobiles under the park's mandate to protect the natural and cultural resources for human enjoyment. He stated snowmobiles "finally let people see what a great experience it is to get out in the wintertime and really see the park….We sometimes hear individuals say snowmobile operation in the park infringes upon the intrinsic majesty of the area, or threatens the wilderness characteristics of the park. I'd have to say they are wrong" (Grandall 1997).

Under Anderson's management, snowmobile use was relatively minor compared with today. By the mid-1990s, up to 70,000 snowmobiles entered the park each winter season (Yochim 2009). This increase in use triggered environmental concerns of air pollution, noise control, and wildlife harassment. A winter use plan was developed in 1990, followed by a second plan in 2000. The 2000 winter plan caused a drastic shift in the effective snowmobile policy. Donald Barry, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, declared "[t]he time has come for the National Park Service to pull in its welcome mat for recreational snowmobiling…[they are] noisy, antiquated machines that are no longer welcome in our national parks" (Hebert 2000).

Outraged by this decision, every single county commissioner—minus one—from the five counties that border Yellowstone signed a formal protest against the decision. Clark Collins, former president of Blue Ribbon Coalition, stated "[t]he National Park Service's plan to end 30 years of snowmobile use in our parks flows from a public process that was badly flawed, and preordained as a means to placate a few extremists" (AP 2000). Ed Klim, President of the International Snowmobiling Manufacturers Association, agreed "There is no basis in fact or law

to totally eliminate snowmobile use" (ibid). In December 2000, the International Snowmobile Association and Wyoming State Snowmobile Association sued the Park Service asking for the court to throw out the plan. This was the second of five legal battles over snowmobiles between 1997 and 2004. In July 2001, the case was settled with the contingency that a new plan be developed by 2002. A revised plan was released in November 2002, allowing a limited number of four-stroke snowmobiles (cleaner burning and less noisy) to operate in the park under the supervision of trained guides. The rule was adopted by the park service in 2003, and environmental groups subsequently sued the Park Service to reinstate the snowmobile ban of 2000. Michael Scott, former executive director of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, lamented on the adoption of the management plan, "We had hoped the Park Service would've moved in the direction of a healthier future for Yellowstone. Instead, they moved in a political direction" (AP 2004a).

Other environmentalists criticized the Park's policy using the conventional explanation of a robust enemy for nonprofit failure. One individual stated, "This is absurd. There are hundreds of miles just outside of Yellowstone and Grand Teton where snowmobilers can roam. Congress should stop kowtowing to the snowmobile lobby and ban these machines from these national parks" (SDUT 2004). Another asserted that "there is no place for snowmobiles in Yellowstone....This does not discriminate against snowmobile enthusiasts. They have millions of acres of national forest in which to scoot about" (ATS 2004). Another stated, "National Parks teeming with wildlife are no place to unleash snowmobiles, no matter what the Bush administration and Republican-controlled Congress have maintained" (SFC 2004). In 2008, after a more than 10-year campaign by environmental groups to end winter snowmobiling, Yellowstone National Park Service made a decision to allow approximately double the number

of snowmobiles permitted in 2003 (Brown 2008). An employee of The Nature Conservancy and 30-year Yellowstone conservationist stated that "winter use is another other outright failure by the environmental community." He asserts that "we can't get traction of the issue…I'm not terribly optimistic that things will change."

We see this same dynamic with the pro-snowmobiling groups. Lynn Birleffi, director of the Wyoming Lodging and Restaurant Association, believes, "citizens should have access to Yellowstone during its most spectacular time, and if we don't make sure that the snowmobiles don't have some role, then people aren't going to be able to get into some parts" (AP 2004b). The alterative proposed by environmentalists to eliminate snowmobiles is to allow slow moving snowcoaches transport visitors. Curt Kennedy, president of the Utah Snowmobile Association, calls snowcoaches "a cattle-car arrangement. It might be a neat experience for someone from Manhattan who has never been out of the city before" (Woolf 2000). Jerry Johnson, West Yellowstone Mayor and operator of Backcountry Adventures, agrees. He sees snowmobiling as "an individual experience. You're outside with the wind in your face. It's the American way: You've got control of your own destiny" (Fullwood 2004).

While these types of statement typify the traditional explanation of a robust enemy, the statements also demonstrate that the snowmobile case is fundamentally about the environmentalists' identification with nature. Conservationists have developed a strong culture of meaning of what types of activities are appropriate during the winter months in Yellowstone. To most conservations, snowmobiles should not be allowed—period. For example, when I asked on advocate if there was any information that would change his mind he responded, "No." For the last 10 years, environmentalists have advocated for the use of snowcoaches as a replacement to snowmobiles in the park. Snowcoaches are large multi-person vehicles that have the ability to

move over snow and ice. The Greater Yellowstone Coalition (2010) argues, “Snowmobiles have been a noisy, air-fouling, wildlife-stressing influence in Yellowstone for four decades.” This organizations declares that that their “mission” in winter use is to “phase out snowmobiles in Yellowstone in favor of cleaner, quieter, more efficient snowcoaches that still provide ample access for visitors to explore and enjoy Yellowstone's remarkable wildlife and geysers in winter.”

Yellowstone’s outdoor recreation planner Michael Yochim (2009: 200) argues that “some people have been involved [in this issue] so long that they have difficulty accepting compromises or solutions different from the ones they have always advocated.” For example, consistent with the Greater Yellowstone Coalition’s goal, Yellowstone National Park’s winter use EIS argued that plowing the roads and allowing buses in Yellowstone would be more environmentally begin than snowcoach, as buses and plows are quitter and would consume significantly less fuel than snowcoaches. However, this solution is considered unacceptable by most environmentalists as it is not part of their identity and discourse. Yochim states (2009: 200-209):

> …..Conservationist had been fighting the winter battle so long that they had acquired tunnel vision. A different solution that would accomplish their own ends in more desirable ways would threaten the credibility that they, and their interest groups, had achieved in advocating a consistent position for the better part of a decade….Conservationists will continue to advocate for the snowcaoach-only alternative, failing to celebrate improvements that have occurring in the park, as well as failing to admit that snowcoaches consume much more fuel and are twice the cost of buses. To do otherwise—to celebrate success and move on or to change their position to support plowing—would be to risk losing control of the issue and the perceive ability to emplace their values in Yellowstone. By claiming that snowmobiles continue to devastate park resource, conservationists portray the issue dichotomously, painting themselves at Yellowstone’s savior in white with the correct solution (and associated values). 209

In other words, rather than solve their stated problem, environmental groups appear to be interested in using the winter use issue as a means to reinforce their cultural identity. The process of reinforcing their identity further entrenches the environmental nonprofits as an exclusive

special interest without room for compromise. Cultures of meaning is an additional explanatory factor that falls outside of the range of the holy trinity (plus one) of nonprofit failure, but is an important factor hindering the success of organizations engaged in coexistence strategies. Improving the effectiveness for some organizations will require strategies that allow organizations to advocate for common versus exclusive special interest solutions.

5.3 Homogenization of strategy

A central challenge in policy studies is the development of strategies to solve societal problems. At the most basic level, there are two schools of thought on implementing policy alternatives. The first school of thought is based in the traditional scientific method, often referred to as positivism (Brunner 2006; e.g. Friedman 1953). In practice, people who are predisposed to this approach believe that through careful examination of empirical evidence we can determine the optimal solution for any given policy problem. To them, the homogenization of organizational strategy is not inherently problematic. Rather, as analysts and practitioners, our goal should be to determine what is the optimal strategies (or portfolio) of strategies to secure conservation outcomes. The second school of thought hinges on the idea we can identify likely levers of policy change, however, there are always factors beyond the scope of our control. This perspective argues that optimal solutions do not exist in open systems (Brewer and deLeon 1983; Brunner 2006; Clark 2002). Rather, we are in a continual struggle to try to find ways to do better. This perspective assumes that having a diverse community that innovates is likely a better recipe for success than relying on a single solution to achieve our goals in open systems.

Capitalist theories assume that for an organization to be successful it must differentiate itself from its competitors. This is assumed to be especially true for nonprofits whose primary source of funds relies on the good nature of donors. Borrowing from ecology, nonprofits must

find their own niche to be successful. Many individuals I interviewed for this manuscript believe that the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit community follows this pattern, arguing that organizations have hyper-differentiated. For example, a program direction at the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance states bluntly that "there is no redundancy" in the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. She believes that any suggestion otherwise is misguided. Similarly, a Greater Yellowstone Coalition employee says "there is not a lot of overlap. Over time groups learned to complement each other." He believes that overlap only occurs by new groups that have not yet have time to acclimate to the nonprofit community.

On one hand, these individuals are right. As the director of a Jackson Hole based nonprofit stated, "there are so many issues for us to address and so little time." Conservation organizations often operate in 'crisis mode' trying to tackle every potential environmental issue in the region. There is always another issue that deserves attention. One could make a substantial argument that a community of 183 nonprofits and $150 million is still not large enough to focus on every relevant environmental issue. Environmental groups in Greater Yellowstone appear to have minor redundancy in focus—very few groups mirror each other perfectly. While content focus of nonprofits is highly diverse, the broad strategies used by nonprofit organizations in Greater Yellowstone are increasingly narrow. In other words, a homogenization of perspective is occurring, which severely limits the ability of the broad community to be successful.

Many individuals I interviewed recognize this problem. An employee of The Nature Conservancy argued, "Yellowstone is where it all started…we've really been surpassed in how we think of conservation…we have not evolved as a community, we keep doing the same things." He explained that often organizations try new strategies, but fall back on "what they know versus what works best." The most lamented example described my interviews was the

history of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition. A 35-year member of the Yellowstone environmental community reminisced about the founding of the coalition in 1983. He states that the "Coalition was a breath of fresh air in Yellowstone. It was originally constructed as a coalition building organization. We needed that." He described coordinating action amongst the growing environmental community was innovative and needed in the early 1980s. An employee of The Wilderness Society explained that the Yellowstone nonprofit community was beginning to fragment in that time period, and "GYC [the Greater Yellowstone Coalition] was poised to be the glue to hold us together." He continued that "Today, the Coalition is just another organization that competes for resource. They do the same thing as everyone else." He contends that the Greater Yellowstone Coalition's homogenization "was a loss for us all." There was a general sentiment in my interviews that you can take the name off of any organization, slap it on another, and no one would know the difference.

Homogenization has occurred for a number of reasons. A former employee of the Sierra Club stated that "We do not have a diversity of views in the conservation community. There are many possible explanations. The age structure of environmental leadership is skewed. The sex structure of environmental leadership is skewed too." While these statements are true, this individual's explanations never went beyond the demographic of the conservation community. For example, parasitic organizations describe the phenomenon of restricting innovation through partial incorporation; this factor describes how nonprofits often restrict new ideas by symbolically but not substantively incorporating new ideas into their existing programs. Similarly, foundation drag in the next chapter explains how funding sources can create institutional pressures for nonprofit to conform to a reduced set of strategies.

The protection of an antelope migration in the southern portion of Greater Yellowstone provides an example of how homogenization of strategy is a more appropriate explanatory factor than the holy trinity (plus one). Greater Yellowstone is home to the longest land mammal migration in North and South America, excluding caribou in Alaska and the Yukon. Every fall, approximately 200 pronghorn antelope migrate approximately 90 miles from Grand Teton National Park to the Upper Green in southeastern Wyoming (Berger 2004). In addition to the extreme distance of this migration, environmentalists value this pronghorn movement for two major reasons. First, this migration prevents the localized extinction of pronghorn in Grand Teton National Park(Berger 2003). Without the migration, Grand Teton will lose their pronghorn population as deep snow conditions within the park are not conducive to winter survival (Harper 1985). Second, archeological evidence suggests that at least portions of this migration have occurred for over 6,000 (Miller and Saunders 2000). While this migration was disrupted for approximately 50 years due to over hunting, it has major historical significance (Cherney In Press). Particularly, since this migration is just one of two long-distance pronghorn migrations in Greater Yellowstone (White et al 2007).

The uniqueness of this migration was first recognized by the conservation community during the planning process for the Jackson Hole National Elk Refuge Environmental Impact Statement in 1999. While discussing the future of migrating elk near the National Elk Refuge, environmentalists realized that this area was also home to the longest land mammal migrations in North America. Over the subsequent eight years, environmental nonprofits began a major campaign to protect this migration in its entirety (Cherney *In Press*).

This initial effort to conserve this migration was wrought with controversy. This controversy was surprising for one reason, as all political perspectives agreed on the goal of

maintaining this migration in perpetuity (Cherney 2004). Conflict existed over the most appropriate means to achieve this goal. Environmental nonprofits suggested that the migration be conserved through the created of a new protected area (e.g. Berger 2005). In its most liberal form, this protected area would be the development of a new national park. However, other alternatives were suggested including memorandum of understanding between major federal landowners. These solutions stood in stark contrast the solutions preferred by the majority of long-time Wyoming residents. Most individuals were in favor of doing nothing (they saw no major direct threats to the migration) or simply persuading—but not requiring— local landowners to change land management practices to facilitate the migration (Cherney and Clark 2009).

A political battle ensued between 1999 and 2008. In the summer of 2008, it appeared as if the environmental nonprofit had no chance at achieving their desired outcome (Cherney *In Press*). At this time, the majority of conservationists blamed their failure to achieve their desired outcomes on a robust opposition; the political power of the fossil fuel and ranching industries. For example, an employee of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance stated, "The BLM just kowtows to the gas industry. They [BLM] doesn't care about pronghorn." Similarly, an employee of a large regional conservation nonprofit said, "Wyoming Game and Fish [Department] ignores us. They just listen to their ranching buddies." This individual argued the failure to achieve protection was due to the political power of local politics.

The conventional explanations of nonprofit failure do a poor job at explaining why protection of this migration did not occur prior to 2008. We can see this through the relatively successful conservation of this migration subsequent to 2008, which did not require defeating a robust enemy. The 11 environmental nonprofits focused working on this case focused on a single

strategy: Creating the first ever national migration corridor as a comprehensive means to secure the long-term viability of this pronghorn migration. These organizations focused on a coordinated advocacy campaign at the local and national levels to convince the public and legislators that this was the best means to ensure protection. The strategy to protect this migration in its entirety failed.

In May 2008, a surprising result emerged. Grand Teton National Park and the Bridger Teton National Forest signed an agreement to protect the northern portions of this migration, and the Bridger Teton National Forest designated the northern portion of the migration as a corridor requiring environmental review for any significant action (Hamilton 2008; Hatch 2008a). When Grand Teton National Park and the Bridger Teton National Forest signed their agreement, environmentalists were elated that their strategy appeared to work. While this appeared to be a success, few actual threats to the migration occurred on this land area. In other words, this new 'protected area' amounted to little more than a symbolic gesture that this migration is important. The vast majority of threats occurred in the form of housing development on private lands and natural gas development on BLM land in the southern half of the migration. Simultaneous to policy change a number of local landowners began modifying fences that stood in the way of migrating pronghorn without through voluntary means. The two major participant groups in this case—environmentalists and localists—pursued parallel strategies to each protect a portion of the migration (Cherney *In Press*).

Homogenization of strategy is better explanatory factor than the holy trinity (plus one) of nonprofit failure in this case. While some conservationists believe that "there is no redundancy" among environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone, these individuals need to realize that while perfect redundancy does not exists, functional redundancy (homogenization) is occurring.

The 11 environmental nonprofits involved in the conservation of the pronghorn migration did not engage in redundant behavior. For example, one organization focused on local politics, another on national politics, and yet another on developing scientific information. However, the overall strategy of creating a protected area was homogeneous. If that strategy failed, the protection of the migration was likely to fail. The resulting success of this story was due to an alternative strategy developed by a participant group outside of the environmental community. Environmentalists can learn from this case that a portfolio of strategies may be necessary to achieve the conservation outcomes they seek.

5.4 Conclusion

The conventional explanations of nonprofit failure focus on two factors for why individual organizations have trouble achieving their goals. First are failures internal to the organization. For example, a lack of resources and poor management explain why an organization may not be able to provide the services it claims to provide. These explanations focus on improving the skills within a nonprofit's staff. The second object focuses on factors completely external to the organization. For example, lack of political will and a robust enemy place failure on individuals and organizations beyond the scope of any single organization. The implied solution is to fight harder. This chapter demonstrates that a third object exists. Rather than place blame internally or with the opposition, the broader nonprofit community can substantially impact the likelihood of specific nonprofit's ability to achieve its goals (Table 5.1). Parasitic nonprofits capitalize on successful organization by siphon resources away from the successful organizations activities. When conservation nonprofits operate as cultures of meaning they often further entrenches the environmental agenda as an exclusive special interest. As long as the environmental agenda is seen as a special interest, it is unlikely that long-term success will

be achieved. Homogenization of nonprofit strategy reduces the likelihood that the available choices will secure the desired outcomes.

Explanatory Factor	Source of Failure	Variable to Change
Parasitic Organizations	Interorganizational	Affection, Rectitude, Respect
Communities of Meaning	Interorganizational	Affection, Rectitude, Respect
Homogenization	Interorganizational	Enlightenment, Skill

Table 5.1. Summary Table of Interorganizational Factors for Environmental Nonprofit Failure.

Nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone and beyond operate in a complex and interdependent network of organizations. This chapter makes the case that conventional explanations of nonprofit failure do not capture the full range of reasons why nonprofits fail to achieve their desired outcomes, as the dynamic within a community typically ignored by nonprofit managers. For nonprofits to leverage greater effectiveness, managers need to consider how the choices of their organization and peer organizations effect the outcomes they seek. While many nonprofit managers recognize this dynamic, most are unwilling to directly address these set of challenges in their organizational strategy. The next chapter sheds light on why this is the case by investigating alternative explanations for failure at the organizational level.

Chapter 6: Alternative Explanations: Challenges of the organization

Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits face many challenges. These organizations operate in a complex political and bureaucratic environment where they must compete for resources in order to achieve successful conservation outcomes. The previous chapter focused on explanations for environmental nonprofit failure where the dynamics of the nonprofit community impede progress of organizational goals. While the collective problems that conservation nonprofits face are significant, nonprofits do not primarily operate as a collective entity. They are first and foremost singular organizations pursuing their own agenda. A nonprofit's primary responsibility is to their organization, not the broad community of which they are apart. This chapter highlights alternative explanatory factors for nonprofit failure at the organizational level. The three factors outlined in this chapter suggest that conventional explanations are also insufficient to explain organizational challenges.

Considerable literature exists on how to improve nonprofit performance. As described in chapter four, the vast majority of the literature focuses on organizational fiscal and human resources management. Fiscal management includes both fundraising and efficiently using acquired resources. Human management applies to staff and board governance, in addition to organizational strategic planning. These topics may seem broad. However, these explanations primarily center on the shaping and sharing of wealth, power, and skill within the organization. While these are important variables to consider, there are other important values are at play in any institutional setting. This chapter supplements our understanding of the inter-organizational factors that impede nonprofit performance by unearthing explanatory factors beyond wealth, power, and skill.

6.1 Identity augmentation

Why do individual citizens become involved with nonprofits? The charitable explanation is that people want to improve the communities in which they live. In other words, someone perceives problem in their community (e.g. environmental pollution, an expanding homeless population, increasing domestic violence) and takes action to help remedy the perceived issue. The premise of this dissertation is we should be evaluating nonprofits based on their performance in remedying the problems in which they formally make commitments to resolve. This is why the appropriate standard for evaluating a nonprofit is the organization's mission statement. However, nonprofits provide a range of indirect services to their membership, donor base, and staff. Often hidden from view and pursued unconsciously, these services are often major factors in why individuals become involved with nonprofits. One of these services is identity augmentation.

Identify augmentation is the indulgence of respect and rectitude that nonprofits provide their constituency. In other words, nonprofits help reinforce a sense of identity and meaning for the individuals involved. For example, a staff member at the Natural Resources Defense Council said he "left a high paying corporate job" for one that gave him more "personal satisfaction." Similarly, an employee at the Jackson Hole Land Trust said he switched from his real-estate career so he could "sleep at night." Such tradeoffs are prevalent among donors and members of environmental nonprofits too. A major individual donor to environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone said he made a small fortune and it was now time "to give back." He talked about how donating to environmental nonprofits gave him a personal sense of "doing good for the planet." Similarly, a program officer at the Moore Foundation remarked, "We give money to organizations that we like." She spoke how the personalities involved in a nonprofit are just

important as the substance in her decision making process. This applies to small donors as well. At a public meeting in Jackson Hole, WY an individual member of the Sierra Club and Greater Yellowstone Coalition told me she joins such groups to "help save wildlife." She spoke on how it "feels good to make a difference."

Communities of meaning discussed in the previous chapter speaks to this issue at the system wide level; that group identifications can further entrench environmental groups as special interests. Identity augmentation is similar. However, identity augmentation refers to the displacement of organizational goals by the informal goals of respect and rectitude indulgences. In other words, substituting conservation nonprofit's goal with the goals of an individual wanting to be well liked and respected by the environmental community or creating a personal sense of worth.

This dynamic may be controversial to some individuals involved in nonprofits. However, similar ideas are well documented in the literature beyond environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. Robert Kaplan (2001:358-359) of Harvard Business School describes the challenges of identity augmentation another way:

> Many people who become employees of these organizations [nonprofits] accept below-market compensation because they believe in the mission of the agency. Their personal values motivate them to do good and to contribute to society through the agency's programs. This is wonderful and a great sources of strength for the nonprofit sector. But it is also a danger. Such motivated individuals come to the agency already equipped with a clear, albeit personal, idea about how to accomplish the organization's goals. And they often encounter a nurturing environment in which all opinions are valued and listened to. This is an engine for diffusing organizational energy.

Kaplan tells the story of a specific nonprofit's strategic planning process. After two full days of meetings that involved the organization's leadership, a manager responded that the plan was great but it missed an issue of strong personal importance to her and for which the organization currently had a major initiative. The issue area had little relevance to the larger organizational

mission. However, she was ready to dismiss the strategic plan in favor of her area of passion. Kaplan (2001: 359) remarks that the organization “had wandered into a new initiative without any sense about whether the initiative fell within its mission and strategy, how the initiative fit with its core capabilities and competencies, or whether the agency [the nonprofit] was particularly well qualified, relative to alternative providers, to make a substantial, cost-effective contribution” simply because staff was passionate about this issue. Some nonprofit scholars recognize identify augmentation in donors and argue that nonprofits should capitalize on it. For example, Jen Shang and Adrian Sargeant (2011) found in the context of public radio "the more donors identified themselves with the station...the more likely they were to give." They argue that smart charities "want donors to begin to see their support of the organization as a critical part of who they are and deliberately attempt to foster this over time." To capitalize on identity augmentation, the authors suggest that nonprofits should be reminded of group identifications immediately before they decide to give. Identify augmentation can provide both benefits and drawbacks.

Many of the individuals I interviewed saw identity augmentation as a challenge, despite not having an explicit vocabulary to discuss the issue. For example, an individual at the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance stated, “Personality and drive overtake reasoned discussion” within the conservation community. She lamented that in the environmental nonprofit community ideas were often valued on the basis of who spoke rather than the likelihood of the strategy to work in practice. She asserted that it was difficult to speak up against the most highly respected conservationists in the region as she was afraid on alienating herself from her peers. She called this issue “inappropriate hero worship.” Similarly, an individual at The Wilderness Society explained that “the moral imperative” is what “inherently attracts people to conservation.” While

he believes that passion is an asset in conservation related work, he continued that "showing people you are passionate" is often more important for your career than achieving conservation outcomes. In other words, identifying yourself as part of the team is more important than the conservation outcome. He stated, "this is depressing because the issues are hard and we need more good professional trained people." An employee of an organization based in Lander, WY agreed, "lots of people are passionate about the region. They are really helpful, but don't always get it." She also believes that the drive to secure conservation outcomes gets usurped by the drive to maintain the perception of passion by fellow community members. An employee with the Greater Yellowstone Coalition bluntly stated that many environmentalists are "more into activism and a good fight than real solutions."

Wolf conservation—or any of the major charismatic megafauna in Greater Yellowstone—presents an ideal context to explain the challenge of identity augmentation. As described in the previous chapter, the failure of environmental nonprofit to achieve their goals related to wolf conservation (e.g. coexistence) is often blamed on a robust opposition. Environmental nonprofits often decry that anti-wolf advocates are too strong of an enemy to fight or that region lacks political will. For example, Mike Clark (2010b) of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition argues that "it's time we muster the political will to move past the polarization and develop a new plan for managing wolves." While the preceding chapter offered parasitic organizations as an alternative explanation, identity augmentation provides another explanation that needs to be considered.

One of the principle challenges of wolf conservation identified is that some conservation nonprofits utilize the wolf issue to fundraise despite the fact their advocacy efforts actually exacerbate wolf conflict. We can unpack this dynamic to understand identity augmentation.

There are at least two factors at play. The first is the recognition that many environmental donors identify with wolves as a symbol of wilderness. Environmental nonprofits recognize this identification in their donors and utilize wolves as a means to fundraise. The previous chapter explained this dynamic in detail. Suffice to say that that utilizing identity as a means to fundraise has the potential to inflame political conflict. The second dynamic is how identity augmentation within nonprofit staff can impede progress on formal conservation goals.

Identity augmentation by nonprofit staff in the wolf case impacts the realization of both goals related to wolf conservation and other equally important formal organizational goals. Related to wolf conservation, individuals appear more interested in symbolic (identification) outcomes over substantive. As one individual put it "I am frustrated that we [as a community] don't strategize in an overtly political way versus just doing what feels good or allows us to be on our high horse." This statement certainly rang true in my interviews. In virtually every interview I conducted, wolves were mentioned as one of the major conservation issues in the region. When I asked what were the goals of wolf conservation for each interviewee's organization, I never received a substantive answer beyond "maintain a viable population of wolves in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem." This is a good symbolic answer. However, no one could articulate to me what is "a viable population of wolves," nor could many organizations explicitly explain how their work contributed to the realization of a viable population. Rather, the sentiment was 'I care about wolves and I need to do something about it.' By raising the symbolic identification with wolves above the substantive commitment to grounded outcomes these individuals demonstrate that the maintenance of identity is more important than the conservation goal.

The more troubling issue is how identity augmentation in the wolf case can impede non-wolf conservation related goals. In other words, how securing one's identify distracts from formal goals. For example, the executive director of a large Yellowstone nonprofit with a broad conservation mission statement said that, "if we wanted a true bang for our buck, we wouldn't focus on wolves. Wolves are too politically polarizing to get anything done." He continued that "if we wanted change, we would focus on issues that are more broadly popular." The director listed a number of issues he thought his organization was well positioned to make progress on. While acknowledging this fact, he admitted that his and his staff's strong attachment to wolves focused them on the wolf issue. He claimed his organization's efforts would not achieve much, but said, "I cannot help myself." A staff member at another carnivore conservation nonprofit agreed. He argued that his organization could make much more progress on issues related to cougars, wolverines, and even bears. However, he stated that "I've been working on wolves for 15 years. How can I give that up?" To this individual, his life's work is so central to who he is that he cannot imagine working on another conservation project.

Identity augmentation can affect conservation related outcomes in a variety of ways. Utilizing the phenomenon for fundraising may increase the available funds a nonprofit has to operate. However, the effect may be negative if the goals of 'feeling good' replace the formal goals of an organization. This explanatory factor falls outside of the holy trinity (plus one). However, some people may try to explain away the negative impacts of identity augmentation as poor management. While management is certainly implicated, the issue runs much deeper. Maintaining a sense of identity is central to all people. The passion individuals bring to nonprofit organizations is of fundamental importance to the work of these organizations. Suggesting that proper management can eliminate the challenges associated with identity augmentation is naïve.

The indulgences that nonprofits provide staff, donors and boards are a fundamental and legitimate purpose of a nonprofit. However, when the goals of identity supersede the formal goals of an organization it may prevent the realization of the formal goals.

6.2 Problem blind strategies

Imagine you are on an expedition attempting to reach the North Pole. Which direction would you start traveling? This question may seem trivial, but it parallels the question that conservation nonprofits must answer. *What strategies should we employ to reach our goals?* If you want to reach the North Pole, you better have a pretty good reason to start traveling south. Unfortunately, many conservation nonprofits in the Yellowstone region are not just traveling south, they are wandering with no compass or sense of direction in achieving their formally articulated goals.

Another way to say this is many nonprofit organizations are solution-oriented versus being problem-oriented. Solution-oriented organizations have predetermined (or pet) strategies that they believe are the best ways to address an issue with minimal analysis to back up their plan of action (Clark 2002). In such cases, solutions are applied irrespective of context. If you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It is akin to deciding to travel to the North Pole via running or dogsled rather than focus on determining which is the in the right direction to head. For example, some enforcement based environmental nonprofits bring litigation regardless of their organization's goals. This is potentially problematic. For example, if your organization's goal is to have "all people in the region working together," litigation may not be the best means to achieve that end. Similarly, strict advocacy organizations tend to focus on educating the public and decision makers to the 'correct' facts. Using the same goal of having all people working

together, what happens if your advocacy strategies alienate your opposition? Perhaps traditional advocacy is not always the best strategy to utilize.

A number of individuals I interviewed spoke to this dynamic. They recognized that their organization may not be employing the most effective strategy, yet they found it difficult to change their organization's course. For example, the executive director of a Bozeman, MT based nonprofit explained, "I find it hard to stay on the cutting edge of what is happening on the ground. We are so busy managing our programs set up in the '90s that we often can't find time to attend to what might work best." He recognizes that many issues his organization faces require utilizing alternative strategies. However, he finds it is difficult to "exchange what we know [how to do] for something different." His organization has become problem-blind unintentionally. Steve Hoffman (2009), Executive Director of Montana Audubon, agrees. "Overcoming certain limiting factors within the organization in terms of traditions, values and organizational habits with respect to how we do our business," he states is challenging in the realization of their goals. He continues, "We have been in business now for over 30 years. In some cases we come up against a situation where this is the way we've always done it." The director of a Jackson Hole, WY based nonprofit agreed that "it is hard to be strategic when the pace is so fast." He argued that modifying organizational strategy is difficult when your organization is always in "crisis mode." A central challenge is overcoming our natural bias to prioritize short-term outcomes over long-term goals (Ascher 2009).

We can see this dynamic in a number of issues. In the pronghorn migration case highlighted in the previous chapter, environmental nonprofits sought a permanent solution in the form of a new national migration corridor. While this is an inspiring large scale solution, political viability was lacking on the ground in Wyoming. Comprehensive solutions appeared to

be preferred in my interviews with environmentalists. A long-time regional conservationist said, "The more you work here, the more you want lasting solutions." He continued that he does not think lasting solutions exist. Rather than find a "perfect solution" he conceded that "we need to find better ways to manage" the problems faced. Similarly, in wolf conservation, an interviewee said, "we are suffering from wolf fatigue" in the region. He continued that "it [wolf conservation] is the permanent conservation issue in the northern Rockies, and it might not be the most important biological issue we face." He argued that if our goal was to "conserve biodiversity and the ecosystem…wolves are the last issue we work on."

In contrast to being solution-oriented (problem-blind), the alternative is to be problem oriented (Lasswell 1971). Being problem oriented requires that the strategies you employ can actually alter the trends in a direction that will help you meet your goals (Brewer and deLeon 1983). Peter Drucker (1990: 82-83) reminds us that "performance in the non-profit institution must be planned. And this starts out with the mission…For the mission defines what results are in this particular non-profit institution." After a nonprofit identifies its goals, a problem-oriented organization will identify what factors are preventing the realization of those goals. This step is challenging for many nonprofits. A nonprofit evaluator based in San Francisco states that "most nonprofits have no model for causality." In his experience working with over 200 nonprofits, he found that most organizations did not systematically think how the strategies they employ will help them reach their organizational goals. In contrast, he found that most organizations are focused on "pet strategies" versus "solving problems."

The issue of bison and brucellosis in Greater Yellowstone presents an ideal opportunity to understand problem-blind strategies. On September 12, 2006, Wyoming's brucellosis-free status was restored by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Wyoming had lost

their status in the Spring of 2004 when the second of two cattle herds tested positive for the disease; states lose their brucellosis-free status when two or more cattle herds test positive in a two-year period. Nine months before Wyoming's status was restored, Idaho lost their status for the first time since 1991 (Federal Register 2006). While Montana has maintained a brucellosis-free status since 1985, there have been a number of scares in recent years when cattle have tested positive but have not triggered the two-year criteria. Losing a brucellosis-free status has economic consequences for livestock producers within that state. The price of cattle often drops, as access to certain markets is restricted. Brucellosis is a bacterium that causes abortions in variety of ungulates including bison, elk, and cattle. Once an animal is infected, it is considered a lifelong carrier. In greater Yellowstone, there is concern among livestock producers that both bison and elk have the potential to transmit the disease to cattle.

Most brucellosis politics focuses on bison. In 1916, the United States Livestock Sanitary Association formed a committee to attempt to eradicate brucellosis in the United States. By the 1960s, brucellosis was largely under control in cattle – however, not completely eradicated. The United States Animal Health Association viewed wild game as a threat to their efforts, and the Park Service began to test bison for the disease and cull infected animals (Cromley 2002a). In the winter of 1996-1997, significant controversy erupted when 1,084 Yellowstone bison were sent to slaughter in the name of brucellosis management. This controversy resurfaced in the winter of 2005-2006 and again in 2007-2008, when 1016 and 1631 bison were killed respectively (Figure 6.1). The Montana Farm Bureau supports these actions claiming, "The National Park Service must take responsibility for animals under their jurisdiction" and that there should be "zero tolerance for bison outside the park" (AP 2006). Dick Dolan, program director of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, stated, "[t]his is the same line they have drawn in the sand

forever," suggesting that a more tolerant policy should be adopted (ibid). Since 1995, at least five lawsuits have explicitly address bison and brucellosis management. However, to date, there is not a single documented case of transference of brucellosis from bison to cattle. In contrast, almost all wildlife-cattle brucellosis infections are attributed to elk (Thorne et al 1991).

The conflict over bison continues to date. The primary goal of environmental nonprofits appears to be allowing bison to naturally migrate outside of Yellowstone in search of winter forage. For example, Mike Clark (2011) of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition says his organizations goal is to "ensure bison have a bright future each and every time they leave Yellowstone National Park." Similarly, the Buffalo Field Campaign mission is "to stop the slaughter of Yellowstone's wild free roaming buffalo." These organizations have tried to halt the harassment of bison outside of Yellowstone for 15 years, but have largely failed. The 2,699 bison slaughtered in the winters of 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 are evidence to that fact, in addition to the yearly trapping of bison that leave the park. For example, in the winter of 2010-2011 nearly 300 bison were trapped by Montana Fish Wildlife and Parks (Repanshek 2011). Despite these failures, environmentalists celebrated what they perceived to be a major victory in the winter of 2010-2011 when 25 bison were allowed to leave the park unmolested (Clark 2011). Even this victory did not last long. Within two weeks of allowing the bison to migrate out of the park one of the animals was shot by Montana state officials for wandering on to private land and another went missing (Flandro 2011).



Figure 6.1. Number of Yellowstone bison slaughtered by year (BFC 2008).

The conventional explanation for why environmental nonprofits have failed in this case is a robust opposition. For example, Jeff Welsch (2011) communications director of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition blames failure on "a small but potent faction of Montanans and their stubborn resistance to allowing bison anywhere in the state." The Buffalo Field Campaign makes similar statements, blaming the Montana Department of Livestock as the primary culprit. The question is this a reasonable explanation for failure?

It is clear that the Montana Department of Livestock controls the vast majority of power in this case (Cromley 2002b). On the surface, a robust opinion appears to be a reasonable explanatory factor. However, the lack of direct political power does not necessarily equate to failure. For example, on the issue of brucellosis in Wyoming, environmental groups were successful in closing three winter feed grounds in the Gros Ventre River Drainage after a four year campaign. In July 2005, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, and Wyoming Outdoor Council held a public meeting in Jackson, WY where they presented a proposal to eliminate three winter feedgrounds in the Gros Ventre River Drainage.

The initial claims and counterclaims made by opposition groups was similar to the Montana bison case. Scott Groene, former Jackson representative of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, claims "Wyoming is asleep at the wheel" (AP 2002). He argues that the unnatural concentration of elk at feedgrounds causes a higher prevalence of brucellosis among elk. Franz Camenzid, director of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, states, "[i]f you don't address feeding, you're not addressing the core of the brucellosis issue" (AP 2005). Environmental groups were met by an equally robust opposition as in Montana. Terry Pollard, a member of the Wyoming Brucellosis Coordination Task Force, argued closing feedgrounds is "very premature and shouldn't even be considered at this time" (ibid). Wyoming State Veterinarian Jim Lagan agreed. He states, "[a]ny abrupt change to feedgrounds could have severe consequences for ranchers." (AP 2004c).

The first few years of this project appeared to be a failure. Environmental groups were relying on the same two strategies in the Montana bison case: advocacy and litigation. Failure was blamed on a small segment of the ranching community. In 2008, the Forest Service reauthorized Wyoming's winter feeding of elk for the next 20 years (Hatch 2008b). This was a setback for environmental groups whose goal was to completely eliminate the winter feeding of elk. Despite this, the reauthorization of winter feeding had a silver lining. The Forest Service excluded the three feedgrounds in the Gros Ventre from the reauthorization. That winter feeding of elk was discontinued on these feedgrounds in 2009 as a pilot project. A victory was achieved for the environmental community. The success in this case appears to be the environmental groups effectively addressing the concerns of the ranching and outfitting community versus simply advocating for closure of the feed grounds.

The current strategies of the environmental nonprofits have not worked in the bison case. The primary alterative advocated by the environmental groups is to close grazing allotments or modifying the timing of them so buffalo and cattle do not overlap on the landscape. However, this does not address the full extent of the problem. Christina Cromley (2002b) argues that the principle problem is not the strength of the opposition, rather that this issue is fundamentally about human values and both sides are reliant on science to provide the answer. Both the problems ranchers and the environmental communities face need to be addressed for a long term solution. Cromley (2002b) finds that in the development of alternatives the environmental groups' solutions have largely ignored the valid concerns of livestock producers. She suggests an alternative strategy that conservation groups can engage in to further their goals is environmentalists enhance economic viability of ranching and minimize threats from market pressures. This strategy working in the Wyoming feed ground case and has the potential to help inform action bison case. What will likely not work is continuing to rely on the same strategies utilized for over 15 years.

The reliance on problem-blind strategies is an additional explanatory factor that can help us understand why environmental nonprofits might be challenged in meeting organizational goals. This factor falls outside the holy trinity (plus one) of environmental nonprofit failure, but is closely aligns with the conventional explanation of poor management. Poor management encapsulates inadequate strategic planning. The central difference between inadequate strategic planning and the reliance on problem-blind strategies is that being problem-oriented requires an organization to systematically analyze and define the problems an organization seek to resolve. Strategic planning may encompass this factor, but often does not. Being successful will require organizations to clarify their goals, identify the relevant trends, understand likely explanations

for what they see, make reasonable projections into the future, and devise alternatives that are both technically proficient and politically viable (Clark 2002). Environmental nonprofits often develop impressive technically proficient solutions that are not politically viable. Such solutions are not problem-oriented. For example, the proposal to prevent bison and cattle to occupy the same tracts of land is a technically proficient means of solving the bison-brucellosis issue, but remains unviable politically. In closing the winter feed grounds in Wyoming, the environmental community was able to meet both criteria.

6.3 Foundation drag

The traditional model of foundation giving is intuitive to most people. It starts with a charitable foundation selecting a nonprofit to which to donate money. The foundation then gives the nonprofit an unrestricted donation or earmarks the donation for a particular program of the nonprofit. The selection process by foundations can vary wildly from detailed quantitative analysis to simply giving money to a nonprofit that foundation believes in. The nonprofit then pursues their mission to the best of their organization's ability. This model is likely intuitive to most people as it is the process individual use when engaging in philanthropy. It is most easily understood as giving away money.

While intuitive, this model is not how most major foundations operate today. Over the last two decades, large foundations have made a shift in the way the view the recipients of their donations. In the traditional model of foundation giving recipients are viewed as grantees. The new model of philanthropy recognizes that foundations have goals too. This model views nonprofits as private contractors to carry out the foundation's mission—not necessarily the nonprofit's mission. In other words, grants from foundation (and large personal donors) now come with increasing significant strings attached as they are directed towards specific purposes.

There are a variety of explanations to why foundations have made this shift. Mathew Bishop and Michael Green (2008: 35) argue in their book *Philanthro-capitalism: How the rich can save the world* that individuals and foundations that focus on this new style of philanthropy "tend to be focused on results, the impact that their giving has." In other words, foundations want measurable results for their social investments. Beyond results, foundations also view themselves in a privileged position to understand the dynamics of a nonprofit community. For example, a program officer for a large foundation that grants in Greater Yellowstone says her organization adopts the role of the comprehensive thinker for the whole Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community. In a sense, she sees herself as orchestra conductors trying to see how the multitude of organizations and strategies fit together. A program officer at the Wilburforce Foundation made a similar remark, "if we don't look at the big picture, who will?"

There is a strong appeal to this line of thinking. Large donors are potentially able to keep nonprofits accountable. However, there are major implications for the effectiveness of conservation nonprofits. I call this pitfall foundation drag. The major challenge associated with foundation drag is mission creep; the goal of the foundation may subsume the goals of the nonprofit. This style of philanthropy can drag the priorities nonprofits away from the nonprofit's mission and towards the foundation's priorities. Dolnicar, Irvine and Lazarevski (2008) argue "public sector nonprofits face coercive, normative and mimetic pressures" by funders and that these pressures can lead to changes with a nonprofit organizational structure antithetical to the realization of the nonprofit's mission. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 155) describe foundation drag as institutional isomorphism, arguing that it is more pronounced when a nonprofit relies on a small donor base:

> The greater the extent to which an organizational field is dependent upon a single (or several similar) source of support for vital resources, the higher the level of isomorphism.

> The centralization of resources within a field both directly causes homogenization by placing organizations under similar pressures from resource suppliers, and interacts with uncertainty and goal ambiguity to increase their impact.

Conforming to intuitional pressures of other organizations (institutional isomorphism) is to be expected. However, the unintentional altering of organizational structure may be detrimental to the success of an organization meeting its objectives (Covaleski et al 1997; Dolnicar et al 2008). Foundation drag is particularly pronounced when donors are not grounded in the social context in which a nonprofit operates.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provide us with an excellent thought experiment to help us understand foundation drag. In 2005, there were 71,095 active foundations in the United States granting $36.4 billion (Wing et al 2008).[23] Gates Foundation gave just over $1.36 billion in the same year (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2007). This means The Gates Foundation's accounts for more than 3.7% of the total foundation dollars donated in 2005. While we must applaud the extreme generosity of the Gates Family and Warren Buffet, their concentrated wealth in philanthropy has implications for the realization of nonprofit goals. In a 2008 Wall Street Journal article, Melinda Gates points out that donating $20,000 to help "a child who needed a kidney" is "$20,000 that doesn't go to buy life-saving vaccines" to children in developing countries (Mossberg 2008). The opportunity costs philanthropists make can have large social implications. We must ask who is best suited to make these types of social decisions. Is a foundation based in Seattle or a nonprofit working with children in developing countries likely have better knowledge on how to improve outcomes? We must consider the possibility that a foundation lacks the contextual knowledge to understand what might be the most appropriate value choices in a context in which they are unfamiliar. Similarly, a small nonprofit in a developing country may not have the same access to experts or best practices that Gates

[23] The most recent year for which data was available.

Foundation has at its disposal. While the answer is unclear, shifting all the power in a single direction is likely a recipe for disaster.

While not the primary concern of foundation drag, abstraction of context has the possibility of entrenching poor solutions. We can see this through another short thought experiment. Imagine that you are a small nonprofit working in a developing country. Your nonprofit's mission is to improve the health and welfare of children within your country. While working on an annual budget of $50,000 per year, your organization has determined that the best long-term strategy is to focus remedying nutrition deficiency in children and expecting mothers. However, one day a program officer from The Gates Foundation approaches you and offers you a $300,000 grant to buy life-saving vaccines for children. Would you accept their funding? Most nonprofit executive directors would likely accept this offer, as would I. However, the resulting outcome would likely to shift your organizational priories away from nutrition deficiency and towards vaccines. In other words, the foundation was able to drag your organizational focus towards the foundations priorities. While in our thought experiment one could argue that foundation drag did not negatively impact the nonprofit's outcome, there are numerous examples of this dynamic hindering the effectiveness conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone.

Foundation drag caused at least one nonprofit to shift their organization's strategy in a direction for which they were ill-equipped to address. The director for this nonprofit bluntly stated that "funders are pushing their agendas." He laments that "they [foundations] have ideas of what the solution should be, but seldom have an understanding of what it takes to implement such a solution." He described that one of his major funders had a "revelation" and thought that local conservation groups should start working with county commissions in Greater Yellowstone as a strategy to achieve conservation outcomes. This foundation believes local politics is the way

forward on conservation in the West. While this may be a good strategy, a staff member at the nonprofit member admits that "our organization does not have the capacity or standing to talk to these politicians." He furthered that while his nonprofit was sympathetic to the strategy, there are "much better positioned groups" to receive the funding. He described how this strategy was shifting the priority of his organization away from their major strength, GIS mapping. In a bout of self-questioning he stated "Are we going to reject the funding? Of, course not. Will we be successful? No."

In a similar situation of foundation drag, a nonprofit engaged in an innovative strategy to address wolf coexistence.[24] This particular strategy had not been attempted before in Greater Yellowstone and showed promise as a means to reduce wolf depredation of livestock. After four years of implementing the project, a number of the staff members came to the conclusion that the program was too expensive and ineffective to justify continuing. A former staff member said, "we wanted to refocus our approach towards other means of coexistence." The organization tried to shift its priorities. However, the initial prototype had built a loyal following among the organization's donors. Another staff member claimed that one of their largest donors threatened to withdraw support for the nonprofit if the program was eliminated. The staff tried to convince the funder of the inadequacy of their program and the promise of a new innovation. "We were in a bind," stated the organization's director. Faced with the choice of "funding and an ineffective program" and "no funding and no program…we chose to continue the program." In other words, the foundation was able to drag the priorities of the organization away from achieving the nonprofit's mission.

[24] I am not identifying the strategy, as it will identify the organization and staff involved.

The general phenomenon of foundation drag does not just occur between foundations and nonprofits. The same general issue is seen between national conservation nonprofits and their field staff. A staff member of a major national environmental nonprofit remarked:

> National Office creates an alert. We vet it for accuracy. They are always pushing the limit of what we are comfortable saying. There is a conflict between what works for fund raising and what works on the ground. We are always factual our vetting, but sometimes the details on the ground are glossed over.

This individual continued that the national office's understanding of Greater Yellowstone is "different than ours." He highlighted examples of the national organization making commitments for the regional Bozeman office, which "caused us to fundamentally change our [the field office's] direction." A staff member for another major environmental nonprofit spoke to how her field office drafted a "GYE [Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem] Strategic Plan." She stated that this plan was the regional office's best conception of realistic goals and strategies to employ. "The national office threw it away," she complained and asserted "we now have a work plan that forces us to…address the wrong issues."

Foundation drag is premised on the fact conservation nonprofits are interested in maintaining their funding streams. As such, they are vulnerable to coercion by major funders. Of course, foundations do not view themselves as coercive entities. A program officer at a foundation that has funded over 35 of Greater Yellowstone's NGOs states, "Foundations have missions and goals. We are constantly re-evaluating our priorities." She continued that while nonprofits may not like the shifting priorities of foundations, deciding where to focus foundation resources is the foundation's business. However, this mentality favors short-term foundation interests over long-term nonprofit interests and is another source of foundation drag.

Many of my interview subjects complained that "donors constantly shift goals." Another criticized that "foundations do not want to support the long-term work that is needed." Another

environmentalist described this as “the petting zoo problem.” He explained that donor often want to work with you for a few years and find someone else to support “when they get bored.” He argued that keeping donors engaged requires you to adopt their ideas in your work. He states that this occasionally helps things, but usually negatively “shifts the focus of our work.” In other words, the direction of nonprofits is constantly pulled in different directions.

Some nonprofits have innovated to address this problem. The executive director of one organization stated, “we have a broad mission by design. It allows us to pursue funding from diverse sources versus allowing funders to drive us.” However, he admits that this strategy makes evaluation of his organization difficult, because there is no clear goal. Foundation drag is also compounded the fear of upsetting donors. As one executive director stated, “you cannot talk openly with your funders about your failures.” He continued that the issue is especially sensitive when it was a funder derived idea. He continued, “Rather than let them know what worked and what did not, you need to focus exclusively on your successes.” Without a feedback loop back to funders, it is likely that bad ideas will continue in practice.

Foundation drag is another explanatory factor that lies outside of the holy trinity (plus one). While the drive for funding is cause of foundation drag, lacking resources and shifting priorities to acquire resources are distinct challenges. One could argue this alternative explanation is captured by poor management. A manager should be able to resist the temptation of resources that shift organizational priorities. Since virtually every major foundation operates under the new model of philanthropy, such temptations are impossible to avoid. While it is easy to place blame on foundations and wealthy individuals for this institutional pressure, accountability lies on both sides of the table. We must acknowledge foundation drag is a significant challenge for the realization of nonprofit goals. Solving this challenge will likely

require that both foundations and nonprofits be attuned to foundation drag in pursuit of mutually agreed upon goals.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter set out to describe explanatory factors for nonprofit failure beyond the traditional explanations of wealth, power, and skill. Identity augmentation is the phenomenon of substituting personal goals for an organization's mission. In particular, identify augmentation describes how personal goals related to affection and rectitude displace an organization's agenda. In short, there is a difference between feeling good and doing good. Given that the nonprofit sector often relies on passionate donors and individuals, it is not surprising that in the pursuit to augment our sense of self-identity. Problem-blind strategies are the promotion and utilization of favored solutions by an organization versus the careful consideration what strategies would best address the problem the organization faces. Often when results do not meet expectations, organizations continue to use the same strategies and simply 'try harder.' When the wrong tool is selected for the job, trying harder will not help the nonprofit meet its goals. Foundation drag is the replacement of a nonprofit's goals for those of a donor. While this may have a temporary effect, it can also shift the long-term priorities of an organization. This presents a major challenge when donors lack the contextual understanding of the problems a nonprofit seeks to remedy.

The six alternative explanations outlined in this chapter and the pervious chapter (Parasitic organizations, cultures of meaning, homogenization, identify augmentation, problem-blind strategies, and foundation drag) demonstrate that the holy-trinity (plus one) of conservation nonprofit failure are insufficient to explain why nonprofits fail. While these six factors help us understand the failure of conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone, we must remember that using

these six factors to augment the holy-trinity (plus one) will still not fully explain the inability of all conservation nonprofits to achieve their goals (Table 6.1). While some readers may be frustrated by the lack of a comprehensive list of explanatory factors for nonprofit failures, it is worth revising that the purpose of this manuscript, as outlined in chapter one, is to expand our critical understanding on why nonprofits fail. The purpose was not to highlight every problem that a nonprofit might face or fully replace conventional explanations. Rather, the central argument is that conventional wisdom is not sufficient to improve nonprofit performance. We must learn to think differently.

	Explanatory Factor	**Source of Failure**	**Variable to Change**
Chapter 4	Lack of Resources	Internal to Organization	Wealth
	Lack of Political Will	External to Organization	Enlightenment, Power
	Robust Opposition	External to Organization	Power
	Poor Management	Internal to Organization	Power, Wealth, Skill
Chapter 5	Parasitic Organizations	Interorganizational	Affection, Rectitude, Respect
	Communities of Meaning	Interorganizational	Affection, Rectitude, Respect
	Homogenization	Interorganizational	Enlightenment, Skill
Chapter 6	Identity Augmentation	Internal to Organization	Affection, Rectitude, Respect
	Problem Blind Strategies	Internal to Organization	Rectitude, Skill
	Foundation Drag	External to Organization	Affection, Wealth, Power

Table 6.1. Summary Table of Explanatory Factors for Environmental Nonprofit Failure.

Success is defined as an organization's ability to meet or make progress towards its formally defined goals. Such evaluation does not require that the organization has already met its desired outcome. Rather, this criterion conservatively defines success as making progress towards formal goals. The key to determining success or failure is determining the appropriate measures of progress. Since the goals of most nonprofits are not amendable to single quantitative metrics, those of us who are interested in evaluating performance must look to multiple indicators to suggest if an organization is on target. Using such criteria creates three potential evaluative outcomes. First is unqualified success. In such a case, all indicators demonstrate

progress towards formal goals (or that the goals have been met). Second is mixed results. This indicates nonprofits can still likely improve upon the current outcome. The final outcome is failure. In this case, trends indicate that trends are unaltered or, in the worst case scenario, moving in the wrong direction.

The ultimate test for explanatory factors is the ability to modify outcomes on the ground (Brunner 2006). Status quo performance, as defined by the four goals evaluated in chapter three, suggest that current explanations for failure are lacking (Table 3.3). In three out of the four goals, all indices suggested that trends related to success are moving in the wrong direction. Detractors of this definition of success argue that slowing down negative trends is a sign of progress. I agree. For example, the successful small-scale implementation of co-existence strategies may improve carnivore conservation in the long-term. However, success is measured by the high-order goals of a nonprofit. High-order goals are akin to keeping a ship afloat. If the ship is sinking, plugging a small hole is not necessarily an indicator of success. When a vessel ends up on the bottom of the ocean, despite minor repairs, the high-order goal is a failure. We need to see the ship rising, not sinking. In Greater Yellowstone, we need to see the signs of progress translate into a reversal of higher-order trends towards nonprofit mission statements. To date, that has not occurred.

The alternative explanations provided in chapters five and six create force us to think differently about nonprofit failure. These explanations are not meant as a perfect substitute for convention. Rather, the implication is that the perspectives of environmental nonprofit managers are often sufficiently narrow to restrict the scope of choices available to them in increasing their organization's performance. Creating the conditions for success will require us expand our viewpoints. We need find better ways to repair the ship. There are instances in where the

manager may not have the requisite training to move beyond convention. However, institutional pressures beyond a manager's control often restrict a manager's ability to move beyond traditional explanations for failure. The next chapter outlines alternatives that may help nonprofit managers improve their organization's performance.

Chapter 7: Building a Stronger Future in Greater Yellowstone

A traditional story in the social sciences is the drunkard's search (e.g. Kaplan 1964; . The fable describes a man who lost his house keys one dark evening after leaving the local pub. The man begins frantically searching them under a streetlamp. A passerby stops and begins watching the drunken man hunt for the lost keys. After a while she asks the man "Is this where you misplaced your keys?" The drunk replies, "No." She responds, "Then why search here?" His answer, "This is where the light is!" The drunkard's search is used to describe the concept of bounded rationality. Bounded rational argues that imperfect information, limits to human cognition, time constraints, and other factors fundamentally limit our abilities to make perfect decisions (Lippmann 1965; Simon 1991; 1996). Often the critical features necessary to solve a problem lie outside of our ability as humans to understand them. Bounded rationality, in contrast to perfect rationality, suggests that optimal solutions are far from the norm in human decision making. The best we can do is to expand the light on critical features that may help us in our continued question to make better decisions as individuals, organizations, and society (Brunner 2006).

Consistent with bounded rationality, in 1971, Harold Lasswell (65) observed that "the tendency of every group is to narrow its frame of reference, chiefly because quick and easy individual payoffs so frequently come by adding minor and rather obvious amplifications to the field of common reference. Hence the focus of attention needs to be directed to neglected areas." This manuscript's purpose is help focus light on to neglected areas on why nonprofits fail. Conventional explanations for nonprofit failure—the holy trinity (plus one)—largely address institutional incentives surrounding power, wealth and skill. In many contexts, these explanations are useful tools to help nonprofit improve their performance. However, these factors cannot fully

account for the reasons nonprofits fail to meet organizational objectives. This analysis suggests that a range of other factors influence the way nonprofits operate. For example, affection and respect—being liked by your peers and social network—can help explain why nonprofits stray from achieving organizational objectives. Cultures of meaning and identity augmentation describe how these factors can affect the realization of goals in the conservation nonprofit community and within individual organizations. In addition to values, the holy trinity (plus one) also fails to account for the dynamics between nonprofits in stifling progress towards organizational goals.

This chapter seeks to provide suggestions for improving nonprofit performance in Greater Yellowstone by encouraging nonprofit managers and funders to look beyond convention. To revisit chapter three, effective nonprofit performance is defined by an organizations ability to meet or make progress towards their formally defined goals. Formal goals are the foundation of nonprofit organizational performance as these objectives represent the organization's contract with the American people through the auspices of the Internal Revenue Service. This chapter first highlights three conventional alternatives suggested by the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community to boost performance and demonstrates that these alternatives lack the capacity to address the fundamental factor contributing to failure. They maintain a narrow frame of reference. I subsequently discuss three additional alternatives aimed at helping nonprofits address an expanded set of explanatory factors. These alternatives are encouraging innovation, prototyping, and goal modification.

7.1 Conventional solutions

In my interviews, many suggestions on how to improve nonprofit performance surfaced from nonprofit staff, directors, and funders. However, three solutions emerged as the most

popular. The first is to focus on improving nonprofit efficiency. This solution is increasing the amount of services rendered per dollar spent by a nonprofit. The Greater Yellowstone Conservation Organization Inventory (2009) confirms that Greater Yellowstone nonprofits see this as the most important means to improve nonprofit effectiveness in a survey asking environmental nonprofits what are the most important solutions to organizational challenges. The second solution advocated to improve performance is to engage in mergers and acquisitions. This solution is similar to the first suggestion, as mergers are a means to improve organizational efficiency. There is an important difference. Unlike simply improving inner-organizational efficiency, mergers require the involvement of multiple nonprofits by definition. This complicates the efficiency process. The third solution is to improve collaboration both within the environmental nonprofit community and with non-traditional conservation partners.

While these three solutions do not represent all means to improve nonprofit performance suggested in my interviews, they represent the most popular ideas advocated by the Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community. The purpose of briefly examining these solutions is not to dismiss them as potential means to improve nonprofit performance. Indeed, these solutions will likely prove useful if applied appropriately. Rather, the purpose is to continue to demonstrate that primary solutions advocated will not address the alternative explanations articulated by this manuscript. Focusing on these solutions does not solve the challenges Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits face in achieving their organizational goals.

7.1.1 Focus on efficiency

It is hard to argue with efficiency as a solution to improving nonprofit performance. The central premise of efficiency simply is doing more with fewer resources. Depending on the

context this could mean purchasing more land or buying conservation easements for reduced prices. Similarly, efficiency could mean minimizing administrative costs within a nonprofit or increasing the number of citizens reached in an educational campaign without raising expenditures. The idea is to free up resources so that they can be utilized in other ways by the organization.

The key feature is to recognize that efficiency focuses on reducing cost in relation to a particular goal. This makes the central challenge determining the appropriate goal to focus on. For example, more efficiently communicating with a nonprofit's membership base references communication with membership as the goal. Improving efficiency in this context may mean shifting from paper mailings to cheaper email communications, assuming the same number of individuals are reached. With low-order organizational goals (specific tasks), such as communication with membership, in efficiency measures are often relatively easy to measure progress. However, efficiency becomes more difficult to measure with higher order goals such as mission statements. Efficiently achieving carnivore coexistence may mean reducing the costs of a program currently implemented or finding new strategies to achieve the same goals for less money. Efficiency is hard to calculate when you are making tradeoffs between vastly different strategies such as litigation or land acquisition. The fact that higher order goals tend to be more difficult to measure biases efficiency towards lower order goals.

This issue is compounded by the fact those advocating for efficiency often do so without a particular goal in mind. For example, the director of a small Greater Yellowstone based foundation stated that her aim was to "improve efficiency" in the system. She stated that she does not care how organizations do this, as long as "they do a better job for less money." Similarly, the executive director of a regional think tank agrees stating that the purpose of

efficiency is to "free up money for other uses…it doesn't matter how it is done [within a nonprofit]." The fundamental assumption of improving efficiency as a means to increase organizational effectiveness is that more resources are likely to improve organizational performance. However, the question becomes, "Is freeing up resources likely to seriously improve Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits' abilities to leverage greater performance?"

Financial resources are an invaluable factor in contributing to nonprofit success. Without money, nonprofits are unable to even attempt to achieve their organizational mission. Of course increased funding and efficiency of resource use are important factors for nonprofits to consider. Chapter three argued that while more money would certainly help, the environmental nonprofit community in Greater Yellowstone is well funded. There are few regions in the world where conservation nonprofits can boast a communal annual budget of $150 million per year. As such, it is difficult to argue that marginally improving efficiency will result in major gains in nonprofit effectiveness. There are simply too many resources available for the community to use a lack of resources as a scapegoat. While efficiency is a helpful idea, it is not a serious solution in solving the challenges nonprofits face.

Additionally, improving financial efficiency will not help solve the six alternative factors highlighted in this manuscript. For example, improving resource use will not address conditioning factors which are centered on affection and respect; Identity augmentation and cultures of meaning fall into this category. Similarly, doing more with less will not help organizations evade parasitic organizations from syphoning off resources or prevent goals from being altered by foundation drag. Nor will the solution of efficiency prevent the homogenization of strategy. The explanatory factor most likely to be affected by improved efficiency is problem

blind strategies. If a nonprofit is able reduce its use of resources in utilizing a particular strategy, it may be able to expand the organization's reach. However if those strategies are problem blind, the result is doing less with more. In other words, if a nonprofit engages in strategies unlikely to achieve the organization's formal goals (problem-blind), then increasing the efficiency of a futile strategy will likely net no effect.

To reiterate, the purpose of briefly analyzing this solution (and the remaining two) is not to dismiss it from our toolbox in increasing organizational effectiveness. Rather, the purpose is to acknowledge that this popular idea for improving nonprofit performance does not address the alternative explanations for nonprofit failure highlighted in the manuscript. Focusing on improving organizational efficiency is a task in which all nonprofits should engage. Doing more with less is a straightforward way to leverage greater effectiveness. The danger is relying on this solution as the primary means to improve performance when poor resource utilization is not the primary means for nonprofit failure.

7.1.2 Mergers and acquisitions

Mergers are a popular idea—particularly among funders—to increase the effectiveness of environmental nonprofits. The idea is simple: by consolidating two (or more) organizations you are able to increase efficiency by reducing costs related to management. For example, nonprofits have large expenditures associated with payroll and accounting. These costs are high upfront, but decline substantially with each additional employee within the organization. By consolidating two nonprofits with similar missions, it is possible to reduce this type management cost and redirect the savings towards programmatic expenditures. In other words, consolidating has the potential of creating more bang for your buck.

While a well-meaning idea, empirical experience in Greater Yellowstone demonstrates that mergers in practice are problematic for environmental nonprofits. In the 125 years that conservation nonprofits have operated in Greater Yellowstone, conservationists could only point me towards three examples of attempted mergers. The outcome in all three cases was similar—the mergers degenerated into virulent conflict between the two organizations and the merger ultimately failed.[25] In fact conflict was so nasty that the individuals I interviewed who were involved in these cases were reluctant to speak to the details. As one individual said, "I don't want to resurface past wounds." However, a generalized account of the three cases is as follows: Over a family dinner, a mother and son who were board members of two different Jackson Hole based environmental nonprofits were discussing the programmatic overlap between organizations. These individuals saw an opportunity for improved resource efficiency, and began exploring the possibility of a merger between their respective boards. After building a coalition of supportive board members, active merger discussions ensued. When the boards shared the proposal with staff members, the situation polarized with staff of both organizations actively lobbying board members against a merger. An individual who was involved in one case stated the ultimate result was "hurt feelings and burnt bridges." In another case, the results were more troubling from a staff member's perspective. She lamented the loss of staff who "quit to make a point."

From a resource allocation standpoint, according to those involved, all the three examples of failed mergers in Greater Yellowstone would have improved resource efficiency within the organizations. From a programmatic standpoint, it appeared that consolidating expertise would potentially have made these organizations more effective at meeting their goals. When I asked

[25] There are likely more examples of failed mergers in the Greater Yellowstone conservation community. However, most discussions of mergers are held closed doors. These three cases are unique in that the proposal to merge organization surfaced in the public realm.

what accounted for these failures, the answer was consistent across cases. Those involved blamed conflicting personalities and the egos of specific board members and staff. The implication was that if these individuals were not involved in the merger everything would have gone smoothly. Perhaps this is the case. However, cultures of meaning and identity augmentation help us understand why mergers of environmental nonprofits are difficult.

Cultures of meaning suggest that individual gravitate towards organization with which they identify. Identifications largely consist of how people related to key symbols or stable patterns of practices within a group (Clark 2002). For example, symbols within an environmental nonprofit may include the founder (an organizational hero) or a particular species the organization is fond of protecting. Stable patterns of practices might include how aggressive an environmental nonprofit pursues advocacy or litigation. In at least one of the failed mergers, the "ego battle" between merging staff was, in part, related to insecurities of key symbols. The functional battle was over which organization's founder was a more appropriate figure to inspire the merged organization. In another merger attempt, the fight was over whose organizational strategies were more effective. Such examples are not ego battles. They are legitimate conflicts of maintaining organization identity. Staff members are invested in maintaining the identity of the organization for which they work. Failure to account for identity augmentation is a recipe for disaster.

From a functional standpoint, acquisitions provide a similar outcome as a merger. However, there has been much less resistance to this course of action. There is significant overlap of employment history between conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. The Greater Yellowstone Conservation Organizational Inventory Survey (2008) found that Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit employees worked for an average of 2.6 conservation

nonprofits in the region over their employment history. This is suggestive that while staff identifies with the nonprofit that employs them, identities are not fixed. In fact, through my interviews, at least six executive directors spoke to how they intentionally "poach" exceptional staff members from other organization. In one case, an executive director hired five individuals from the same nonprofit within a six month period. While not a true 'acquisition,' when staff comes willingly they are more amenable to shift their organizational identities.

7.1.3 Collaboration

Over the last 10 years there has been a significant push for increased collaboration in Greater Yellowstone as a solution to increase the effectiveness of environmental nonprofits. Conservationists advocate for this solution on two levels. The first is that increased collaboration needs to occur between environmental nonprofits. The second is that increased collaboration needs to occur between environmental nonprofits and "nontraditional" partners. Nontraditional partners refer to people and groups that do not share the social or political orientation of conservation nonprofits. There is the general assumption that working with other groups will increase the likelihood of achieving conservation outcomes.

There is a strong rationale for engaging in collaborative efforts. The purpose of collaborative efforts is to build understanding, exchange ideas and practices, build decision support, coordination across jurisdictional boundaries, and develop the capacity to address future challenges (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Many practitioners and academics seek collaboration as a productive means to improvement conservation outcomes. Indeed, this is likely the case. However, a principle challenge with collaboration within the environmental community is exacerbating problems associated with communities of meaning. This is not an argument against collaborative efforts. In contrast, we must acknowledge that collaboration among likeminded

individuals has the potential to further reinforce the environmentalist cultural identity. This has the potential to continue to create a deeper political divide than actually exists between environmentalists and their opposition. Conscious effort need to be made by environmental groups to avoid this challenge.

While we must be watchful of this theoretical concern, broad collaboration within the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community is lacking. An employee of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance states, "We have tried different ways to get together and work, but they have largely been failures. Even the premier national groups cannot do this. We typically fail due to competition for money." Similarly, an employee for the National Parks Conservation Association states that "There is little collaboration in the region. We all operate in our silos. Conservation here is more adversarial than anywhere else I have worked." A former Sierra Club employee states, "It is an old boys' culture." She argued that if you are not part of the inner circle, "it is difficult to get people to work with you." A Nature Conservancy employee states, "There are big rifts in the conservation community; we have very difficult questions we must ask ourselves [if we wish to work together]." These statements should not be taken as outright dismissals of collaboration in the region. There are many successful examples of conservation nonprofits working together. Chapter three discussed this dynamic in more detail. However, the key point is that collaboration within the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community has yet to live up to its promise in the eyes of many conservationists.

Collaboration with nontraditional partners minimizes the special interest challenge associated with cultures of meaning, as multiple interest groups are at the table. Indeed, this is the principle argument within the Yellowstone nonprofit community for collaboration with nontraditional partners. For example, an employee of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition states

that “The public does not trust us. There are strong negative stereotypes of green organizations…we are always in a handicapped position.” This individual continued that environmental groups need to work with the ranching community to “build trust” as a means to reduce the influence of those who oppose environmental outcomes and build nonpartisan solutions. Similarly, an employee of another Bozeman based nonprofit argued that collaborating with the opposition “is the only way…to develop lasting solutions.”

While collaborative efforts are a promising means to improve nonprofit performance, this solution only addresses one of the six major alternative explanatory factors for nonprofit performance. This is not a direct critique of collaboration. Rather, my point is to highlight that of the three most popular solutions advocated in my interviews only one solution directly addresses the six alternative explanations for nonprofit failure. In other words, the solutions we currently attempt to employ are unlikely to solve the full range of problems environmental nonprofits face.

7.2 Alternative solutions

The purpose of reviewing popular conventional alternatives is not to dismiss these strategies outright. Rather, it was to demonstrate that these alternatives are not likely sufficient to leverage greater effectiveness within the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. This section provides three alternatives nonprofits can engage in to help move beyond convention.

7.2.1 Encouraging innovation

The principle argument in this manuscript is that the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community—while diverse, well-funded, and passionate—is not considering a broad enough range of explanatory factors to increase conservation success in the region, despite that these organizations are uniquely suited to do so. We can, and should, expect these organizations to do better. Currently, the alternative explanatory factors demonstrate that institutional pressures

narrow the scope of choice for conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. Actively encourage innovation is a means of improving the realization of conservation outcomes by expanding the options available. Peter Drucker defines innovation as a "change that creates a new dimension of performance" (Hesselbein 2010: 11). These changes can be technical, such as devising a new system to keep wolves separated from livestock. Innovations can also be social, such as changing the behavior of citizens. We must remember, however, that innovation requires "bringing something new into use" (Mohr 1969). It is vital that conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone find way that environmental nonprofits can change to create new dimensions of performance. This requires us to look outside of the light of conventional wisdom and utilized other factors.

Often when we think of an innovation, we assume that the technology or practice can be applied in a range of contexts. While these types of innovations occasionally surface, the vast majority of innovations must be applied with careful consideration of the details in a particular case. Garry Brewer and Peter deLeon (1983: 283) reminds us that "one person's innovation could be another's destruction." When ideas are implemented in practice, the facts and particulars of the case are usually "far more complex…than anyone imagined" (ibid). Nothing can substitute for the practitioners understanding of the minute details and fine points of a complex technical and political situation. Rather than rely on expert innovation and diffusion to practitioners, I recommend two methods of encouraging innovation in the field: prototyping and a portfolio approach. Prototyping is geared towards changes nonprofits can make in improving their performance. A portfolio approach is a means for foundations and donors to encourage innovation in the system.

Prototyping is a low stakes strategy nonprofits can engage in to developing a greater likelihood of achieving organizational goals. Prototypes, compared with major initiatives, tend focus on flexibility, continued learning, and creativity. This method differs from careful experimentation as it does not requires that all possible variables be identified from the onset. A key feature "of all prototyping is *its provisional, improving, exploratory approach* to a context." (emphasis in original; Lasswell and McDougal 1992: 895). It is highly likely that the most effective strategies will not be employed from the onset, rather they will developed through experience. Prototyping "relies on decentralized decisions by groups that face variations on a common problem" (Brunner and Clark 1997: 54). Lasswell (1971: 71) states that a primary purpose of a prototype is to determine the "willingness among the most effective participants to give the innovation a fair test." Prototypes do not guarantee a successful outcome. Rather, it is expected that the innovation will require continued modification until the program or technology is ready for broader implementation. They are "a way of finding out what practices work and why and how to diffuse them" (Clark 1999: 410).

Prototypes require an initial goal for guidance. However, this strategy for improvement does not rely on a formal plan of action. As unexpected challenges and opportunities arise in addressing the problem, prototyping allows the practitioners the flexibility to adapt the unfolding details. Rather than a major initiative or organizational campaign, a prototyping allows nonprofits to test strategies with minimal political visibility. The advantage is minimizing political resistance to an idea to see if it actually works in practice. If the prototype is unsuccessful, the small scale implementation will make it more likely that poor practices are terminated.

There are limited, but highly successful, examples of prototyping improving the realization of conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone. For example, the 2005 proposal (highlighted in chapter six) of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, and Wyoming Outdoor Council to eliminate the winter feeding of elk in the Gros Ventre River Drainage is an example of a successful prototype. Rather than advocate for the full elimination of the winter feeding of elk, the original proposal was adapted as a means to test the concerns of all stakeholders. Similarly, coexistence strategies (highlighted in chapter five) engaged at the landowner levels are prototypes to determine the feasibility of minimizing conflict.

A *Portfolio Approach* requires a shift in the way donors view nonprofits. In general, foundations and private donors want to see a strong return for their investment. This is a fairly rational response, as most of us want to imagine that our donations have an impact. We are predisposed to fund success. However, supporting innovation will require that we expect and tolerate a certain level of failure by nonprofits. We can use the concept of portfolios in investing as an analogy for an alternative way to view the funding of nonprofits. Most professional investment managers suggest that investors develop a diversified portfolio of securities as a means to reduce risk to the investor assets. This is a strategy to help achieve the goal of maximizing the investor's overall return. Among its advantages, diversification allows investors to participate in a limited amount of high-risk investments (with potential high pay-offs) without risking the complete realization of their financial goals.

This concept can be applied to nonprofits by arguing that some organizations, and programs within organizations, are riskier than others. For example, a conservation organizational strategy with a low-risk conservation pay-off is buying conservation easements or

land. As such, it is no surprise that land trusts account for approximately 65% of total conservation nonprofit dollars in Greater Yellowstone.[26] In contrast, investing in a prototype is a much riskier conservation investment. But such innovations have the potential to drastically increase the realization of conservation goals beyond the status quo.

Foundations try to take this approach by funding a diversity of organizations. However, from my interviews, it appears that little attention is paid to explicitly funding innovative approaches. Usually, foundations want to diversity by funding proven innovations. Proven innovations are no longer innovations—they are interventions (Lasswell and McDougal 1992). Foundations have the potential to drastically alter the conservation landscape by spending limited dollars to explicitly fund innovative ideas, perhaps by calling for innovation improvement grants. If single foundations do not want to take on this risk, there is room for a collection of foundations to form an innovation fund. Private donors, due to the scale of their donations, will have a much more difficult time explicitly funding innovation. The creation of a fund may open the opportunity for small donors to have an additional impact.

There are a number of regional models that can be used to create an innovation fund. In the last 20 years there has been an increase in collective fundraising opportunities for private donors in Greater Yellowstone. Efforts include the Community Foundation of Jackson Hole, 1% for the Tetons, Yellowstone Park Foundation and the Bozeman Area Community Foundation. These organizations aggregate the donations of smaller individuals and distribute the funds to projects deemed worthy.

7.2.2 Community based initiatives

[26] This number is derived from the percentage of income received by the 34 nonprofits that exclusively focus on Greater Yellowstone.

Community based initiatives are an innovation that show promise to leverage greater effectiveness in Greater Yellowstone's nonprofits. A community based initiative is comprised of individuals with different perspectives who "interact directly with one another over a period of time, in an effort to resolve an issue in the place where they live (Brunner 2002: 7). These initiatives are "defined by a shared territory that is local in scope and includes many different interests" (Ibid 2002: 250). By focusing on issues at a local scale and through face-to-face interaction, participants are more likely to build a shared responsibility for the outcomes within their community. Community based initiatives focus on developing a multi-interest group, as opposed to a single special interest group. By working together, it is more likely that all participants will be able to advance their common interests (Brunner and Steelman 2005). This has the potential to created lasting outcomes for the diverse interests involved. However, it is important to understand that no set formula or prescriptive model exists for how a community based initiatives should operate. Rather, community based initiatives are a means for different interests to "directly engaged on another over a period of time in an effort to resolve their differences over an immediate issue" (Brunner and Colburn 2002: 201).

Regional environmental nonprofits are well positioned to help foster an environment conducive of such initiatives. The fact that many environmental nonprofits are predisposed to the solution of collaboration with nontraditional partners suggests that strong potential exists. However, the concept of a community based initiatives should not be confused with collaborative conservation (or collaboration defined more broadly). While substantial overlap exists between the concepts, collaborative conservation prioritizes the interests of the environmental community over the interests of other individuals and groups within the community. Community based initiatives do not place priority for conservation outcomes over

others in the community. Rather, a community based initiative seeks to "integrate their separate interests in possible or balance them if necessary through new policies" (Brunner and Steelman 2005: 19). This devolution of power to the broad community may be unpalatable to some conservationists, as there is no guarantee that the community will advance the conservationists desires. The advantage, however, is that if advanced the initiative's outcome will likely be broadly supported by the community.

There are a number of successful examples of community based initiatives operating in the Northern Rockies. The premier regional example is the Blackfoot Challenge Initiative in the Blackfoot Valley, MT. This community based initiative has been incredibly successful at finding common ground amongst historically warring interests on a number of issues. The Blackfoot Challenge was initially formed by a limited group of landowners who wanted to protect their community's land for future generation, but now includes a highly diverse group of landowners, private firms, nonprofit organizations, and government agencies. The group's website purports (BF 2006):

> Cooperation. Trust. Consensus. Three words guide the Blackfoot Challenge. Here, private landowners take the lead and public agencies follow in a shared goal-to keep large landscapes intact and rural lifestyles vital. What's our secret to success? Focus on the 80 percent that folks can agree on and not the 20 percent that might divide us. Leave egos at the door and wear a Blackfoot Challenge hat in our meetings. Listen well, don't rush and find the common ground before acting.

Through working as a community initiative the Blackfoot Challenge was able to reduce grizzly bear conflict by 93% between 2003 and 2009 through coexistence strategies. This outcome met the interests of ranchers by minimizing livestock losses and other negative impacts bears cause landowners. Additionally, this outcome met the interests of environmentalists by reducing the likelihood that bears would be killed. Additionally, within 15 years the Blackfoot Challenge reported "1,500 acres of wetlands and 15,000 acres of native grasslands…and nearly 45,000

acres of private land have been protected with perpetual conservation easements" (Nambisan 2008: 8).

Another example of a regional community based initiative is the Sustaining Jackson Hole in Teton County, WY. This initiative was formed by two regional nonprofits, the Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and the Charture Institute, as a means to address the increasing challenges Jackson Hole faced in the form of increasing population, wealth, and politics in Teton County. The initiative defined its purpose as identifying "the qualities we, as a community, would like to leave for future generations of Jackson Hole visitors & residents" (Charture 2011). This initiative formed working groups focused on a variety of topics including the arts, economy, environment, recreation, social services, and transportation. A number of the partners from Sustaining Jackson Hole formed a new foundation called 1% for the Tetons, based on Patagonia, Inc.'s program 1% for the planet. The Teton's fund aggregates donations from 77 local business (and growing), who all commit to contributing one-percent of their total organizational revenue to the foundation. One-percent for the Tetons then disperses funds to local nonprofits that are engaged in projects that address the concerns developed by Sustaining Jackson Hole's working groups (One-Percent for the Tetons 2010). The fund has dispersed nearly all of its funds to local environmental nonprofits working on local projects that directly benefit the community. Despite this type of proven track record in the Blackfoot and Jackson Hole, community based initiatives are largely ignored by environmental nonprofits as a means to secure their interests.

Community based initiatives can directly address a number of the alternative conditioning factors. For example, 'communities of meaning' describes how group identifications tend to abstract one's political opposition to mere caricatures of reality.

Community based initiatives have the potential to broaden the perspectives of the individuals involved through face-to-face interaction. For example, in the summer of 2005, the Bridger-Teton National Forest began the revision of their forest management plan. Rather than engage in the traditional model of public comment, the Forest Service undertook a new comment system based, in part, on small group discussions that forced divergent interest groups to work together. At the end of the public comment meeting in Moran, WY, one of the most traditional outfitters said to one of the most extreme environmentalists "I didn't know we have so much in common." The environmentalist replied with "me either." Community based initiatives are geared at fostering this type of dialog.

7.2.3 Goal modification

The central thrust of my analysis relies on the foundation that nonprofits should be evaluated on the basis of their formally defined goals. The highest order goals of an organization are found in the organizational mission and vision statement. Detractors to this style of analysis will argue that nonprofit pursue a range of legitimate goals beyond what is contained in the mission statement. Indeed this is true. In contrast to formal goals, effective goals are the goals a nonprofit actually pursues. This analysis highlights a number of situations where nonprofits pursue effective goals over the formally defined goals of the organization. For example, foundation drag is replacing the formal goals of a nonprofit with the effective goals of a foundation. Similarly, identity augmentation substitutes the effective goals of an individual for the formal goals on the organization. Those opposed to an appraisal based on formal goals will argue that the effective goals—what an organization is actually attempting to achieve—should be the basis for appraisal.

I agree that effective goals are legitimate pursuits for a nonprofit. For example, increasing in fundraising or organizational membership are legitimate (and necessary) goals for a nonprofit to operate. These effective goals are rarely integrated in the formal goals of an organization making these effective goals potentially irrelevant criteria for appraisal based on my methodology. However, this is a naïve understanding of how I suggest organizations should be appraised. All organizations (and individuals) operate within a hierarchal framework of goals. For example, I may have goals related to career advancement (such as promotion) and personal recreation (learning to ski well). At any given time, I may value achieving one of these goals over the other and devote more time and resources obtain my favored outcome. While individuals rarely need to make formal goal commitments, organizations do so in the form of mission statements. As argued in chapter three, the mission and vision statement of a nonprofit is a formal contract with the American people to pursue those ends. In exchange for pursuing their formal goals, these organizations enjoy certain exemptions from the law such as tax-exempt status. Nonprofits must pursue what they formally claim to seek.

A key feature we must acknowledge is that hierarchal goal frameworks are dynamic and unstable over time. For example, as an individual I may place greater emphasis on the goal of getting promoted at my job versus increasing my skiing ability over time. I am not locked into a permanent goal structure. While nonprofits are required to state their formal goals publicly, these organizations are similarly not constrained to a permanent goal hierarchy. The mission and vision statements an organization commits to are dynamic and change over time. A primary recommendation for improving nonprofit effectiveness is to revise a nonprofits' formal goal statement to meet its current effective goals. This allows nonprofits to meet their social contract and be transparent in their purposes to the American people.

On the surface, the suggestion to revise a formal goal statement may seem nothing more than a symbolic gesture. While symbolism is involved, shifting the formal goal statement to reflect the effective goals of a nonprofit creates the opportunity for an organization to move away from problem-blind to problem-oriented strategies. Problem-oriented strategies require systematic and realistic organizational appraisals. At the most basic level, an organizational evaluation is fundamentally learning about the way we work as a means to do better. Goals are the foundation of any evaluation. An evaluation cannot occur without determining what is objective being sought. By determining goals, it makes it possible to select criteria to measure progress towards or away from goals. If the improper goals are selected for appraisal, little will be learned.

Unfortunately, goal clarification is a difficult task. Quite often goals are determined after the fact or made sufficiently broad to capture the widest range of possible participation within an organization. Determining goals as a means to bolster the image of an organization, for example, does little for meaningful evaluation. Similarly, crafting the broadest possible mission statement allows for little insight the function of an organization. By explicitly clarifying and committing to an organizations highest order effective goals, an organization is more likely to learn how to improve its performance.

Unfortunately, there are strong incentives against goal clarification. As discussed in the section on foundation drag, many nonprofits find it difficult to talk about their failures with their funders. A former employee of American Wildlands states that most “people don’t want to appraise their organization.” He continued that the standard rationale vocalized is that “we have too many obligations.” In reality, he argues it is “we don’t want to know the answer.” An employee of The Nature Conservancy agrees. He states that “monitoring and self-evaluation are

shunned by the nonprofit community." He argues that beyond the typical explanation of "we don't have the resources or time," the primary motivation is that environmental nonprofits "fear to highlight failure." Rather than see evaluation as a means to improve performance, these individuals imply that people tend to fear bad results. However, without taking the risk to evaluate organizational performance the likelihood of improving outcomes is nonexistent.

7.3 Conclusion

The single most important concept for nonprofit mangers and funders to acknowledge in improving conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone is that nonprofits must broaden the range of available options to them. Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits have an impressive record in securing positive environmental outcomes over the last 120 years. With the vast resources available to the conservation nonprofit community we can continue to expect better performance in the future. The available resources not only include the substantial financial available to the community, but the hundreds of dedicated conservationists who are passionate about the region and want to continue to secure a healthy future for Greater Yellowstone. The knowledge and experience of these practitioners must be leveraged for greater success. The current strategies employed by these organizations, unfortunately, are not enough to secure the future these organizations desire. Similarly, utilizing current strategies and simply "working harder" will also be insufficient. As Walter Lippmann (1915: 51) once wrote, "Where all think alike, no one thinks very much."" The key for Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofits is to break free of conventional thinking in an explicit effort to innovate.

Chapter 8: Implications for Environmentalism, Democracy, and Yellowstone

Chapter one asserted that there is an ongoing battle in American Environmentalism to answer two simple questions: What is an environmental outcome? And, what are the best means to achieve those outcomes? While some environmental advocates might purport to hold the correct answer to these questions, the reality is the answers will continue to be negotiated by environmentalists—and society—over time. There is no enduring or singular correct answer; the answers will continue to develop as society progresses. This social evolution does not paralyze us from improving outcomes. Rather, those of us who care about the environment are responsible for contributing to answering these questions in the context of our time.

The formal goals of environmental nonprofits give us a window into current thoughts on what constitutes a pro-environmental outcome. This manuscript does not address the normative question of what the formal goals of environmental nonprofit *should be*. Rather, this analysis uses the formal goal statements of environmental nonprofits as a partial indicator of the environmental movement's answer to this question. I take the formal commitments of these organizations at their word. By doing so, it opens up the possibility to start answering the second question. Given the current goals of environmentalism in the United States, what are the best means to achieve them? How can environmental nonprofits do better?

The central message of this manuscript is that environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone are artificially and unnecessarily restricting the scope of choices available to them. By doing so, these nonprofits are less likely to achieve their current and future goals. Many members of the nonprofit community are locked in convention with limited possibilities of finding new ways forward. This conclusion is supported by a number of experienced practitioners in the region. A conservation planner for The Nature Conservancy stated,

"Yellowstone is where it all started…[despite this] we've really been surpassed in how we think of conservation." "We have not evolved as a conservation community," he states, "it is time for change." The previous chapter discusses how environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone might do better. This chapter discusses broader implications these findings for American environmentalism and democratic practice.

8.1 American environmentalism

Environmental nonprofits often portray themselves as of saviors of the natural world. These organizations claim to be in a privileged position to 'speak for the trees.' In effect, these organizations seek to give voice to nature in political and policy processes. Environmentalists often believe that their positions transcend politics; despite the reality politics are inherent in the social negotiations of environmental outcomes and strategies. While their right to hold this privileged position in our society is occasionally questioned by those outside the movement (e.g. Huber 1999), a more fundamental challenge for environmentalists is addressing the concerns of critical lovers of the environmental movement.

We must remember that the dynamic to question environmental outcomes has been constant since the birth of American Environmentalism. Early wise-use conservationists (e.g. Gifford Pinchot and Teddy Roosevelt) battled preservationists (e.g. John Muir and Henry Senger) over the appropriate uses for our public lands, with both sides of the debate asserting that their strategies and desired outcomes for environmental protection were superior to the other. Since that time, the most ardent environmentalists have maintained a sense of moral and strategic correctness in their opinions, often fundamentally dismissing those with divergent opinions.

Many environmentalists have great disdain for members of the environmental movement who do not share their vision of the future—or definition of what it means to be 'environmental.' For example, David Brower's shows us his contempt for compromising environmentalists when he states, "polite conservationists leave no mark save the scars upon the Earth that could have been prevented had they stood their ground" (Scheuering 2004). Mark Dowie (1999: 256) believes that "without fervor in the ranks" the large national nonprofits "cannot formulate a vision" for environmentalism. Such individuals believe that grassroots activism hold the true vision for the future. Other critics argue that retreating to an exclusive vision of environmentalism is a mistake. Adam Werbach (2004, pp.16-31), former president of the Sierra Club, alleges:

> ….the ability of environmentalism, as a language, an ideology, a set of practices, and network of institutions, cannot deal with the most pressing ecological challenges facing the planet….the environmental movement is not prepared, nor does it have a plan, to fight the enormous battles we face…

Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus (2004: 6-10) of the Breakthrough Institute agree:

> …it is hard not to conclude that the environmental movement's approach to problems and policies hasn't worked particularly well….What the environmental movement needs more than anything else right now is to take a collective step back to rethink everything….We concluded that the problem wasn't with environmental leaders so much as with their conceptual models, policy frameworks, and institutions.

These three individuals have declared that environmentalism "dead" and proclaim that the way forward is to build a new progressive ideology that integrates environmental values with other political concerns of American citizens. The central challenge they articulate is that "for too long, environmentalists have believed that their cause—protecting nature—to be so transparently right that they have thought little about their failure to appeal to deeply held national aspirations" (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007: 65). To them, improving environmentalism is not about the

fervor of the believers, but rather the pragmatics of integrating the environmental agenda with other interests in society.

This dissertation sought to use the Greater Yellowstone system as a microcosm for understanding the challenges of larger environmental movement. While the region is unique in its biophysical features and bureaucratic landscape, the challenges Greater Yellowstone's nonprofits face are shared with environmental nonprofits beyond Yellowstone. The vast majority of critical lovers of the environmental movement, such as above, are experienced practitioners who are passionate about making a difference. Their appraisals are the result of experience of working within environmental nonprofits. However, such appraisals have rarely taken the form of systematic empirical study. Rather, they are the informed opinions of some of the worlds' leading environmental practitioners. Mac Chapin (2004: 3), director of the Center for the Support of Native Lands, agrees:

> It has been the case for some time that the large conservationists are not accountable to anyone, and that far too little is known about what is really happening in the field. In particular, we don't know whether the large-scale, science-based programs that appeal so much to funders are really achieving conservation goals. We also have little sense of what works and what doesn't work in what circumstances.

This analysis aimed at contributing to our knowledge of environmental nonprofits through a systematic empirical appraisal of the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. There are several broad implications for environmentalists in the context of previous critiques.

The most fundamental lesson for environmentalists is that despite the environmental movement's expansion in size, the perspectives of environmentalists have narrowed. While most modern environmentalists romanticize past leaders as visionaries (which they were), the more important reality is that the power of past environmentalism stemmed from its diversity in ideological perspective. Rachel Carson, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and David Brower are

important figures in environmentalism's history, but the notion many modern environmentalists have is that these individuals fostered a revolution against mainstream society. "Environmentalism was never particularly counter cultural," but rather the product of middle-of-the-road political thought (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007: 30). American Senators came up with the idea for the first Earth Day. The most important environmental laws were bipartisan and signed by a republican president—Richard Nixon. The Endangered Species Act was passed by Congress in 1973 with amazing voting record in the Senate of 92-0 and 355-4 in the House. The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA; 1970), the law requiring that all major federal decisions to have an Environmental Impact Statement, passed the Senate unanimously and the House 372-15. The Clean Water Act (1972) shared a similar fate with a 52-12 record in the Senate and 347-23 in the House. Environmentalist can hardly imagine such strong popular support for major environmental laws today. These outcomes were not about fervor in the ranks. They were about meeting the needs of all Americans.

Since the 1970s, both membership and the total number of environmental nonprofits in the United States surged. There are more than 10,000 environmental nonprofits in the United States with a moving membership base of 12 to 20 million Americans. While these groups were a relatively weak organizational force in the 1970, today's top 50 most wealthy environmental nonprofits command an annual budget of more than $3 billion. In the last 30 years, this growing community has splintered into a movement in support of one political party (USSEPWC 2008). A movement that once received broad political support is no longer a bipartisan affair—despite the fact the majority of American's claim to be in support of a clean and healthy environment. The environmental movement has narrowed to an exclusive special interest.

While this narrowing is troubling from a political perspective, the Greater Yellowstone experience suggests that the issue goes beyond party affiliations. Environmental nonprofit managers are utilizing a restricted set of conceptual tools that limit the likelihood of achieving their desired outcomes. This is exactly the complaint of critical lovers such as Nordhaus, Shellenberger, and Werbach. These individuals have called for a reframing of environmental politics from a discourse of limits to possibility. While their diagnosis is helpful in rebranding environmentalism, we need to go beyond their call. Challenges such as identify augmentation, cultures of meaning, and homogenization require us to expand our viewpoints and embrace a diversity of views within the environmental movement. Rather than hold the perspective that there is a true voice for American environmentalism—a correct perspective to hold—we must open up to the idea that the multiple viewpoints makes environmentalism stronger. Conflict and disagreement within environmentalism has been with us from the start. Rather than seek a uniform voice, we need to embrace continued dissent and disagreement.

Maintaining the environmentalist identity is just as important as securing environmental outcomes. A chief roadblock in the way of expanding environmental viewpoints is to recognize that environmental nonprofits serve the important social function of maintaining individual identities. This includes the "good feeling" donors and members have for contributing to a nonprofit. It also consistent with the rectitude based standpoint of staff members who have chosen a career path of making a better world. In other words, nonprofits help reinforce a sense of identity and meaning for the individuals involved. It is a means to differentiate oneself from the masses and at the same time develop a community of likeminded individuals. Environmentalism has become just another special interest group precisely because those involved have a need to differentiate themselves from other people in our society.

While many critical lovers suggest that we need a culture shift within environmentalism in order to leverage greater effectiveness, identify augmentation and cultures of meaning suggest that is will be a long uphill battle. Changes to the status quo are always met with resistance. With a nonprofit community of 10-20 million individual members and a multi-billion dollar organization industry, shifts in culture may be too much to ask. The 2005 firestorm within the environmental community over the "Death of Environmentalism" is evidence that proposed changed threatens the identities of many environmentalists.

Abraham Kaplan (1963: 10) once wisely wrote "that there can be agreement on policy without agreement on…underlying philosophy." The key for innovators is finding a way to support the current identities of environmentalists, while at the same time finding ways to change practices. Community based initiatives that address the real problems people face of the ground are one means of achieving this end. This may seem contradictory to the previous implication. However, it is not. We must expand the perspective of the broad community, without directly threating the identities of those resistant to change.

Environmental nonprofits must not shy away from public goal commitments. There is a generalized trend of environmental nonprofits failing to clarify exactly what they are seeking. For example, in chapter six I highlighted the fact few environmental nonprofits can articulate what overarching outcome they seek in the wolf case. Individuals can articulate that they 'want to win a lawsuit' or that they 'want to reduce the number of wolves killed.' However, they cannot articulate why this is important beyond 'I care about wolves and I need to do something about it.' This general pattern is systemic within the environmental nonprofit community. There are a number of reasons why nonprofits are reluctant to make their desired outcomes explicit.

The primary factors are rooted in organizational insecurities. Insecurities range from fear of negative appraisals in the eyes of funders to a fear of an insufficient member base.

Critical lovers of the environmental movement have made calls against the politics of limits. That is, there is a longstanding paradigm within American Environmentalism that suggests saving the environment must be based on preventing actions from harming the environment. The narratives that are woven into this paradigm "are premised on the notion that humankind's survival depends on understanding that ecological crises are a consequence of human intrusions on Nature, and that humans must let go of their consumer, religious, and ideological fantasies and recognize where their true self-interest lies" (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2008: 130). The critical feature is that humans must be prevented from impacting nature. The concept of prevention is a fuzzy at best, as it give the public no clear commitment about what environmentalists stand for. Critical lovers argue that without a positive public vision for the future, environmentalism will continue to thin as a special interest.

The Greater Yellowstone experience suggests that environmental nonprofits need to make clearer goal commitments to the public for an additional reason. The rise of critical lovers of the environmental movement over the past 10 years suggests that all is not well in environmentalism. There is a general sentiment that environmental nonprofits are not reaching their full potential. The evaluation of progress towards the goals of Greater Yellowstone's 183 environmental nonprofits confirms this suspicion. If it is unclear what you are trying to achieve, trying to improve performance is akin to playing a game of darts while blindfolded. Without knowing what you are aiming for improving efficiency or innovating new techniques will be futile. Clear goals are the foundation of effective programs. The lack of explicit and well-understood goal commitments opens up environmental nonprofits to the effects of parasitic

organizations, foundation drag, and the reliance on problem-blind strategies. Environmental nonprofits can do better. This starts with a specific commitment clarifying exactly what is to be achieved.

Striving for a unified public is a fool's errand. Two explanatory factors within the holy trinity (plus one) focus on the perspectives of 'non-environmental' individuals. The lack of political will centers conservationists educating or convincing the public of the infallibility of the environmental position. It as if environmentalists believe that marketing and education is enough to change environmentally damaging human behaviors. Similarly, the concept of the robust opposition attributes environmental failure to the inability to stand up to a bully. Besides increased funding, the concept centers on convincing the public of the errors of the oppositions' ways.

Chapter four discussed the complications of attributing failure to these factors. However, the fact remains that that most environmentalists seek to develop an environmentally responsible public. That is, convince the public that the environmentalist's perspective is the correct way to view the world; that the environmentalism transcends politics and is in the interest of all Americans. Yet, history has shown us on virtually every issue in modern society a unified perspective is an impossible task. Notwithstanding, policies are implemented and outcomes are changed in ways that meet the needs of many citizens. How can this be? The fact is a unified perspective or outlook on the world is not a perquisite for environmental outcomes. Too often those seeking environmental action "focus on trying to get everyone to think alike, forgetting that is how people act, not what they think, that in the end matters most" (Pielke 2010: 45).

Focusing on pragmatic solutions that solve the problems of multiple interest groups has proven an effective means to build a stronger environmental future in Greater Yellowstone.

Community based initiatives, such as the Blackfoot Challenge and Sustaining Jackson Hole, have not sought to convince the environmental opposition of the infallibility of the environmentalist perspective. Rather, they focused on finding good solutions to empirical problems. That is focusing on solutions that are a technically proficient means of solving the problem, morally acceptable to the community, and politically viable in the context of rural America. The broader environmental movement can learn from such success by focusing on these three criteria of policy success.

8.2 Implications for democracy

The influence that nongovernmental organizations should have on American democratic practices has been contested since the founding of our nation. James Madison warned that special interest groups could negatively impact American governance and proposed constructing institutional means to limit their effects. Madison (1961: 26) asserted:

> Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.

Little has changed since Madison's time. Claims are still rampant on how the influence of special interest groups negatively impacts our democracy. For example, in September 2008, Senator Inhofe (R-OK) released a report entitled *Political Activity of Environmental Groups and Their Supporting Foundations* (USSEWPC 2008). The senator argued environmental nonprofits are illegitimate stealth advocates for the Democratic Party despite the fact environmental organizations claim to serve public interests. Outside of the context of the environment, former Representative Pat Williams (D-MT; 2008) made a similar claim arguing that the National Rifle Association (NRA) had become a pawn of the far right and was inappropriately spending "hard-

earned dues money on politics." He lamented the influence of the NRA has on American politics. This is particularly striking as the Representative has a perfect voting record with the NRA in his 18 year career in the House. In October 2008, a series of articles in *The Denver Post* criticized the Colorado Democracy Alliance, insinuating impropriety among a collection of left-leaning nonprofits. The author's major argument was that Democrats were using "nonprofits to push politics" (Fender 2008a; 2008b). In a press conference during the economic crisis, President Obama (2008) argued that "we cannot sustain a system that bleeds billions of taxpayer dollars on programs that...exist solely because of the power of a politician, lobbyist, or interest group." The President implied that special interest groups were a major cause of the economic crisis. Jeff Ventura, a spokesman for the chief administrative officer of the House, has even complained about the methods that special interest groups use to engage representatives. Ventura asserts, "advocacy groups are collecting e-mails and then shoving them into a system that was really designed for manual input, not for people to send us wholesale batches of thousands of e-mails at a time" (Krebs 2008). He argues that nonprofit advocacy groups overwhelm the politicians.

The question in the face of such critics is: *why focus on improving nonprofit performance?* Despite the challenges interest groups pose in our democracy, the existence of interest groups is necessary for it to function. In Federalist 10 Madison (1961: 46) states "[t]here are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests." Madison advised that destroying liberty is unreasonable if we wish to have political freedom, and that creating a uniform perspective is an impractical task. He asserted that the best we can do is moderate the negative effects of such groups. A number of modern democratic scholars agree, using numerous justifications to rationalize the

legitimacy of nongovernmental organizations in the democratic process (Douglas 1987; Dahl 1983; Maloney & Jordan 2007). However, four major arguments are routinely invoked by democratic scholars.

First, NGOs allow for increased participation of the public in policy decisions. Political parties and politicians need to consider and balance a multitude of interests in decision making. It is reasonable to assume that the primary interests of some citizens are poorly represented by their elected officials. Nonprofits can provide a voice to such citizens. Summarizing the argument, Grant Jordan and William Maloney (2007, p.25) assert, "the more interests [organized groups] actively advance their concerns, the more government has to adjust the policies to avoid opposition, and the more democracy there is." Second, NGOs provide benefits to the public for which a democratic government is severely inhibited. James Douglas (1987, p.46) contends that "[t]he democratic state has to treat all its citizens equally, which is what we mean by equality before the law. Voluntary organizations are not similarly constrained." In other words, NGOs allow a minority interest to offer services to the public that the majority are unwilling to provide. Third, NGOs add conservatism to public policy by inhibiting other organized interests from implementing rapid changes to the status quo. Dahl (1983, p.43) explains, "[e]ach of the major organized forces in a country prevents the others from making changes that might seriously damage its perceived interests." This behavior guards against ill-informed, rash policy changes. Fourth, NGOs provide oversight to the state, which guards against the government subverting the will of the people (Dahl 1984). Dahl (1983, p.37) notes, "[to] prohibit citizens from organizing freely in order to make their views known to legislators and to other citizens would violate the criteria of effective participants and enlightened understanding, and it would mock the idea of final control over the agenda by the citizen body." Nongovernmental organizations are critically

important to the functioning of our democracy. In a political system where it is difficult for the average citizen to have a voice, nongovernmental organizations are a means of securing the outcomes citizens' desire outside of government.

The narrow and cynical way to think about nonprofits is solely as a pressure group. Pressure groups are typically defined as an organization that believes in a particular cause and wants to influence on public policy outcomes, usually through swaying decision makers. We usually view such organizations as advocacy groups. This is the way much of the political science literature treats nonprofits (e.g. Douglas 1987; Maloney & Jordan 2007). If we define nonprofits as pressure groups, improving performance makes little sense from a system-wide perspective. Improving performance under such conditions is simply about outcompeting the opposition. However, nonprofits engage in a wide variety of activities beyond advocacy (Charnovitz 1997). Narrowly defining nonprofits as pressure groups is a mistake, as it limits the scope of choice available to solve social problems.

The critical point is that leveraging greater nonprofit performance outside of the paradigm of pressure groups creates room for significant progress in improving both nonprofit and democratic outcomes. The lessons in this manuscript are likely to be applicable to nonprofits in other sectors. Expanding the range of available strategies, not directly fighting the status quo for organizational change, making explicit goal commitments, and realizing that outcomes can be achieved without widespread social transformation will benefit most nonprofits in the fulfillment of their desired future.

Understanding the benefits of improving nonprofit performance in democratic practice is more complex, as any conversation will ultimately be informed by our differing definitions of democracy. However, a key feature in virtually any discussion of democracy is that common

interest outcomes—the public good—should usually be prioritized over exclusive special interest outcomes (Brunner and Steelman 2005). The tyranny of the minority should not dictate the future of the majority. Such ideas are well ingrained in American democratic practices. As such, we routinely see special interest groups appealing to the common interest as a means to rally support for their political perspectives. We have seen how democratic scholars justify the utility of interests groups: bestowing a voice to citizens, creating benefits outside of government, guarding against ill-informed decisions, and provide oversight to the state. However, how does improving a nonprofit's performance go beyond finding ways to supplant the will of a minority over the majority?

A key finding of this analysis is that the greatest room for leveraging new dimensions of nonprofit performance is moving beyond the conventional paradigm of nonprofit failure. Relying on explanatory factors, such as a robust opposition, directs our attention to outdoing the opposition; to be more effective, we must topple those against us. In contrast, the three alternative means to improve performance discussed in the previous chapter focus on ways that environmental groups can secure their interests and the interests of other members of the broader community. Treating policy outcomes as a zero-sum game is a recipe for continued failure. While there are situations where the desired outcomes of divergent political actors will directly conflict with each other, most political situations are amenable to solutions beyond advocating "yes" or "no" to a single policy choice. A third-way forward is obtainable on most issues where the non-exclusive special interests of multiple interest groups can be met.

8.3 Environmental saviors

The Greater Yellowstone is a global symbol for conservation. The region has a strong legacy of leadership in biodiversity conservation. The Yellowstone region is home to the world's

first national park and the nation's first national forest. The formation of the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee in 1964 symbolized one of the first major efforts to manage large landscapes as an ecosystem across jurisdictional boundaries. With the reintroduction of wolves in 1995, Greater Yellowstone region become one of the last intact ecosystems in North America. These efforts are in no small part due the tremendous dedication of environmental nonprofits passionately striving to protect this region for future generations. From the Boone and Crocket Club's efforts originating in 1887; to the Greater Yellowstone Coalition's formation in 1983, to more recent establishment of Endeavor Wildlife Research in 2005—one trembles to think where we would be today without the leadership of these organizations.

The analysis contained within this manuscript is not an attempt to belittle the past efforts of Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits. In fact, the purpose is quite the opposite. These organizations have provided an incredible service to the American people. Those of us who care deeply for Greater Yellowstone see a need for continuing to improve our community's ability to secure conservation outcomes in the common interest. Environmental nonprofits have emerged as regional leaders to help the realization of this goal. However, we can—and should—expect more from these organizations. Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits can do better. While we will never have the precision to perfectly manage environmental nonprofits, we can improve on current strategies to leverage better performance in securing conservation outcomes.

Conventional explanations for nonprofit failure disproportionally focus on 'the other.' We routinely hear statements such as: They are not giving us enough money; the public does not care; the opposition is just too strong. Conventional strategies to remedy these challenges show little promise in lifting nonprofits to new levels of performance. The central premise of this analysis is that improving should begin with focusing on self-scrutiny and self-appraisal. Susan

Clark (2008: 216) argues that "many of our present leaders in greater Yellowstone are rich in experience but poor in theory—about both the challenges they and we face and the responses needed." The implication is that leaders—in the nonprofit, for-profit, and government sectors—are overwhelmed with challenges on a daily basis. For the nonprofit sector these challenges include attending public meetings, maintaining relationships with key decision makers, keeping up with the latest policies, fundraising, staffing, and all the while maintaining the energy to fight the next battles. Many individuals simply do not have the time to sit back and think.

Improving conservation outcomes will require environmental nonprofits to reach beyond their comfort zones and think critically about their fundamental assumptions and mental models of how the world works. This is the central challenge all environmental nonprofits face. The opportunity exists for Greater Yellowstone's environmental nonprofits to once again be world leaders. These organizations are in a strong position to innovate more robust strategies for securing conservation outcomes. The way forward is developing solutions that solve the grounded problems of multiple interest groups. Alternatively, these organizations can maintain the status quo and continue to fall short of meeting their formal goals. The choice is theirs.

References

Alameda Times-Star (ATS). 2004. Editorial: Oohs, aahs and no roars. June 8.

Allen, M.D. 2010. Open Letter to Mike Leahy and Kirk Robinson. April 8. 4pp.

Allison, G. 1971. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis*. Boston: Little Brown.

American Wind and Wildlife Institute (AWWI). 2010. American Wind & Wildlife Institute -- Members. Accessed on June 9, 2010. [Available at http://www.awwi.org/members.aspx].

Anda, J.A. 2010. 3 Ideas for KL Amendments. *National Journal: Energy and Environment Blog.* Accessed June 10, 2010. [Available at http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/05/does-the-bill-pass-muster.php#1584354].

Ascher, W. 1978. *Forecasting: An appraisal for policymakers and planners*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ascher, W. 1986. The evolution of the policy sciences: Understanding the rise and avoiding the fall. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 5(2): 365-373.

Ascher, W. 1999. *Why Governments Waste National Resources: Policy failures in developing countries*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ascher, W. 2009. *Bringing in the Future: Strategies for Farsightedness and Sustainability in Developing Countries*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ascher, W., R. Healey, and T. A. Steelman. 2010. *Knowledge and Environmental Politics Re-Imaging the Boundaries of Science and Politics*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Associated Press (AP). 2000. Snowmobile group, others file lawsuit. December 7.

Associated Press (AP). 2002. Conservationists oppose elk feeding. March 11.

Associated Press (AP). 2003. Three Counties Say Wolves 'Unacceptable.' April 19.

Associated Press (AP). 2004a. Snowmobile regulations leave environmentalists, snowmobile advocates unsatisfied. February 12.

Associated Press (AP). 2004b. Tourism group sues over sled ban. November 12.

Associated Press (AP). 2004c. Elk feedgrounds focus of brucellosis forum. May 20.

Associated Press (AP). 2005. Brucellosis committee holds off on elk-feedground-closure plan. August 24.

Associated Press (AP). 2006. Livestock groups turn up opposition to bison plans. June 20.

Auer, M.R. 2007. The Policy Sciences in Critical Perspective Pp 541-564 in *Handbook of Public Administration, Third Edition*. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis.

Bath, A.J. 1990. Public Attitudes of Interest Groups in Wyoming Towards Wolf Restoration in Yellowstone National Park. *Wildlife Society Bulletin*. 17: 519-525.

Bath, A.J. and C. Phillips. 1990. *Statewide Surveys of Montana and Idaho Resident Attitudes Towards Wolf Reintroduction in Yellowstone National Park.* Report submitted to Friend for Animals, National Wildlife Federation, US Fish and Wildlife Service, and US National Park Service.

Barker, E. 2010. Rammell eyes wolf eradication in Idaho Co. *Lewiston Morning Tribune.* December 9.

Beck, A.T. 1999. *Prisoners of Hate: The cognitive basis of anger, hostility, and violence.* New York: HarperCollins.

Berger, J. 2003. Is it Acceptable to let a Species go Extinct in a National Park? *Conservation Biology* (17): 1451–1454.

Berger, J. 2004. The Last Mile: How to sustain long-distance migration in mammals. *Conservation Biology* (18): 320–331.

Beyer, C. (2007). Non-Governmental Organizations as Motors of Change. *Government and Opposition, 42*(4), 513-535.

Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 2007. Annual Report 2006 Grants Paid Summary. Accessed on February 24, 2011 [Available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/nr/public/media/annualreports/annualreport06/AR2006GrantsPaid.html].

Bishop, M. and M. Green. 2008. *Philanthro-capitalism: How the rich can save the world*. New York: Bloomberg Press.

Block, S. 2004. *Why Nonprofits Fail: Overcoming founder's syndrome, fundphobia, and other obstacles to success*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Boschken, H.L. 1994. Organizational performance and multiple constituencies. *Public Administration Review* 54, 308-312.

Bozeman, B. and D. Sarewitz. 2005. Public value failures and science policy. *Science and Public Policy* 32(2): 119–136.

Brewer, G.D. 1995. *Environmental challenges: Interdisciplinary opportunities and new ways of doing business*, Stockholm, Sweden: Mistra Lecture, Royal Institute of Technology.

Brewer, G.D. and T.W. Clark. 1994. A policy sciences perspective: Improving implementation. Pp 391-413 in T. W. Clark, R. P. Reading and A. L. Clarke (Eds.). *Endangered Species Recovery: Finding the Lessons, Improving the Process*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Brewer, G. and P. DeLeon. 1983. *The Foundations of Policy Analysis*. Homewood: Dorsey.

Brewer, G. and J.S. Kakalik. 1979. *Handicapped Children: Strategies for improving services*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Brinkley, D. 2009. *The Wilderness Warrior*. New York: HarperCollins.

Brooks, T.M., R.A. Mittermeier, G.A.B. da Fonseca, J. Gerlach, M. Hoffman, J.F. Lamoreux, C.G. Mittermeier, J.D. Pilgrim, and A.S.L. Rodrigues. 2006. Global Biodiversity Conservation Priorities. *Science* 313(5783): 58-61.

Brooks, D. Don't Follow the Money. *New York Times* October 18, A31.

Brown, M., 2008. Yellowstone sharply increases snowmobile limit. Available at: http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/6600ap_wst_yellowstone_snowmobiles_reversal.html ?source=rss [Accessed November 29, 2008].

Brown, M. 2010. Grizzly Numbers Hit New High in Yellowstone Region. The Salt Lake Tribune. October 28. Accessed December 15. [Available at http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/50555198-68/bears-grizzly-yellowstone-bear.html.csp].

Brown, M. 2011. Mont. to Kill Wolves that Prey on Elk. Associate Press. February 16. Available at: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110216/ap_on_re_us/us_endangered_wolves_montana. [Accessed February 17, 2011]

Brunner, R.D. 1985. Policy sciences. Pp. 607-8 A. Kuper and J. Kuper, (Eds.). in *The Social Science Encyclopedia*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Brunner, R.D. 1991. Global climate change: Defining the policy problem. *Policy Sciences* 24: 291-311.

Brunner, R.D. 1991. The policy movement as a policy problem. *Policy Sciences* 24: 65-98.

Brunner, R.D. 1997. Introduction to the policy sciences. *Policy Sciences* 30: 191-215.

Brunner, R.D. 2002. Problems in Governance. Pp. 1-47 in Brunner, R.D, C. Colburn, C.M. Cromley, R. Klein, and E. Olson (Eds.). *Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brunner, R.D. 2006. A Paradigm for Practice. *Policy Sciences* 39(2): 135–167.

Brunner, R.D. 2008. The Policy Scientist of Democracy Revisited. *Policy Sciences*. 41: 3-18.

Brunner, R.D. and T. W. Clark. 1996. Making partnerships work in endangered species conservation: An introduction to decision process. *Endangered Species UPDATE* 13(9): 1-5.

Brunner, R.D. and T.W. Clark. 1997. A practice-based approach to ecosystem management, *Conservation Biology* 11: 48-58.

Brunner, R.D. and C. Colburn. 2002. Harvesting Experience. Pp. 201-247 in Brunner, R.D, C. Colburn, C.M. Cromley, R. Klein, and E. Olson (Eds.). *Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brunner, R.D, C. Colburn, C.M. Cromley, R. Klein, and E. Olson (Eds.). 2002. *Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brunner, R.D. and T.A. Steelman. 2005. Pp. 1-46 in Brunner, R.D., T.A. Steelman, L. Coe-Juell, C.M. Cromley, C.M. Edwards, D.W. Tucker (Eds.). *Adaptive Governance: Integrating Science, Policy, and Decision Making*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Brunner, R.D., T.A. Steelman, L. Coe-Juell, C.M. Cromley, C.M. Edwards, D.W. Tucker (Eds.). 2005. *Adaptive Governance: Integrating Science, Policy, and Decision Making*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Buffalo Field Campaign (BFC), 2008. Yellowstone Buffalo Slaughter Counts. Accessed on November 29, 2008. [Available at http://www.buffalofieldcampaign.org/bisonslaughertotal.html].

Cameron, K. 1980. Critical Questions in Evaluating Organizational Effectiveness. *Organizational Dynamics* 9: 66-80.

Carlsson, S. and J. Hedman. 2007. Management Support System Design: A competing values approach. *Advances in Informational Systems Development*, 2: 335-345.

Carman, J.G. and K.A. Fredericks. 2008. Nonprofits and evaluation: Empirical evidence from the field. In J.G. Carman and K.A. Fredericks (Eds.). *Nonprofits and Evaluation. New Directions for Evaluation*, 119: 51-71.

Carson, R. 1962. *Silent Spring*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

Casey, D., and T.W. Clark. 1996. *Tales of the Wolf: Fifty-one Stories of Wolf Encounters in the Wild*. Moose: Homestead Press.

Chase, A. 1987. *Playing God in Yellowstone Park: The Destruction of America's First National Park.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Chambers, S., & Kopstein, J. 2001. Bad Civil Society. *Political Theory*, 29(6): 837-865.

Chaney, R. 2009. Predator Patrol: Blackfoot ranchers rest easier knowing their stock is being watched over by range rider. *Missoulian* October 11. Accessed on November 2, 2010 [Available at http://missoulian.com/lifestyles/territory/article_255b70fc-b518-11de-b4fc-001cc4c002e0.html]

Chapin, M., 2004. A Challenge to Conservationists. *WorldWatch*, (Nov/Dec): 17-34.

Charnovitz, S., 1997. Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and international governance. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 18(2): 183-286.

Chase, A. 1987. *Playing God in Yellowstone: The destruction of America's first national park.* San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Cherney, D.N. 2004. Protecting Pronghorn Migration Corridors: Finding ways to work together. *NRCC News* 17(2).

Cherney, D.N. In Press. Securing the Free Movement of Wildlife: Revisiting the lower 48's longest land mammal migration. *Environmental Law*.

Cherney, D.N., A. Bond, and S.G. Clark. 2009. Understanding Patterns of Human Interactions and Decision Making: An initial map of Podocarpus National Park, Ecuador. *Journal of Sustainable Forestry* 28: 294-7111.

Cherney, D.N and S.G. Clark. 2009. The American West's Longest Land Mammal Migration: Clarifying and securing the common interest. *Policy Sciences* 42(2): 95-111.

Clark, M. 2010a. New Direction Needed for Wolves. GYC News August 11 [Accessed 11/2/2010 at http://greateryellowstone.org/news/index.php?id=477]

Clark, M. 2010b. Big News for Wolves in Greater Yellowstone. Open letter (email) to Greater Yellowstone Coalition Supporters. August 8.

Clark, M. 2010c. URGET ACTION ALERT: Protect wolves and the Endangered Species Act! Open letter (email) to Greater Yellowstone Coalition Supporters. December 7.

Clark, M. 2011. Yellowstone Bison Under Attack! Open letter (email) to Greater Yellowstone Coalition Supporters. February 2.

Clark. S.G. 2008. *Finding a Path Toward Sustainability: Leaders and Management Policy in Greater Yellowstone*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Clark, S. G. 2009. An informational approach to sustainability: "Intelligence" in conservation and natural resource management policy. *Journal of Sustainable Forestry* 28(6): 636-662.

Clark, T. W. 1992. Practicing natural resource management with a policy orientation. *Environmental Management* 16: 23-433.

Clark, T.W. 1993. Creating and using knowledge for species and ecosystem conservation: Science, organizations, and policy. *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 36: 497-525.

Clark, T.W. 1997. Conservation biologists in the policy process: Learning to be effective and practical. Pp. 575-597 in G. K. Meffee and C. R. Carroll (Eds.). *Principals of Conservation Biology*. Sunderland, Mass., Sinauer Associates, Inc.

Clark, T.W. 1997. *Averting Extinction: Reconstructing Endangered Species Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Clark, T. W. 1999. Interdisciplinary problem solving: Next steps in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. *Policy Sciences* 32: 393-414.

Clark, T. W. 2000. Interdisciplinary problem solving in endangered species conservation: The Yellowstone grizzly bear case. Pp. 285-301 in R.P. Reading, and B. J. Miller, (Eds.). *Endangered Animals: A Reference Guide to Conflicting Issues*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Clark, T.W., 2002. *The Policy Process: A Practical Guide for Natural Resources Professionals*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Clark, T. W., A. P. Curlee, S. C. Minta, and P. M. Kareiva (Eds.). 1999. *Carnivores in Ecosystems: The Yellowstone Experience*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Clark, T. W., and A. M. Gillesberg. 2001. Lessons from wolf restoration in Greater Yellowstone. Pp. 135-149 in Sharpe, V.A., B. Norton, and S. Donnelley (Eds.). *Wolves and Human Communities: Biology, Politics, and Ethics*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Clark, T. W., and D. J. Mattson. 2005. Making carnivore management programs more effective: A guide for decision making. Pp. 271-276 in Clark, T. W., M. B. Rutherford, and D. Casey, (Eds.) *Coexisting with Large Carnivores: Lessons from Greater Yellowstone*. Washington D.C.: Island Press.

Clark, T. W. and M.B. Rutherford, M. B. 2005. Coexisting with Large Carnivores: Orienting to the problems. In T. W. Clark, M.B. Rutherford and D. Casey, (Eds.), Coexisting with large carnivores: Lessons from Greater Yellowstone (pp. 3–27). Washington, D.C: Island Press.

Clark, T. W., Rutherford, M. B., & Casey, D. (Eds.). 2005. Coexisting with large carnivores: Lessons from Greater Yellowstone. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Clark, T.W. and S.C. Minta. 1994. *Greater Yellowstone's Future: Prospects for ecosystem science, management and policy*. Moose: Homestead Press.

Collins, J. and J. Porras. 1994. *Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies.* New York: Harper Business.

Corrigan, P. 2005. The Return of the Wolf. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. April 4. E1.

Covaleski, M.A., M.W. Dirsmith, J.E. Michelman. 1993. An institutional theory perspective on the DRG framework case-mix accounting systems and health-care organizations. Accounting. *Organizations and Society* 18*:* 65–80.

Craighead, J. J. 1991. Yellowstone in transition. Pages 27–40 in Kieter RB, Boyce MS, (Eds.) The *Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: Redefining America's Wilderness Heritage*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Craighead, JJ., J.S. Sumner, and J.A. Mitchell. 1995. *The Grizzly Bears of Yellowstone: Their Ecology in the Yellowstone Ecosystem, 1959-1992*. Washington D.C.: Island Press.

Crick, B. 1959. *The American Science of Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cromley, C.M. 2000. The killing of grizzly bear 209: Identifying norms for grizzly bear management. Pp. 173-220 in Clark, T. W., A. R. Willard, and C. M. Cromley, eds. *Foundations of Natural Resources Policy and Management*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cromley, C.M. 2002a. Bison management in Greater Yellowstone. Pp. 126-158 in R.D. Brunner, C.H. Colburn, C.M. Cromley, R.A. Klein, and E.A. Olson, (Eds.) *Finding Common Ground: Governance and natural resources in the American West*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cromley, C.M. 2002b. *Beyond Boundaries: Learning from bison management in Greater Yellowstone*. Ph.D. dissertation, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, New Haven.

Crutchfield, L.R. and H.M. Grant. 2008. *Forces for good: The six practices of high-impact nonprofits*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Dahl, R.A., 1983. *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R.A., 1984. Polyarchy, Pluralism, and Scale. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 7(4): 225-240.

Davies, J.C. 1973. Where from and where to? Pp. 1-27 in. J.N. Knutson (Ed.). *Handbook of Political Psychology* San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, Inc.

Davis, J.A. and T.W. Smith. 2009. *General social surveys, 1972-2008* [machine-readable data file] /Principal Investigator, James A. Davis; Director and Co-Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. --NORC ed.-- Chicago: National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor].

Dawkins, R. 2006. *The God Delusion*, Bantam Books: New York.

D'Aunno, T. 1992. The effectiveness of human service organizations: A comparison of the models. Pp. 341-361. in Y. Hansenfeld (Ed.), *Human Services as Complex Organizations* Newbury Park: Sage.

Defenders of Wildlife (DW). 2008. The Bailey Wildlife Foundation Wolf Compensation Trust. Memo on Payments to Ranchers for Livestock Losses Caused by Wolves.

Defenders of Wildlife. 2010. Coexisting with Carnivores. Defenders of Wildlife Programs and Policy. [Accessed November 11, 2010 at http://www.defenders.org/programs_and_policy/wildlife_conservation/solutions/coexisting_with_carnivores/index.php]

Department of the Interior (DOI). 1916. *Annual Report of the Superintendent of National Parks to the Secretary of the Interior*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.

DiMaggio P, Powell WW. 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Journal of Sociology* 48: 147–160.

Dolnicar, S., Irvine, H. and Lazarevski, K. (2008), Mission or money? Competitive challenges facing public sector nonprofit organizations in an institutionalized environment. *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing*, 13(2): 107–117.

Douglas, J., 1987. Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization. Pp. 43-54 in W.W. Powell and R. Steinberg, (Eds.) *The Nonprofit Sector: A research handbook*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dowie, M., 1991. American Environmentalism: A movement courting irrelevance. *World Policy Journal*, 9(1): 67-92.

Dowie, M., 1996. *Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Drucker, P.F. 1990. *Managing the Nonprofit Organization: Practices and Principles*. Butterworth-Heinemann: Oxford.

Drucker, P.F. 2005. *Managing the Nonprofit Organization: Practices and Principles*. New York: First Collins Business.

Ehrlich, P.R. 1968 *The Population Bomb,* New York: Ballantine Books.

Eisenberg, P. 1997. A Crisis in the Nonprofit Sector. *National Civic Review* 86(4): 1542-1811.

Erickson, L. 2008. Brag Session: Corporation for the Northern Rockies. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

Environmental News Service (ENS). 2004. *Wyoming Wolves Threatened with Poisoning, Trapping, Shooting*. November 9. Last accessed December 7, 2006 at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/nov2004/2004-11-09-09.asp.

Falk, R. 1995. Casting the spell: The New Haven School of international law. *The Yale Law Journal* 104: 1991-2008.

Farr, J., J.S. Hacker, N. Kazee. 2006. The Policy Scientist of Democracy: The discipline of Harold D. Lasswell. *American Political Science Review* 100(4): 579-587.

Federal Register. 2006. Brucellosis in Cattle; State and area classifications; Wyoming 75 FR 54402 September 15.

Fender, J., 2008a. Colorado Democratic scheme called ingenious. Available at: http://www.denverpost.com/ci_10623568?source=rss [Accessed November 29, 2008].

Fender, J., 2008b. Progressive gang uses nonprofits to push politics. *The Denver Post*. Available at: http://www.denverpost.com/commented/ci_10646537?source=commented-news [Accessed November 29, 2008].

Flandro, C. 2011. Gardiner-area Ranchers Weigh in on Nearby Bison. Bozeman Daily Chronicle. January 31. Accessed on February 18, 2011 [Available at:http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/article_664f7246-2cd8-11e0-8d48-001cc4c03286.html].

Fox, S. 1985. *The American Conservation Movement: John Muir and his legacy*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Friedman, M. 1953. *Essays in Positive Economics*. Chicago: Chicago Press.

Fullwood, J. 2004. Debate revs up snowmobilers. *Sacramento Bee*, February 1, pp. M1.

Gearino, J. 2009. A 'Green' Victory. *Casper Star Tribune*. December 29.

Gedicks, A. 2001. *Resource Rebels: Native challenges to mining and oil corporations*. Cambridge: South End Press.

Glick, D. and C. Freese 2004. Yellowstone: A 130-Year Experiment in Integrated Conservation and Development. Pp. 124-153 in McShane, T.O and M.P. Wells. *Getting Biodiversity Projects to Work: Towards more effective conservation and development*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Grandall, D. 1977. Transcript of Conversation, Jack Anderson and Derrick Grandall, April 1, 1977, p. 5, "Snowmobile Briefing Book," vol. 1, Yellowstone Research Library, Mammoth, Wyoming.

Greater Yellowstone Coalition (GYC). 2010. Yellowstone Grizzlies: Numbers rise, but threats loom. Greater Yellowstone Coalition. [Access December 2, 2010 at http://greateryellowstone.org/issues/wildlife/Feature.php?id=39

Greater Yellowstone Conservation Organization Inventory (GYCOI). 2009. *Greater Challenges, Fewer Resources: Preliminary Findings of Greater Yellowstone Conservation Organization Survey 2009*. Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and Charture Institute.

Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC). 2010. Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee. Accessed June 3, 2010 at http://fedgycc.org/

Guggenheim, D. (Director). 2006. *An Inconvenient Truth: A global warning* [DVD].

Hall, E. 2008. Brag Session: Teton Science Schools. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

Hall, P. D. 2006. A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000. In W. W. Powell (Ed.), *The Nonprofit Sector: A research handbook* (2nd ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hamilton, C. 2008. Decision Notice & Finding of No Significant Impact Pronghorn Migration Corridor Forest Plan Amendment, USDA Forest Service Bridger-Teton National Forest Wyoming.

Hammergren, L. 1998. *Political Will, Constituency Building, and Public Support in Rule of Law Programs*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development.

Haroldson, M.A., C.C. Schwartz, and K.A. Gunther. 2008. Grizzly bears in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: garbage, controversy, and decline to recovery. *Yellowstone Science* 16(2): 13-24.

Harper, H. 1985. *A Review and Synthesis of Existing Information on the History, Migrations Routes, and Wintering Areas of Pronghorn that Summer in Grand Teton National Park.* Moose: Grand Teton National Park.

Hatch, C. 2008a. Preserving the pronghorn corridor, *Jackson Hole News & Guide* February 6.

Hatch, C., 2008b. Jackson Hole News & Guide | Elk feed areas get 20 years. Available at: http://www.jhguide.com/article.php?art_id=3316 [Accessed November 29, 2008]

Hatch, C. 2010. No agreement of conflicting wolf rulings: While one conservationist sees room to negotiate, two hunters disagree. Jackson Hole News & Guide, November 24 [Accessed November 26, 2010 at http://www.jhnewsandguide.com/article.php?art_id=6716]

Hawken, P. 2007. *Blessed unrest: how the largest movement in the world came into being, and why no one saw it coming*. New York: Viking.

Healy, R.G. and W. Ascher. 1995. Knowledge in the policy process: Incorporating new environmental information in natural resource policy making. *Policy Sciences* 28(1): 1-19.

Hebert, J.H. 2000. Park Service issues broad ban on snowmobiles. *Associated Press State and Local Wire*. April 27.

Herman, R.D. and D.O. Renz. 1998. Nonprofit Organizational Effectiveness: Contrasts between especially effectives and less effective organizations. *Nonprofit Management & Leadership* 9(1): 23-38

Herman, R.D. and D.O. Renz. 1999. Theses on Nonprofit organizational Effectiveness. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 28(2): 107-126.

Herman, R.D. and D.O. Renz. 2004. Doing This Right: Effectiveness in local nonprofit organizations, a panel study. *Public Administration Review,* 64(6), 694-703.

Herman, R.D. and D.O. Renz. 2008. Advancing Nonprofit Organizational Effectiveness Research and Theory: Nine these. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 18(4): 399-415.

Hesselbein, F. 2010. Diversity: The Imperative for Today's Leaders Pp. 9-14 in M. Goldsmith, J. Baldoni, and S. McArthur. *The AMA Handbook of Leadership,* New York: AMACOM.

Hoffman, S. 2008. Brag Session: Montana Audubon Society. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

Hofrichter, R. 2000. *Reclaiming the Environmental Debate: The politics of health in a toxic culture*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Holland, J.H. 1992. Complex Adaptive Systems. *Daedalus* 121: 17–30.

Horowitz, R. 1962. Scientific Propaganda In *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* H.J. Storing (Ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Huber, Peter. 1999. *Hard Green: Saving the Environment from the Environmentalists, A Conservative Manifesto*. New York: Basic Books.

Inman, B. 2008. Brag Session: Wildlife Conservation Society. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

Iriye, A. 1999. A Century of NGOs. *Diplomatic History*, *23*(3): 421-435.

Jalonick, M.C. 2006. Park plan meets with criticism. *Casper Star Tribune*, November 21.

Jenkins-Smith, H.C. and P.A. Sabatier. 1993. The Study of Public Policy Process In *Policy and Change and Learning: An advocacy coalition approach*, P.A. Sabatier and H.C. Jenkins-Smith (Eds.). Boulder: Westview.

Kaplan, A. 1963. *American Ethics and Public Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kaplan, A. 1964. *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science*. Chandler: San Francisco.

Kaplan, R.S. 2001. Strategic Performance and Measurement and Management in Nonprofit Organizations. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*. 11(3): 353-370.

Kanter, R.M. and D.W. Brinkerhoff. 1981. Organizational Performance: Recent Developments in Measurement. Pp. 321-49 in R.G. Turner and J.F. Short Jr. (Eds.). *Annual Review of Sociology*. Palo Alto: Annual Reviews.

Keiter, R.B. 1991. An Introduction to the Ecosystem Management Debate. Pp. 3-18. In. Keiter, R. and M. Boyce (Eds.). *The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: Redefining America's Wilderness Heritage*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Krebs, B., 2008. House.gov Still Plagued by E-mail Deluge - Security Fix. *The Washington Post*. Available at: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/housegov_still_plagued_by_e-ma.html [Accessed November 30, 2008].

Lasley, L. 2008. Brag Session: Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

Lasswell, H.D. 1971. *Preview of Policy Sciences*, New York: American Elsevier.

Lasswell, H.D. 1956. *The Decision Process: Seven categories of functional analysis*. College Park, Maryland: Bureau of Governmental Research, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Maryland.

Lasswell, H.D. & Kaplan, A., 1963. *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lasswell, H.D. & McDougal, M.S., 1992. *Jurisprudence For A Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy*, New Haven: New Haven Press/Kluwer Law.

Lemos, M. C. and B. J. Morehouse. 2005. The Co-production of Science and Policy in Integrated Climate Assessments. *Global Environmental Change Part A* 15(1): 57-68.

Lemos, M. C., T.J. Finan, R.W. Fox, D.R. Nelson, and J. Tucker. 2002. The Use of Seasonal Climate Forecasting in Policymaking: Lessons from Northeast Brazil. *Climatic Change* 55: 479-507.

Leopold, A.S., S.A. Cain, C.M. Cottam, I.N. Gabrielson, and T.L Kimball. 1963. Wildlife Management in the National Parks. Report of the Advisory Board on Wildlife Management. Transactions of 28th North American Wildlife Natural Resource Conference, Washington, D.C. Wildlife Management Institute pp. 28-45.

Lewis, S. 2008. Landmarks and Landscapes. *Yellowstone Science* 16(2): 1.

Lichtblau, E. 2010. Topic of Foreign Money in U.S. Races Hits Hustings. *New York Times*. October 9, A14.

Lippmann, W. 1915. *The Stakes of Diplomacy*. New York: Holt & Co.

Lippmann, W. 1965. *Public Opinion* New York: Free Press.

Little, D. 1974. Toward Clarifying the Ground of Value-Clarification: A reaction to the policy-oriented jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal Virginia *Journal of International Law* 14: 452-461

Lloyd, J. 1997. Wolves as Neighbors: Howls of praise and fear. *Christian Science Monitor*. February 13. p.10.

Long, D. 2004. *Ecoterrorism*. New York: Facts On File, Inc.

Los Angeles Times Poll, Apr, 2001. Retrieved Nov-9-2010 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Los Angeles Times (LAT). 2006. Editorial: A walk in the park; The whine of the snowmobile is not a sound visitors to Yellowstone expect – or should have to hear. *Los Angeles Times* November 24, pp.A40.

MacDonald, C.C., 2008. *Green, Inc.: An Environmental Insider Reveals How a Good Cause Has Gone Bad*, Guilford: The Lyons Press.

Mackenzie, G.C. and R. Weisbrot. 2008. *The Liberal Hour: Washington and the politics of change in the 1960s*. New York: Penguin Press.

Madison, J., 1961. No. 10: The Same Subject Continued. Pp. 45-52 in *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Mentor Press.

Maloney, W. and G. Jordan. 2007. *Democracy and Interest Groups: Enhancing participation?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marvick, D. 1980. The work of Harold D. Lasswell: His approach, concerns, and influence. *Political Behavior* 2(3): 219-229.

Mattson, D.J. and T. Merrill. 2002. Extirpations of grizzly bears in the contiguous United States, 1950-2000. *Conservation Biology* 16(4): 1123-1136.

McBeth, M. & Shanahan, E., 2004. Public Opinion for Sale: The role of policy marketers in greater Yellowstone policy conflict. *Policy Sciences*, 37(3/4): 319-338.

McDougal, M. S. and J. Schneider. 1975. The protection of the environment and world public order. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 261: 81-114.

McDougal, M. S., Lasswell, H. D., & Reisman, W. M. 1981. The world constitutive process of authoritative decision. Pp. 191-282 In M. S. McDougal & W. M. Reisman (Eds.), *International Law Essays: A supplement to international law in contemporary practice*. New York: Foundation Press.

McGee, L. 2008. Brag Session: Wyoming Outdoor Council. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

McNie, E.C. 2007. Reconciling the Supply of Scientific Information with User Demands: An Analysis of the Problem and Review of the Literature. *Environmental Science & Policy*. 10: 17-38.

Merelman, R.M. 1981. Review Article: Harold D. Lasswell's Political World: Weak tea for hard times, *British Journal of Political Science* 11(4): 571-497.

Miller, M. E. and P.H. Saunders. 2000. The Trapper's Point Site (48SU1006): Early archaic adaptations and pronghorn procurement in the Upper Green River basin. *Wyoming Plain's Anthropologist* 45: 39–52.

Milstein, M. 1995. Wolf: Return to Yellowstone. *Billings Gazette*, Billings, MT.

Mohr, L.B. 1982. *Explaining Organizational Behavior*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Molloy, D. 2009. Ruling on case CV 07-134-M-DWM. September 21. 46pp.

Morgenthau, H.J. 1952. Review of Power and Society *American Political Science Review* 46(1): 230-234.

Mossberg, W. 2008. Problems -- and Solutions: Melinda Gates on how the Gates Foundation sets its priorities in a world filled with challenges. *Wall Street Journal* June 9.

Nader, R. 1965. *Unsafe at Any Speed: The designed-in dangers of the American automobile* New York: Grossman Publishers.

Nie, M. A. 2003. *Beyond Wolves: The Politics of Wolf Recovery and Management*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Nordhaus, T and M. Shellenberger 2004. *The Death of Environmentalism: Global warming politics in a post-environmental world* Oakland: The Breakthrough Institute.

Nordhaus, T and M. Shellenberger. 2007. *Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility* New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.

Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative (NRCC) & Charture Institute (CI), 2007. *The Greater Yellowstone Conservation Directory*, Jackson Hole: Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and the Charture Institute.

Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative (NRCC) & Charture Institute (CI), 2008. Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone Region: Past, Present, and Future, Survey Data. Jackson, WY.

Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative (NRCC) & Charture Institute (CI), 2009.Greater Yellowstone Conservation Organization Survey 2009, Survey Data. Jackson, WY.

Norton, B.G. *Toward Unity Among Environmentalists*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nystrom, A.D. 2009. *Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks*. Berkeley: Wilderness Press.

Obama, B., 2008. Transcript: Obama economic press conference. Available at: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20081125/pl_ynews/ynews_pl161 [Accessed November 30, 2008].

O'Driscoll, P. 2001. Gray Wolves' Return Presents Challenge in the West. *USA Today*. January 15. 4A.

One-Percent for the Tetons. 2010. Grants. Accessed on December 15 [Available at http://onepercentforthetetons.org/grants/].

Ostertag, B. 2006. *People's Movements: The journalism of social justice movements*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Ottoway, D. & Stephens, J., 2003a. Nonprofit land bank amasses billions. *The Washington Post*, A1.

Ottoway, D. & Stephens, J., 2003b. On Eastern Shore, for-profit 'flagship' hits shoals. *The Washington Post*.

Parsons, W. 1995. *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. Lyme: Edward Elgar.

Pease, C.M. and D.J. Mattson. 1999. Demography of the Yellowstone grizzly bears. *Ecology* . 80: 957-975.

Pielke Jr., R. 1995. Useable Information for Policy: An appraisal of the U.S. Global Change Research Program. *Policy Sciences* 28: 39-77.

Pielke Jr., R. 2007. *The Honest Broker: Making sense of science in policy and politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Pielke Jr., R. 2010. *Climate Fix: What scientists and politicians won't tell you about global warming*, Basic Books, New York.

Pierce, P. 2008. Brag Session: Yellowstone to Yukon Initiative. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

Pilkey, O.H. and Pilkey-Jarvis, L. 2007. *Useless Arithmetic: Why environmental scientists can't predict the future*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Pfeffer, J. 1973. Size, Composition and Function of Hospital Boards of Directories: A study of organization-environmental linkage. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 18(3): 349-64.

Porter, J. and S. Wilson. The Southwestern Alberta and Drywood-Yarrow Conservation Partnership: Large carnivore tour in the Blackfoot watershed. *NRCC News* 23(1): 4-5.

Post, L.A., A.N.W. Raile, and E.D. Raile. 2010. Defining Political Will. *Politics & Policy*. 38(4): 653-676.

Primm, S. 2000. Real bears, symbol bears, and problem solving. *NRCC News* 13: 6-8.

Primm, S. 2010. The Good News About Grizzly Expansion. *NRCC News* 23(1): 5.

Primm, S.A. and T.W. Clark. 1996. The Greater Yellowstone policy debate: What is the policy problem? *Policy Sciences* 29: 137-166.

Provan, K.G. 1980. Board Power and Organizational Effectiveness among Human Service Agencies. *Academy of Management Journal*. 22(2): 221-36.

Quinn, R.E. and J. Rohrbaugh. 1981. A competing values approach to organizational effectiveness. *Public Productivity Review*, V(2), 122-140.

Quinn, R.E. and J Rohrbaugh. 1983. A spatial model of effectiveness criteria: towards a competing values approach to organizational analysis. *Management Science*, 29, 363-377.

Repanshek, K. 2011. Several Hundred Bison hazed into Capture Facility at Yellowstone National Park. National Parks Traveler. January 31. Accessed on February 6, 2001 [Available at http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2011/01/several-hundred-bison-hazed-capture-facility-yellowstone-national-park7558].

Rich, A., 2004, *Think tanks, public policy, and the politics of expertise*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Richardson, V. 1998. Ecoterrorists Send Warnings to Save Yellowstone Wolves: Unknown Radicals Threaten to Bomb Farm Bureau's Office. *The Washington Times* November 27.

Robbins, J. 2006. Resurgent wolves now considered pests by some. *New York Times*. March 7. p.A13.

Robbins, J. 2005. As Population of Yellowstone Grizzlies Grows, Further Protection Is Up for Debate. *New York Times* September 26.

Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation (RMEF). 2009. Elk Chart. [April 27] Accessed at: http://www.rmef.org/NR/rdonlyres/706B1DE4-E6DF-45F1-A96C-2C8E6974D264/0/ElkChart.pdf

Rosenberg, G.N. 2008. *The Hollow Hope: Can courts bring about social change?* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ross, D. 1991. *The Origins of American Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rustow, D.A. 1966. The study of elites: Who's who, when, and how. *World Politics* 18(4): 690-717.

Rutherford, M. B. 2003. *Conceptual frames, values of nature and key symbols of ecosystem management: Landscape-scale assessment in the Bridger-Teton National Forest*. Ph.D. Dissertation. New Haven, CT: Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Studies.

Sabatier, P.A. 1999. The Need for Better Theories in *Theories of the Policy Process*. P.A. Sabatier (Ed.). Boulder: Westview.

Salamon, L. M. (1994). The rise of the nonprofit sector. *Foreign Affairs, 73*(4): 109.

San Diego Union-Tribune (SDUT). 2004. Editorial: Protect Yellowstone; Snowmobiles don't belong in national parks. *San Diego Union-Tribune*, June 17, pp. B12.

San Francisco Chronicle (SFC). 2004. Editorial: No place for snowmobiles. *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 16, pp. B8.

Sarewitz, D., 2004. How science makes environmental controversies worse. *Environmental Science & Policy* 7: 385–403.

Sarewitz, D., G. Foladori, N. Invernizzi, and M. Garfinkel. 2004. Science Policy in its Social Context. *Philosophy Today* 48(5): 67–83.

Sarewitz, D. and Pielke, R.A. Jr. 2007. The Neglected Heart of Science Policy: Reconciling Supply of and Demand for Science, *Environmental Science and Policy* 10: 5-16.

Sarewitz, D., R.A. Pielke, Jr., and R. Byerly, Jr. (Eds.). 2000. *Prediction: Science, decision making, and the future of nature.* Washington, DC: Island Press.

Scheuering, R.W. 2004. *Shapers of the Great Debate on Conservation: A biographical dictionary*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Schneider, A.L. and H. Ingram. 1997. *Policy Design for Democracy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Schullery, P. 1997. *Searching for Yellowstone*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Schullery, P. 2010 Greater Yellowstone Science: Past, Present, and Future, *Yellowstone Science* 18(2): 7-13.

Schullery, P. and S. Stevenson (Eds.). 2004. *The Greater Yellowstone Idea, in People and Place: The Human Experience in Greater Yellowstone*, Yellowstone National Park Center for Resources.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA, (Eds.). 2002. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2001. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA, (Eds.). 2003. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2002. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA. (Eds.). 2004. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2003. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA, West K, editors. 2005. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2004. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA, West K, editors. 2006. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2005. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA, West K, editors. 2007. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2006. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA, West K, editors. 2008. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2007. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz CC, Haroldson MA, West K, editors. 2009. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2008. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Schwartz C.C., Haroldson M.A., West K., editors. 2010. Yellowstone grizzly bear investigations: annual report of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, 2009. Bozeman (MT): U.S. Geological Survey.

Scott, W. R. 1977. Effectiveness of Organizational Effectiveness Studies, In P. S. Goodman and J. M. Pennings (Eds.), *New Perspectives on Organizational Effectiveness*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.

Seashore, S.E. 1979. Assessing Organizational Effectiveness with Reference to Member Needs, Meetings of the Academy of Management.

Shang, J. and A. Sargeant. 2011. Donor Identity can be Key to Fundraising. *Philanthropy Journal*. January 19. Available at: http://www.philanthropyjournal.org/resources/special-reports/fundraising/donor-identity-can-be-key-fundraising [Accessed on January 22, 2011].

Shaiko, R. 1999. *Voices and Echoes for the Environment*, New York: Columbia University Press: New York.

Simon, H.A. 1991. Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning. *Organization Science* 2(1): 125–134

Simon, H.A. 1996. *Sciences of the Artificial* 3rd ed. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Snyder, G.R. 2006. On the Brink: How nonprofits have lost their way and some essentials to bring them back. Lincoln: iUniverse.

Soraghan, M. 2006. Yellowstone Snowmobilers in park get early holiday present. *Denver Post*, November 21, pp.A-01.

Sowa, J.E., S.C. Selden, and J.R. Sandfort. 2004. No Longer Unmeasurable? A multidimensional integrated model of nonprofit organizational effectiveness. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 33(4):711-728.

Speth, J.G., 2008. Environmental Failure: A Case for a New Green Politics. Available at: http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2075 [Accessed November 29, 2008].

St. Clair, J., 2003. *Been Brown so Long, It Looked Like Green to Me: The Politics of Nature*, Monroe: Common Courage Press.

Stein, T. 2003. Wyo. Rancher Struggles to Co-exist with Wolves, But Pays Heavy Price. *The Denver Post*. May 18. p.A16.

Steinberg, R. 2006. Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations. In W.W. Powell & R. Steinberg, (Eds.) *The Nonprofit Sector: A research handbook*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 117-139.

Stephens, J., 2003. Charity's land deals to be scrutinized: Senators send letter to Conservancy. *The Washington Post*.

Stephens, J. & Ottoway, D., 2003a. Nature Conservancy suspends land sales. *The Washington Post*, A3.

Stephens, J. & Ottoway, D., 2003b. Charity hiring layers to prevent probe. *The Washington Post*.

Stone, M.M., B. Bigelow, and W. Crittenden. 1999. Research on strategic management in nonprofit organizations: Synthesis, analysis, and future directions. *Administration and Society* 31(3).

Stringham, S. 1986. Effects of climate, dump closure, and other factors on Yellowstone grizzly bear litter size. *International Conference on Bear Research and Management*. 6: 33-39.

Sunstein, C.R. 2001. *Republic.com*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

de Tocqueville, A. (1901). *Democracy in America* (H. Reeve, Tran.) (Vols. 1-2, Vol. 2). New York: D. Appleton.

Taylor, D.E. 2002. Race, Class, Gender, and American Environmentalism. US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station, Portland, OR.

Taylor, D. 2009. American Environmentalism: The Role of race, class, and gender in shaping activism 1820-1995. Pp. 307-326 in King, L. and D. McCarthy (Eds.). *Environmental Sociology: From analysis to action*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Tereck, M. 2010. The Oil Spill and the Conservancy's Response. Cool Green Science, The Conservation Blog of The Nature Conservancy, May 1st. accessed at http://blog.nature.org/2010/05/mark-tercek-gulf-oil-spill-nature-conservancy/

Thompson, T. 1991. Attitudes of Wyoming Residents on Wolf Reintroduction and Related Issues. Wyoming Game and Fish Department, Cheyenne.

Thorne, E.T., M. Meagher, R. Hillman. Brucellosis in Free-Ranging Bison: Three Perspectives. Pp. 275-287 in Keiter, R. and M. Boyce (Eds.). *The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: Redefining America's Wilderness Heritage,* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Trentadue, A. 2008. Brag Session: Valley Advocates for Responsible Development. Presented at Conservation 2.0: Conservation in the Greater Yellowstone: Past, Present, & Future. May 8. [Video available at http://www.gycoi.org/annualConference.htm].

Turner, J. 2008. *Travels in Greater Yellowstone*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Udall, S. 1963. *The Quiet Crisis*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Udall, M. 1974. The Environment at Valley Forge. National Wildlife Federation "Legislator of the Year" award acceptance speech. April 4.

University of Wyoming (UW). 2001. Greater Yellowstone Bibliography. Accessed July 21, 2010 at http://www-lib.uwyo.edu/db/ynp/default.cfm.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. Population of Counties Decennial Census 1900 to 2000. Washington D.C.: The U.S. Census Bureau.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2002. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2001 Interagency Annual Report, T. Meier, ed., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2003. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2002 Interagency Annual Report, T. Meier, ed., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2004. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2003 Interagency Annual Report, T. Meier (Ed.), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Idaho Fish and Game, and USDA Wildlife Services 2005. Rocky Mountain wolf recovery 2004 interagency annual report. D. Boyd, ed. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Blackfeet Nation, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Idaho Fish and Game, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2006. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2005 Interagency Annual Report, C.A. Sime and E. E. Bangs, (Eds.), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Blackfeet Nation, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Idaho Fish and Game, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2007. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2006 Interagency Annual Report, C.A. Sime and E. E. Bangs, (Eds.), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Blackfeet Nation, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Idaho Fish and Game, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2008. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2007 Interagency Annual Report, C.A. Sime and E. E. Bangs, (Eds.), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Blackfeet Nation, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Idaho Fish and Game, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2009. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2008 Interagency Annual Report, C.A. Sime and E. E. Bangs, (Eds.), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Blackfeet Nation, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Idaho Fish and Game, and USDA Wildlife Services. 2010. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2009 Interagency Annual Report, C.A. Sime and E. E. Bangs, (Eds.), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Ecological Services. Helena, Montana, USA.

U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee Minority Staff (USSEPWC), 2008. *Political Activity of Environmental Groups and their Supporting Foundations Update 2008*, Washington DC: US Senate.

Vogel, J.M. 2004. Tunnel Vision: The regulation of endocrine disruptors. *Policy Sciences* 37(3-4): 277-303.

Vogel, J.M. 2005. Perils of Paradigm: Complexity, policy design, and the endocrine disruptor screening program. *Environmental Health* 4:2.

Vogel, J.M. 2006. *Persistent Policy Problems*. Ph.D. dissertation, Environmental Studies Program, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder.

Wagner, A. 2010. White House Calls Partisan Campaign Groups a 'Threat to Our Democracy.' October 7. Accessed on March 8, 2011 [Available at http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/10/07/white-house-calls-partisan-campaign-groups-a-threat-to-our-demo/].

Wagner, F.H. 2006. *Yellowstone's Destabilized Ecosystem: Elk effects, science and policy conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wallace, R.L. 2003. Social influences on endangered species recovery: Lessons from U.S. marine mammal programs. *Conservation Biology* 17(1):104-115.

Wallace, R.L. and K.A. Semmens. 2010. Social and institutional challenges in species and ecosystem conservation: an appraisal of the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission. *Policy Sciences* 43:203-228.

Washington State University (WSU). 2010. Yellowstone Park Science Bibliographic Database. Accessed July 21, 2010 at http://refbase.wsulibs.wsu.edu/yellowstone/index.php.

Welsch, J. 2010. Grizzly Bears: Despite new protections, threats remain. *Greater Yellowstone Advocate*. 27(2): 10-11.

Welsh, J. 2011. Guest Opinion: Bison deserve homes on Montana range. *Billings Gazette.* February 5. Accessed February 6, 2011 [Available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/guest/article_c02eedac-b2e2-5c4f-be4c-5c22e9b1b4d9.html].

Werbach, A., 2004. *Is Environmentalism Dead?* San Francisco: The Commonwealth Club.

Werker, E., & Ahmed, F. Z. (2008). What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2): 73-92.

White, P.J., T. Davis, K. Barnowe-Meyer, R. Crabtree. 2007. Partial Migration and Philopatry of Yellowstone Pronghorn *Biological Conservation* 135: 518-526.

Whittlesey, L.H. and E.A. Watry. 2008. *Yellowstone National Park*. Charleston: Arcadia Publishing.

Wildvasky, A. 1979. *Speaking Truth to Power: The art and craft of policy analysis*. Boston: Little Brown.

Wilkinson, T., 1997. Last Stand for Bison Herd At Yellowstone National Park? *Christian Science Monitor,* February 21. 89:3.

Wilkinson, T. 1998. *Science Under Siege: The politicians' war on nature and truth*. Boulder: Johnson Books.

Willcox, L. 2009. Yellowstone Grizzlies' Need Federal Protection. Switchboard: Natural Resources Defense Council Staff Blog. Accessed June 8, 2010 at http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/lwillcox/yellowstone_grizzlies_need_fed.html.

Williams, P., 2008. NRA's political agenda goes well beyond gun rights. *Grate Falls Tribune.* Available at: http://www.greatfallstribune.com/article/20081113/OPINION/811130307 [Accessed November 29, 2008].

Wilmot, J. and T.W. Clark. 2005. Wolf Restoration: A battle in the war over the west. Pp. 138-174 in Clark, T. W., M. B. Rutherford, and D. Casey, (Eds.). *Coexisting with Large Carnivores: Lessons from Greater Yellowstone*. Washington D.C.: Island Press.

Wing, K. T., Pollak, T. R., & Blackwood, A. 2008. *The nonprofit almanac.* Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.

Wondolleck, Julia M. and Steven L. Yaffee. 2000. *Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in Natural Resource Management*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Woolf, J. 2000. No More Snowmobiles in Park? *The Salt Lake Tribune*. March 16, pp. B1.

Woody, T. 2009. Battle Brewing over Giant Desert Solar Farm. *New York Times*. August 5.

Yamin, F. (2001). NGOs and International Environmental Law: A critical evaluation of their roles and responsibilities. *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, *10*(2), 149-162.

Yochim, M.J. 2003. Snow machines in the gardens: The history of snowmobiles in Glacier and Yellowstone National Parks. *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* Autumn.

Yochim, M.J. 2009. *Yellowstone and the Snowmobile: Locking horns over national park use.* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Youth, H. 1989. Boom Time for Environmental Groups, *WorldWatch* November/December: 33.

Yuchtman, E and S.E. Seashore. 1967. A System Resource Approach to Organizational Effectiveness. *American Sociological Review*. 32(6): 891-903.

Zammuto, R. 1984. *Assessing Organizational Effectiveness: System change, adaptation, and strategy*. University of New York Press: Albany, NY

Appendix A: Goal statements

The following are goals contained within the mission and vision statements of Greater Yellowstone's conservation nonprofit community. The statements are modified (1) to remove any reference to specific organizations, (2) divided when the missions/vision statements contained multiple goals, (3) and slightly edited for readability when the previous changes created awkward phrasing.

1. Advocate for responsible development & sustainable use of the natural resources (water, air, wildlife, & land) in Teton Valley, Idaho.
2. Advocate for responsible, sustainable management of the wildlife, waters, and air quality of Wyoming's Upper Green, a vital portion of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.
3. Advocate for the protection of Montana's wildlife and its habitats.
4. Antelope preservation and management through the development of supplemental water resources in selected areas where both the habitat and wildlife are being impaired by lack of this vital resource.
5. Assist landowning families of the area in the conservation of agricultural, ranch, and natural lands in order to sustain and protect open spaces, watersheds, wildlife habitat and other ecological values for today's inhabitants and as a legacy for future generations.
6. Assuring the vitality and welfare of wild Trumpeter Swan populations.
7. Be a strong, unified voice for an ethic of conservation in Wyoming, focusing on birds, other wildlife, and their habitats, for the benefit of present and future generations.
8. Be the leading source and teacher of wilderness skills and leadership that serve people and the environment.
9. Be the repository for certain interests in real property owned by Teton County, WY, for the purpose of implementing the Scenic Preservation element of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan, and otherwise assisting in the preservation of the County's scenic resources and wildlife habitat.
10. Bring market principles to resolving environmental problems.
11. Bring people together to develop and implement innovative strategies for conserving wild places and wildlife.
12. Bring people together who love this region to enhance and protect our unique environment.
13. Build broad citizen support for conservation.
14. Build leadership and involvement in government, in order to preserve and enhance Montana's air and water, open spaces, forests, and wildlife for future generations.
15. Build on an interest in birds to promote the conservation of our natural environment through enjoyment, education, and action.
16. Build the capacity of Montana's conservation and environmental community to advance conservation issues within the state's democratic process.
17. Challenge practices of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) which produces radioactive and hazardous air emissions.
18. Change individual attitudes toward nature and help people imagine wildlife and humans living in sustainable interaction on both a local and a global scale.
19. Connecting people and nature through education.
20. Conserve bears and their habitat around the world.

21. Conservation - Restoring - Educating through Fly Fishing
22. Conservation of nature.
23. Conserve open space, agricultural land, wildlife habitat and the creation of public trails in and around Gallatin County.
24. Conserve agricultural and natural lands and to encourage land stewardship in the Upper Snake River Watershed for the benefit of today's communities and as a legacy for future generations.
25. Conserve biodiversity by ensuring the persistence of imperiled species and their habitats.
26. Conserve land for people to enjoy as parks, gardens, and other natural places, ensuring livable communities for generations to come.
27. Conserve the wild turkey.
28. Conserve, maintain, protect and restore the soil, forest, water and other natural resources of the United States and other lands; to promote means and opportunities for the education of the public with respect to such resources and their enjoyment and wholesome utilization.
29. Conserve, restore and protect the unique fishery, wildlife and aesthetic qualities of the Henry's Fork watershed.
30. Conserve, restore, and manage wetlands and associated habitats for North America's waterfowl.
31. Conserve species and ecosystems by providing reliable scientific and policy information.
32. Conserve species and ecosystems bringing people together to formulate and implement sound, effective conservation policies, and building support from an informed public through education and engagement.
33. Contribute new knowledge toward improving the management and preservation of our natural environment by pursuing innovative, long-term research on key ecosystem components.
34. Coordinate and fosters cooperation among Montana's environmental groups by arming them with the tools to inform, expand and mobilize their members as a more potent force in Montana's political landscape.
35. Coordinate science-based effort to elevate the wolverine's management status through support and initiation of research, and to develop an information network for professional and public education.
36. Create an enduring natural legacy for future generations through stewardship of all Wyoming's wildlife.
37. Dedicated to responsible land stewardship in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to ensure that human activities are in harmony with the area's irreplaceable wildlife, scenic and other natural resources.
38. Defending and protecting the rich biodiversity and the public lands, streams, wildlife and clean air of the American West.
39. Displace the use of petroleum in the Greater Yellowstone region's transportation sector by advocating the use of conservation in travel, alternative fuels, encouraging new technologies such as hybrid vehicles and reducing truck and bus idling practices.
40. Educate our citizens as to the value of wildlife and its conservation.
41. Educate the public about current conservation issues that affect Idaho's native flora and habitats.

42. Educate the public about the biology and habitat needs of the Rocky Mountain Bighorn Sheep and to encouraging the active stewardship of wildlife and wildlands.
43. Educating Idahoans about the consequences of current development patterns and the alternatives to those patterns and engaging them in activities that encourage thoughtfully planned development and exemplary development policies.
44. Encourage citizens to appreciate and empower citizens to defend native biodiversity in the Northern Rockies.
45. Encourage the appreciation and conservation of the native flora and plant communities of Wyoming through education, research, and communication.
46. Enforce and strengthen environmental laws on behalf of hundreds of organizations and communities.
47. Enhance the economic viability of family ranches; preserving traditional rural community and family ranch values; ensuring productive agriculture through the protection of private property rights and open space, as well as maintaining healthy grasslands, wildlife habitat, and watersheds; working cooperatively with groups, agencies, and individuals who share our goals and commitment to the land.
48. Ensure and perpetuate wild, free-roaming herds of buffalo (bison) in and adjacent to Yellowstone National Park.
49. Ensure that both today's and tomorrow's generations will continue to enjoy clean water, natural beauty and have access to the Montana backcountry experiences.
50. Ensure that future generations enjoy the clean air and water, beauty, wildlife, and opportunity for renewal that pristine forests, rivers, deserts, and mountains provide.
51. Ensure the conservation of mule deer, blacktail deer, and their habitats.
52. Ensure the future of elk, other wildlife, and their habitat.
53. Ensures the legacy of our National Land Heritage by mentoring future generations of stewardship leaders in sustainable land management.
54. Ensuring that grizzly populations are healthy and large enough to be viable in the long-term, and that strong habitat protections are in place prior to removing the grizzly from the Endangered Species Act list.
55. Establish common long and short-term management policies, goals, and objectives necessary for cooperatively managing and funding noxious weed activities across all jurisdictional boundaries in the Jackson Hole weed management area.
56. Facilitate the free flow of information and enhance the capacity of citizens to make informed decisions about important public issues, in order to foster effective public participation in global civil society.
57. Forge partnerships to protect America's legacy of land and water resources.
58. Foster the public's understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of Yellowstone National Park and its surrounding ecosystem by funding and providing educational products and services.
59. Foster the science and art of natural resource conservation.
60. Foster the science and art of soil, water, and related natural resource management through advocacy, professional development, and educational activities to achieve sustainability.
61. Have local citizens, businesses, anglers, boaters, and conservationists all working together to permanently protect the best remaining free-flowing rivers and streams of the Snake Headwaters using the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.
62. Heighten environmental awareness.

63. Help conserve the natural habitats and open spaces that will ensure that the spirit of the West continues to thrive.
64. Help people and wildlife coexist.
65. Helping birds of prey through veterinary care, education, conservation and human/wildlife conflict resolution.
66. Honor the legacy of traditional field rangers and wardens whose independence, initiative and spirit of adventure made us heir to the natural places and wildlife we enjoy today.
67. Identify sources of human/wildlife conflict and creating effective, practical and affordable solutions and preventions.
68. Improve the economic and social conditions through the conservation, utilization and development of the natural and human resources of the area.
69. Improve the wetlands throughout the state, to provide habitat for waterfowl and other species.
70. Increase the effectiveness of wildlife and habitat management in the Rocky Mountains through conducting vital wildlife research that is not being accomplished in a comprehensive manner by government agencies or private entities.
71. Increase the effectiveness of wildlife and habitat management in the Rocky Mountains through increasing the public's awareness of and participation in natural resource issues through education and outreach programs that provide individuals with a greater connection to the natural world.
72. Inform and inspire people to act on behalf of the West's land, air, water and inhabitants.
73. Inspires Americans to protect wildlife for our children's future.
74. Keep the ranching way of life in the Madison Valley Area.
75. Keeping the world-renowned U.S. Northern Rockies ecologically intact by restoring and maintaining connections between key habitats for healthy populations of native wildlife.
76. Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat.
77. Offer academically rigorous, field-based courses that: broaden the nature of a liberal arts education; teach critical thinking about social and environmental issues; foster understanding of and respect for natural and human communities; and cultivate a sense of place that encourages personal, social and environmental responsibility.
78. Organizing Montanans to protect our water quality, family farms and ranches, and unique quality of life.
79. Our mission is to champion environmental protection through the unique perspective of flight.
80. Our mission is to protect the cougar throughout the Americas.
81. Our mission is to protect the environmental quality of the Northwest. Build broad citizen support for conservation.
82. Our mission is to support safe and healthy communities, sustainable economies, conservation of farm, forest and ranch lands, and protection of natural resources and wildlife habitat.
83. Our mission is to systematically, rigorously, and comprehensively survey, assess, understand, and tell the story of the Yellowstone Country and its many life forms throughout the year.
84. People protecting lands, waters, and wildlife of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, now and for future generations.
85. People working to conserve and protect the integrity of our environment and community.

86. Perpetuate of wildlife, wildlife habitat, and wildlife related recreational opportunities for sportsmen and sportswomen.
87. Pioneer solutions to help people and predators co-exist.
88. Preserve biological diversity
89. Preserve open space and the scenic, ranching, and wildlife values of Jackson Hole by assisting landowners who wish to protect their land in perpetuity.
90. Preserve the plants, animals, and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive.
91. Preserve, conserve, and enhance both Pronghorn Antelope and their ecosystems.
92. Preserve, protect, enhance, and restore Montana's rivers, water bodies, and their watersheds for their natural, recreational, and cultural values.
93. Preserves Idaho's clean water, wilderness and quality of life through citizen action, education, and professional advocacy.
94. Promote a healthy Wind River watershed, and by that, assist in restoring justice and health to our communities.
95. Promote a trails and pathways connected community.
96. Promote an awareness, understanding and appreciation of the natural world through quality educational experiences.
97. Promote and facilitate non-motorized transportation and recreation options in Jackson Hole through program development, fundraising, advocacy, and fostering public-private partnerships.
98. Promote and support sound management of fish and wildlife including public hunting and fishing on an optimum, sustained yield basis.
99. Promote community decisions that respect the land and the people of the West.
100. Promote environmental justice. We accomplish these goals by strengthening grassroots conservation networks; providing strategic communications, advocacy and other assistance to local conservation groups; and by helping to improve communications among those groups and other segments of society.
101. Promote interest in native plants and plant communities, and collecting and sharing information on all phases of the botany of native plants in Idaho.
102. Promote restoration, maintenance and perpetuation of native fish, wildlife and their habitat.
103. Promote scientific understanding, informed dialogue, and collaborative approaches to resolving our region's most complex socioeconomic and natural resource challenges.
104. Promote sustainable choices that protect the quality of the region's landscape and the way of life for present generations and those to come.
105. Promote the development, conservation, and utilization of the water resources of Wyoming for the benefit of Wyoming people.
106. Promote the educational and interpretive programs in Grand Teton National Park and the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.
107. Promote the guardianship and provident management of big game and associated wildlife in North America and maintain the highest standards of fair chase and sportsmanship in all aspects of big game hunting, in order that this resource of all the people may survive and prosper in its natural habitats.
108. Promote the moose conservation by educating the public, conserving habitat, and promote hunting and viewing moose.

109. Promote the protection and enhancement of wildlife habitat, the quality of wildlife management programs, and protect America's family heritage of hunting and fishing.
110. Promote ways for our community to live compatibility with wildlife.
111. Promoting and preserving winter wildlands and a quality human-powered snowsports experience on public lands.
112. Protect America's wilderness and to develop a nationwide network of wild lands through public education, scientific analysis, and advocacy.
113. Protect and enhance habitat, to perpetuate quality hunting and fishing, to protect citizen's right to use public lands and waters, and to promote ethical hunting and fishing.
114. Protect and enhance Wyoming's environment and quality of life for future generations.
115. Protect and restore all public lands and waters from the damage caused by dirt bikes, jet skis and all other off-road vehicles.
116. Protect and restore forests, wildlands, watersheds and wildlife in the Northern Rockies Bioregion by participating in public land management decision processes. Encourage citizens to appreciate and empower citizens to defend native biodiversity in the Northern Rockies.
117. Protect and restore Montana's natural environment.
118. Protect and restore North America's grizzly bear populations by conserving wildlife habitat.
119. Protect and restore western watersheds and wildlife through education, public policy initiatives and litigation.
120. Protect and revive wild places by promoting road removal, preventing new road construction, and stopping off-road vehicle abuse.
121. Protect forest, grassland and aquatic ecosystems.
122. Protect our public wild lands because present generations are responsible for ensuring a future of wild places for people and wildlife.
123. Protect, restore and improve the rivers of Idaho and the communities that depend on them.
124. Protecting Montana's wilderness heritage, quiet beauty, and outdoor traditions, now and for future generations.
125. Protecting the environmental rights of all people, including future generations. Among these rights are clean air, clean water, healthy food, and flourishing ecosystems.
126. Protecting the magnificent places, natural resources, and wildlife of this earth and to defending the right of all people to a healthy environment.
127. Protecting wildlife and wild places in Wyoming and surrounding states, primarily on public land.
128. Protection and enhancement of wildlife, wildland ecosystems, and our natural wonders.
129. Protection of all native wild animals and plants in their natural communities.
130. Provide a means whereby all people coordinate their efforts to accomplish these purposes.
131. Provide a safe, permanent home to native wildlife that cannot survive in the wild, rehabilitate and return those that can, and to offer people a vivid first-hand experience with wildlife as an effective way to teach about conservation biology and the urgent need to preserve habitat through teaching, writing, and film.

132. Provide agricultural landowners with land conservation options to enhance their business planning to remain productive and independent today, and better prepared to pass on their tradition to future generations.
133. Provide educational excellence in summer camp programming that fosters responsibility, honesty, integrity, cooperation, conservation values and creative problem-solving among the entire camp community, in an enriching, safe, western environment.
134. Provide leadership for the conservation of Wyoming's soil and water resources, promote the control of soil erosion, promote and protects the quality of Wyoming's waters, reduce siltation of stream channels and reservoirs, promote wise use of Wyoming's water, and all other natural resources, preserve and enhance wildlife habitat, protect the tax base and promote the health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of this state through a responsible conservation ethic.
135. Provide opportunities for discovering and exploring personal vision and purpose in our lives through retreats and workshops, community service programs, indigenous and contemporary ceremonies, and time honored tools for soulful living.
136. Provide permanent protection for private lands that are ecologically significant for agricultural production, fish and wildlife habitat, and open space.
137. Provide reliable information through innovative research and state-of-the-art conservation planning to foster ecologically sound management of wildlife and their habitats.
138. Provides financial support for programs and projects which enhance, preserve and protect Grand Teton National Park's treasured cultural, historic, and environmental resources.
139. Provides objective research, education, and technical advice to grassroots groups, non-governmental organizations, regulatory agencies, businesses, and indigenous communities on natural resource issues, especially those relating to mining.
140. Providing affordable mapping and geographic information technologies to environmental and community organizations in the Pacific Northwest and Northern Rockies.
141. Providing citizens around the world share a right to timely, accurate, and unbiased information about the environmental, social, and economic issues that affect their lives.
142. Providing educational programs and materials about natural history and ecology.
143. Reinforce ecosystem viability through habitat conservation and education projects that build on available research.
144. Represent activists, Indian tribes, local governments, and citizen groups who seek to protect and restore the forests, rivers, grasslands, wildlife, and human communities of the West through litigation.
145. Restore and protect the natural heritage of North America by designing and helping create systems of interconnected wildlands that can sustain the diversity of life.
146. Restore bison to Indian Nations in a manner which is compatible with their spiritual and cultural beliefs and practices.
147. Restore landscape and watershed integrity.
148. Restore rivers, eliminate water degradation, improve public land management and protect public access for responsible recreational use.
149. Restore whitebark pine ecosystems.
150. Restoring and protecting the natural environment of the Interior American West.
151. Roster responsible environmental stewardship by increasing understanding and appreciation for the relationships binding humans and nature in the Greater Yellowstone region.

152. Saves wildlife and wild lands through careful science, international conservation, education, and the management of the world's largest system of urban wildlife parks.
153. Secure the ecological integrity of the Wild Rockies Bioregion through citizen empowerment, and the application of conservation biology, sustainable economic models and environmental law.
154. Serving as the political voice of Montana's conservation and environmental community.
155. Stimulate and encourage scientific research and investigation in the fields of geology, zoology, botany, history, and related subjects in the Grand Teton National Park, Ecosystem, and the western portion of the United States.
156. Strengthen leaders, organizations, and coalitions or networks that protect and conserve the Earth.
157. Support our hunting heritage and to protect and promote laws that increase hunting opportunity and safety.
158. Support, nurture, and connect collaborative natural resource groups.
159. The creation of forums for the respectful exchange of ideas and perspectives in the pursuit of solutions to the region's difficulties.
160. Through advocacy and education, work to preserve and restore the world-class rivers, diverse wildlife, landscapes, and outstanding beauty of Park County, Montana.
161. Through land acquisition, sustainable programs, and leadership training, the Fund and its partners demonstrate effective conservation solutions emphasizing the integration of economic and environmental goals.
162. To conserve, protect and restore North America's trout and salmon fisheries and their watersheds.
163. To empower women, who historically have had little power in affecting environmental policy, to create an ecologically sustainable and socially just society.
164. To encourage and empower citizens in opposition to the spread of industrialization in the Bridger-Teton National Forest,(BTNF); to stop drilling in the BTNF; to stimulate local citizen action; to engage federal agencies and political leadership; and to stop the rapid spread of energy exploitation that threatens ecologically important areas.
165. To encourage the production of natural history programming around the world by providing nonfiction filmmakers and broadcasters with an international forum to conduct business, test new equipment, refine program production techniques, and continue to seek new and more effective ways to promote awareness and sensitivity to the conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitat around the world.
166. To enhance wild sheep populations, promote professional wildlife management, educate the public about wild sheep and the conservation benefits of hunting, encourage fair chase hunting, and protect sportsmen's rights - while keeping administrative costs to a minimum.
167. To ensure the conservation and blacktail deer and their habitats.
168. To equip young people with the skills and values to be vigorous citizens who improve their communities and environment.
169. To explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; To practice and promote the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems and resources; To educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.

170. To further educational and community-based efforts which demonstrate the interdependence of human culture and ecology.
171. To generate, manage, and grant funding for projects which environmentally benefit the future of trout and fly fishing by annually sponsoring a three-day event uniting enthusiastic fly fishers from around the world with premier regional guides who all endeavor to celebrate the joy and spirit of the sport during the fishing, social, and fundraising activities of the event, and who throughout the year, promote that same joy and spirit of fly-fishing and the future of trout.
172. To preserve, conserve, and study Montana's native plants and plant communities.
173. To promote access and stewardship in the Upper Snake River Watershed through education, partnerships, and outreach.
174. To protect and enhance America's National Park System for present and future generations.
175. To provide education, legislative advocacy, and grassroots support for wildlife and wildlife management based on sound scientific and sociological principles. We are committed to ensuring individual as well as institutional accountability for wildlife conservation. By building partnerships, networks, and coalitions with others, we can preserve protect and enhance wildlife populations and wildlife habitat for future generations.
176. To provide extraordinary outdoor adventure experiences that inspire financially disadvantaged children and young adults to dream, to see beyond their current circumstances, and ultimately succeed in building a healthy, happy, and productive life.
177. To safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants and animals, and the natural systems upon which all life depends.
178. To stop the slaughter of Yellowstone's wild buffalo herd, protect the natural habitat of wild free-roaming buffalo and native wildlife, and to work with people of all Nations to honor the sacredness of the wild buffalo.
179. To strengthen, support, and coordinate weed management efforts in Montana in accordance with the Montana State Weed Plan.
180. To understand and explain issues of growth, change, and sustainability in resort and national park gateway communities.
181. To work proactively to give humans an understanding and a respect for grizzlies as an indicator of the health of other species, as well as the ecosystem in which we all live.
182. Transplant disease-free wild migratory buffalo into public lands on the Big Open in Phillips and Valley Counties in conjunction with the Canadian National Grasslands in southern Saskatchewan through the Bitter Creek Corridor.
183. Understanding the nature of ecosystems through collaborative science and education in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.
184. Unite businesses dedicated to preserving a healthy environment and shaping a prosperous and sustainable future for communities in the Yellowstone-Teton region.
185. Using the best available scientific knowledge and advancing that knowledge where we can, we work to preserve the diversity and abundance of life on Earth and the health of ecological systems by: * protecting natural areas and wild populations of plants and animals, including endangered species; * promoting sustainable approaches to the use of renewable natural resources; and * promoting more efficient use of resources and energy and the maximum reduction of pollution. We are committed to reversing the degradation

of our planet's natural environment and to building a future in which human needs are met in harmony with nature.

186. We seek to preserve our unique natural heritage the public will articulated by the Wilderness Act and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.
187. We...strengthening grassroots conservation networks; providing strategic communications, advocacy and other assistance to local conservation groups; and by helping to improve communications among those groups and other segments of society.
188. Work cooperatively with farmers, ranchers, and other landowners to develop incentive-based agreements that benefit landowners, streamflows and communities.
189. Work together so that Montana ecosystems will continue to nourish birds, other wildlife, and the human spirit for future generations.
190. Work with communities throughout the Rocky Mountain West and across the country to reduce the social, economic, and environmental problems caused by oil and gas development.
191. Work with detection dogs to benefit science and conservation.
192. Working to ensure sustainable human communities, using law, science and education in partnership with other non-profit groups in order to promote the public interest.
193. Working to protect and restore wild grizzly populations and their habitat in the lower 48 United States and Canada.
194. Works for clean water, healthy streams, and abundant fisheries in Teton Valley.